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ABSTRACT 
 
Although economic growth has brought significant improvements in the standard of living in 
the UK over recent decades, there are still individuals living in poverty.  Furthermore poverty 
in the UK is expected to rise.  Although monetary poverty has wide ranging impacts such as 
poor health, low educational attainment and employability and reduced life expectancy, it 
does not (in the form of a poverty line at 60% of the median equivalised household income) 
appear to have an impact on wellbeing when the threshold was tested.  Instead, 
multidimensional poverty – that purported by the Capabilities Approach – is a more 
individually relevant measure of poverty.  Using a list, developed by Nussbaum, of core 
capabilities seen as essential for human life, capability measures were taken from the British 
Household Panel Survey.  In analysis, some are found to be significant determinants of 
wellbeing, individually and in sum.  Furthermore, individuals within the dataset experience 
loss aversion to capabilities.  This thesis concludes that poverty measurement should be 
meaningful at the individual level, and to that aim, the Capabilities Approach provides a 
richer and more relevant evaluation of what poverty really means.     
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
“What reason have you to be merry? You’re poor enough!”  (Ebenezer to his nephew, 
‘A Christmas Carol’, Charles Dickens, Stave 1)  
"The great end of all human industry is the attainment of happiness. For this were arts 
invented, sciences cultivated, laws ordained, and societies modelled, by the most 
profound wisdom of patriots and legislators." (The Stoic, in Hume 1742, paragraph 5) 
“What have wealth or grandeur to do with happiness?”  (Marianne to Elinor, ‘Sense 
and Sensibility’, Jane Austen, Chapter 17) 
Layard (2011) argues there is need of a “revolution” in social science where every academic 
should be attempting to understand what makes people happy, and furthermore that 
happiness should be the explicit aim of government intervention.  His statement agrees with 
that of Hume made almost 270 years before:   
“The great end of all human industry is the attainment of happiness” (Hume 1742, 
paragraph 5).   
In addition, Kahneman and Sugden (2005) believe happiness should have a prominent role 
in politics – it should be a policy goal.  Indeed Bentham claimed that society was only as 
good as its citizens were happy (1907).  Layard (2011) believes that human beings have an 
innate desire to be happy and this makes a happy society therefore a good society.  But we 
need to make a good society our goal; if we are to promote the greatest happiness, we need 
to know what affects it. 
One of the greatest ‘controversies’ regarding wellbeing in economics is that presented by 
Easterlin (1974), who found that despite decades of economic growth, US citizens were no 
happier.  More recently Easterlin et al (2012) observed that despite a four-fold increase in 
real GDP in China (from a low baseline), life satisfaction had not improved.  Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2004) observed roughly similar phenomena in the UK and the US. In a world 
where the fruits of economic growth – at least in the developed world – do not automatically 
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lead to greater happiness at the individual level, we have to wonder if there is something 
missing.   
Furthermore despite centuries of attention, persistent low income – poverty – remains a 
social ill.  Although it does not necessarily follow that increasing income results in increasing 
wellbeing, it is evident that in both developed and undeveloped countries, extreme poverty 
has a significant negative effect on wellbeing (Blanchflower, Oswald 2004). 
This thesis began as an exploration of the nature and causes of poverty in the UK, and how 
it affected wellbeing.  However despite extensive research, I could not find any theoretical 
justification for the current EU and UK measure – household income less than 60% of the 
median equivalised income at a national level – other than it has its origins in a data 
collection looking at the characteristics of households below average income, where 
households below 50%, 60% and 70% of national average income.      
This led to several important questions that inspired the papers that follow:  what does the 
poverty line mean for individuals?  If we cannot assume that having lower income (at least, 
when we are talking about those in the 59th percentile compared to those in the 61st) means 
individuals have lower wellbeing, why do we have that measure at all?  Is there a better 
measure of what it means to be poor? 
On Poverty 
A poverty line – a cut-off point separating the poor from the non-poor – is often used as a 
way of identifying the size and characteristics of the poor population.  In the UK and many 
other OECD countries, poverty is frequently measured as the percentage of households 
living below 60% of the median income. Brewer et al expect that absolute poverty will 
increase by approximately 600,000 children and 800,000 working-age adults by 2020, with 
median income expected to fall by around 7% in real terms over the same time period 
(Brewer, Browne et al. 2011). 
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In terms of poverty policy, the UK  – despite having policies and metrics and task forces – is 
seen to exemplify the discrepancy between debate and action:  academic research aims to 
achieve empirical discovery, but politicians have long denied the validity of any empirical 
poverty approach (Veit-Wilson 2000), leaving the state of poverty policy in the UK worryingly 
inconsistent with the most recent research and – more importantly – the population.   
Modern poverty targets appear to have been developed by the European Community in the 
Copenhagen Agreement at the World Summit for Social Development in 1995 (United 
Nations 1995). Signatories to this agreement, including most EU countries, pledged to 
prepare national anti-poverty plans and establish targets for poverty reduction.  Some 
countries, such as Ireland, adopted whole-population targets whereas others targeted sub-
groups (for example child poverty in the case of the UK) (Veit-Wilson 2000): in 1999 the Blair 
administration pledged to eradicate child poverty by 2020, and this target was made legally 
binding in 2010 in the Child Poverty Act.  There is no chance that this 2020 target will be met 
(Belfield, Cribb et al. 2014) and no clear way forward for poverty alleviation:  the fixed-
percentage measures are highly sensitive to fiscal redistribution, so there may be a case for 
other measures of poverty to be employed.   
Within developed countries, low income remains associated with lower wellbeing, as does 
poverty: but the association is not as direct as one might think.  Money – at least in the main 
part – has no intrinsic value unless it can be exchanged for goods and services.  Goods and 
services have no price unless they are demanded.  There is no demand for something that 
is not needed or desired.   
From the above, we can see that low income – and/ or poverty – would obviously affect 
wellbeing where wellbeing depends on things that can be bought.  Problems may arise when 
the things that are needed or desired cannot be bought because of restrictions other than 
money:  the ability to achieve ends – functionings – depends on capabilities and poverty 
within this context is seen as capability deprivation (Sen 1979).  The capabilities approach 
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has as its ends ‘a good life’.  Alkire argues that multidimensional poverty approaches, like 
the capabilities approach, focus on an aspect of life neglected by financial poverty treatment:   
“To increase income we need to invest in education so that people can have more 
productive working lives and we need to invest in health so that they’re not absent 
from their jobs so much. So there are multiple investments that we have to make to 
increase income – and many of these are valuable for their own sake. If we measure 
these things directly we can see in the very short term who does and does not have 
these functionings and it helps us to target poverty reduction activities…more actively.”   
(Alkire 2010, audio recording of 2010 Thulin Lecture accessed via University of Illinois) 
The Capabilities Approach 
As mentioned above, the Capabilities Approach focuses on what individuals are able to be 
and do in their lives (Sen 1985).  It can be seen as approach to comparative quality of life 
assessment and to theorising about basic social justice, where each person’s overall life is 
an end, not just as part of a total or average wellbeing of a nation. 
It has the benefits of not being restricted to material outcomes (everything that has intrinsic 
importance to an individual is valued within the approach), not being victim to adaptation 
criticisms (that Sen believes afflict the analysis of wellbeing alone), is based on the individual 
and can be applied to any circumstance where individuals live and can take part in the 
empowerment process (Alkire 2008).     
The approach is centred on choice or freedom, holding that the crucial good that societies 
should be promoting for their people is a set of opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which 
people then may or may not exercise in action:  the choice is in the hands of the individual 
(Nussbaum 2011).  The two core components of the capabilities approach are capabilities 
and functionings, the former being what people are able to be and do and the latter what 
they actually achieve, where functionings vary from the basic, such as having sufficient 
nutrition, to the more complex activities such as feeling self-esteem within your community.    
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Freedom of opportunity should be the goal of a good society, according to the capabilities 
approach (Nussbaum 2011), but Sen has not specified what those opportunities should 
comprise.  Instead he sees capabilities as a comparison space, where what constitutes a 
good life should be arrived at through consensus in democratic discussion.  Nussbaum 
however, does believe there are some central capabilities, including health, bodily integrity, 
ability to play, feel emotion and so on (Nussbaum 2011), without which a life has no human 
dignity – that is, without them we are not living a human life.  Layard (2011) also notes seven 
determinants of wellbeing that can be seen as similar to the capabilities implied by Sen and 
developed by Nussbaum. 
Anand, Hunter and Smith (2005) and Veenhoven (2010) set a precedent by extracting 
capability information from the British Household Panel Survey’s wide range of questions.  
Although this doesn’t represent the democratic consensus building approach that Sen 
envisaged – the practicability of which may be limited at the national level – it should 
constitute an improvement in poverty measurement when compared to an arbitrary standard 
such as a poverty line. 
Procedure 
In the sections above I presented a brief overview of monetary poverty in the UK and the 
Capabilities Approach to poverty, created for less developed countries.  That overview will 
be expanded in the core chapter.  In this thesis I aim to make the case that monetary 
poverty – determined at an arbitrary level – is not relevant to wellbeing; that capabilities are 
determinants of wellbeing; and finally that multidimensional poverty – capability deprivation – 
is relevant to wellbeing.  This aim is undertaken through three papers using a range of 
analytical techniques to test the hypotheses above.   
It should be noted that this thesis is – rather than a traditional five chapters – a collection of 
three papers, each of which can largely stand alone.  Each paper has its own introduction, 
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literature review, conclusions and appendices.  For that reason this chapter – an overall 
introduction – and Chapter 5 (conclusions) are relatively short.   
In the first paper, Chapter 2, I construct an 18 ‘year’ panel dataset and create a poverty 
indicator using a frequently used poverty definition:  annual household income less than 
60% of the the median equivalised national figure.  I then use decomposition analysis and 
regression discontinuity analysis to test the importance of the poverty line on wellbeing for 
individual within the dataset.  This chapter finds that being poor – at least having an income 
below the poverty line mentioned – does not significantly affect individual wellbeing.  The 
majority of wellbeing differences (96%) between the poor and non-poor – as designated by 
the 60% median equivalised income threshold – are due to characteristics such as health, 
education and so on, rather than there being some tangible effect of the status of being poor 
itself.   
On the basis of this finding, Chapter 3 goes on to assess the importance of multidimensional 
poverty as an alternative to financial poverty:  capabilities – both individual and in sum – are 
measured by extracting capability factors from a range of BHPS indicators, building on work 
by Anand et al (2005).  I then apply principle components analysis to the set of indicators to 
focus on the underlying factors; these factors are used in fixed effects regressions to 
examine their significance for wellbeing.  The results suggest that some capabilities 
(practical reason, bodily health and control) are significant in the model of wellbeing, and 
that the total number of capabilities is positively associated with higher wellbeing.   
The third paper looks at positive and negative changes in capabilities looking for asymmetric 
wellbeing responses via fixed effects regression.  Loss aversion is often identified in 
expected utility when income changes are suggested, but has thus far not been investigated 
for changes in capabilities.  Given that Chapter 3 finds some association between 
capabilities and wellbeing, Chapter 4 aims to make a contribution towards that gap by 
looking for loss aversion.  This paper finds that there are indeed asymmetric wellbeing 
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responses to capabilities:  capability losses appear to have a statistically significant – albeit 
small - negative effect on wellbeing, where removing one capability from an individual 
reduces their wellbeing by 0.1 points on the wellbeing scale; a gain of one capability 
increasing wellbeing by 0.01. 
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, overall conclusions from these investigations will be presented, 
along with consideration of the implications for poverty policy in the UK.   
Notes: 
All three studies use data taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) with all 
analyses being performed using Stata versions 11 to 13.   
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Much has been made within the last 30 years of the relationship between income and 
wellbeing, and interest in happiness determinants is rising significantly within economics.    
Despite the attention given to income and wellbeing, there is a dearth of clear-cut evidence 
explaining how income poverty interacts with individuals’ wellbeing.  After exploring the 
concepts of wellbeing and poverty, I use a relative measure of income poverty– defined as 
household income less than 60% of the median – to examine whether this seemingly 
arbitrary indicator divides those with low well-being from those with high levels of well-being. 
Using the British Household Panel Survey, I apply fixed effects regression and 
decomposition and regression discontinuity techniques to investigate this issue.  The 
analysis suggests that this definition of poverty does not appear to separate two populations 
with distinctively different levels of well-being. Instead, I suggest that multi-dimensional 
poverty may produce a clearer division.   
 
Acknowledgements: 
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1 Introduction 
In 1901 Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree created a measure of poverty based on what he 
believed were necessary purchases:  a sum of money “insufficient to obtain the minimum 
necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency” (Seebohm Rowntree 1901).  
Any family that did not have this amount of money was deemed poor.  This is one of the first 
incarnations of a poverty line.  However 1901 presents a very different context; the ‘laissez-
faire’ politics of the era meant that there was no safety net for the poor, or ill, or otherwise 
suffering.  Poverty mitigation was the domain of the philanthropist rather than the politician.  
As society has evolved, so has the concept of poverty, even though its impacts remain the 
same:  poverty is thought to result in, amongst other issues lower educational attainment 
(thus, lower in-work earnings and lower rate of employment), poorer health, higher risk of 
infant mortality, teenage pregnancy and suicide, poor housing quality and increased risk of 
homelessness, greater probability of being a victim of crime (or indeed engaging in criminal 
activity) and higher risk of substance abuse (Parekh, MacInnes and Kenway, 2010). 
Despite these impacts, in recent decades little direct attention has been given to poverty in 
the UK, other than that instigated at the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, 
which seems to be the origin of modern poverty targets (United Nations 1995). Signatories 
to this agreement, including most EU countries, pledged to prepare national anti-poverty 
plans and establish targets for poverty reduction.  Some countries, such as Ireland, adopted 
whole-population targets whereas others targeted sub-groups (for example child poverty in 
the case of the UK) (Gordon, Townsend 2000). 
A poverty line – a cut-off point separating the poor from the non-poor – is often used as a 
way of identifying the size and characteristics of the poor population.  In the UK and many 
other OECD countries, poverty is frequently measured as the percentage of households 
living below 60% of the median income (Gordon, Townsend 2000).  However there is little 
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critical assessment of this threshold and even less evidence justifying the choice of 60% 
over, for example, 50% or 40%.   
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, there is a school of thought calling for a 
“revolution” in social science where every academic should be attempting to understand 
what makes people happy, and furthermore happiness should be the explicit aim of 
government intervention (Layard 2011).  Indeed there is evidence that governments are 
engaging with wellbeing research, with the UK and France setting out to specifically 
measure wellbeing (for example the Sen-Fitoussi-Stiglitz commission).   
One of the main complications with wellbeing research is the scope of the concept, and the 
difficulty in pinpointing exactly what is meant by individual wellbeing is well known:   
“One could be well off, without being well. One could be well, without being able to 
lead the life he or she wanted. One could have got the life he or she wanted, without 
being happy. One could be happy, without having much freedom. One could have a 
good deal of freedom, without achieving much. We can go on”.  (Sen 1999, p3)  
In this study a continuum of wellbeing measures is considered, from affective states (angry, 
happy, sad and so on) to biochemical reactions to stimuli.  It is important for any study to 
focus on concepts that are appropriate to the task at hand, and for the purpose of 
investigating the impact of poverty – which is arguably a state of being, rather than a 
momentary event – an evaluative measure of wellbeing is needed rather than momentary 
emotions.   
Based on Kahneman, Diener and Schwartz (2003), the concept of wellbeing used here 
involves a component of judgement and comparison with the ideals, aspirations of other 
people and oneself, ultimately represents individuals’ perception of their position related to 
these subjective values.   
Personality has been found to have a direct influence on an individual’s wellbeing (Lykken, 
Tellegen 1996) and may also influence individual wellbeing responses to external stimulus, 
Chapter 2:  The poverty line:  A step change in wellbeing? 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 12 
therefore addressing it in any wellbeing study is wise.  A fixed effects regression analysis, 
controlling for individual specific effects, is undertaken to investigate the significance of a 
poverty indicated, followed by decomposition and regression discontinuity analyses which 
aim to examine whether the poor and non-poor are heterogeneous groups with regard to 
wellbeing, and therefore whether there is a step change in wellbeing at the level of the 
poverty line.  Ultimately this paper aims to bring about a debate as to whether the poverty 
line is a meaningful measure for individuals, and whether mitigation based on this line 
should be at the forefront of poverty policy and research. 
This paper continues as follows.  Section 2 discusses literature on poverty and wellbeing.  
Section 3 uses information on poverty measurement to feed into the development of a 
methodology to analyse how poverty affects a given definition of life satisfaction.  This latter 
section also presents the data to be used in the analysis that is undertaken in Section 4.  
Section 5 summarises this paper and discusses the potential implications.   
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2 Wellbeing and Poverty 
Wellbeing (subjective and objective), happiness and welfare can often be seen as 
interchangeable.  Frey and Stutzer define subjective wellbeing as “scientific term used in 
psychology for an individual’s evaluation of his or her experienced positive and negative 
affect, happiness and satisfaction with life” (Frey, Stutzer 2002, p403).   
The terminology used to define the concept of wellbeing differs frustratingly from paper to 
paper.  Kahneman et al (2003) address this issue when they discuss the different levels of 
quality of life when applied to what they term hedonic psychology – the study of what makes 
experiences and life pleasant or unpleasant.   
Poverty may be seen as a state that develops over time, rather than an event that comes 
and goes between minutes.  As a result it may only affect certain components of the 
wellbeing-happiness-life satisfaction continuum of measures, so choosing an appropriate 
measure of wellbeing is paramount to the success of any investigation.   
In this section the concept of wellbeing used in this study is explained, followed by 
commentary on the particular measure of poverty.  I review some historical poverty issues, 
and discuss how the current measure was arrived at.   
2.1 Wellbeing measurement 
Life does not involve simply a balance of pleasant versus unpleasant experiences, it 
involves several aspects – including happiness and subjective well-being – as detailed in 
Figure 2.1 below, taken from Kahneman et al (2003).  Here we can see that establishing a 
concept of a good life – arguably what everyone wishes to achieve for themselves and their 
loved ones – is not straightforward.   
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Figure 2.1 – Levels in the analysis of quality of life  
 
Source:  Kahneman et al (Kahneman, Diener et al. 2003) 
At the uppermost level of the diagram above, cultural and social context come into play, 
along with exogenous characteristics such as poverty incidence, infant mortality, crime or 
pollution – how individuals view a good life.  This is followed by subjective well-being – a 
judgement of the overall quality of ones life.  
The aspects so far are inextricably influenced by persistent moods; this represents the 
characteristics and personalities of individuals (some people might be chronically happy, 
others generally miserable regardless of the other aspects of their quality of life) that will 
differ widely between individuals 1 .  Obviously this will be an important factor for 
measurement, one that I will return to in Section 3.1. 
                                               
1
 Given the enormity of the literature, and its specialised nature, this paper does not aim to analyse 
how personality affects wellbeing at any deeper than the most superficial level. 
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At the lower levels of the diagram, real-time affective states are related to the current 
situation – pleasure or displeasure (happiness/ unhappiness).  There are multiple aspects to 
this; the influence of both past and present situations and the transient physiological and 
biochemical changes involved in the experience.   
Finally, underpinning all other components of quality of life, neural systems and the 
biochemistry together regulate the way we respond to situations; this level is arguably the 
foundation of all the others, and it will differ on an individual basis, adding complexity and 
uncertainty to any quality of life judgement.  
2.1.1 Determinants and influences 
Interest in happiness economics has increased significantly according to the number of 
journal articles published focusing on happiness, wellbeing or life satisfaction (Stutzer, Frey 
2012). This has led to a vastly increased understanding of the determinants and influences 
on individual wellbeing: personality and genetic factors, socio-demographic factors, 
economic factors, contextual and situational factors and institutional factors (Frey, Stutzer 
2010).   
Argyle (2003) suggests that much of the information we now have about the causes and 
correlates of happiness is founded in Cantril (1965) and the myriad social surveys that 
followed.  Frey and Stutzer (2010), amongst others, have published comprehensive reviews 
of the determinants of happiness.  Based on the latter source, along with survey articles by 
Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith (1999), Argyle (2003) and MacKerron (2012) we understand 
the determinants of wellbeing to include2: 
 Income – the income-wellbeing relationship is one of the most frequently analysed in 
the wellbeing literature; relative income rather than absolute income is thought to be 
more important, but has a diminishing marginal utility; the effects of income are 
disrupted by comparison, adaptation and aspirations, as explained below; 
                                               
2
 For an expanded discussion, see Appendix D of this paper 
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 Age – the young and the old appear to be happier than those who are middle aged; 
the age-wellbeing relation may be U-shaped, but at the very least is not linear; 
 Gender – women have been suggested to report higher wellbeing, but the difference 
is not consistently observed; 
 Health – people who are healthier tend to be happier, but there may be some reverse 
causation, where happier people tend to be healthier (or report that they are 
healthier); 
 Relationships – there may be a correlation between marriage and greater happiness, 
but again, this is not a consistent or clear observation; 
 Employment – unemployment is regarded as generally negative for wellbeing, 
however employment may have positive or negative effects depending on factors 
such as hours worked and job satisfaction; the effects retirement and home-making 
are not well understood; 
 Education – suggestions that higher education brings about higher wellbeing may 
only be true in the indirect sense, where higher education increases income or 
employment prospects; the self-esteem benefits of education are not thought to be 
significant.  
In this paper I will focus on the effect of income poverty – one of the economic determinants 
– controlling for as many of the other possible determinants as possible.  
Demographic variables are often found to correlate with subjective wellbeing (Argyle 2003), 
but Andrews and Withey (1976) conclude that many of the relationships are fairly weak, with 
just 10% of the variance accounted for by the explanatory variables.  Diener (1984) did not 
contradict this position, but found explanatory variables responsible for 15% of the variance.  
This is somewhat explained by Inglehart (1990) who suggests that aspirations and 
expectations may have a greater role to play than raw observations alone.   
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People tend to make judgements about their lives based on and aspiration level that is 
formed by their hopes and expectations: how they are progressing towards their aspirations 
determines in part how satisfied they are with their lives (Frey, Stutzer 2010).  The problem 
is that because people adapt, and that they compare, inevitably leads to the development of 
new aspirations.  This ‘hedonic treadmill’, where people constantly strive to better their 
position but then adapt and raise their goals, thus gaining no additional satisfaction, is widely 
acknowledged in happiness literature.   
A further explanation to Diener (1984) and Andrews and Withey’s (1976) observations could 
be that individuals compare:  They compare their incomes, jobs, education, purchases, 
statuses and so on to, both, other people they deem ‘peers’ and to other times within their 
own lives.  The concepts of aspiration and interdependent preferences are recognised 
complications in the happiness-income relationship and are supported by experimental 
studies showing the importance of relative judgements for happiness outcomes (Smith, 
Diener and Wedell, 1989, Tversky, Griffin 1991). 
Following on from the concept of comparison, it is widely recognised that individuals ‘adapt’.  
As Frey and Stutzer state: 
“One of the most important processes people go through is that of adjusting to past 
experiences.  Human beings are unable and unwilling to make absolute judgements.  
Rather, they are constantly drawing comparisons from the past of from their 
expectations of the future.  Thus, we notice and react to deviations from aspiration 
levels.” (Frey, Stutzer 2002, p414) 
Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) suggest that although adaptation is typically to 
retrospective stimuli, it can also depend on anticipation of future stimuli (aspirations).  This is 
reflected in Goedhart, Halberstadt, Kapteyn and Van Praag (1977) who finds that what 
income people deem “sufficient” depends partially on their expectations for the future.   
The effects of aspirations, achievements, adaptation and relativity are now well recognised 
as important determinants of wellbeing and determinants of the role other explanatory 
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variables have to play.  The difficulty is, however, capturing these effects in models: these 
concepts are difficult to include in wellbeing models as they are inherently hard to measure 
and are context specific.  Although authors such as Clark and Oswald (1996) have done 
some work to examine reference group comparison effects, it is at best an approximation as 
we are assuming a priori that we know to whom individuals refer as their peers.   
2.2 The poverty line 
The term “the poverty line” is probably familiar to most economists, and indeed much of the 
population, however it may not necessarily be fully understood.  Logically, it would seem to 
be a threshold below which people are deemed poor.  But how is the threshold arrived at?  
And what does it mean to the individuals who are ‘poor’?  This paper aims to focus on the 
wellbeing impact of this line. 
According to Hagenaars and De Vos (1988), all poverty definitions fit into one of the 
following categories: 
 Poverty is having less than an objectively defined, absolute minimum. 
 Poverty is having less than others in society. 
 Poverty is feeling you do not have enough to get along.  
These categories are, in the order of the list above, absolute, relative and somewhere-in-
between.  The choice of definition is often made on the basis of availability of data, on that of 
politics or on the basis of historical arguments, and that research tends to disregard all other 
definitions once the choice has been made (Hagenaars, De Vos 1988).  The implication of 
their argument is that the poverty measure should be appropriate for the task at hand, as 
well as relevant to the individuals subject to measurement.   
2.2.1 UK poverty measurement 
The concept of comparing incomes against an average measure arguably came from Peter 
Townsend, first in 1954 (comparing families against the average income of the lowest 25% 
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households of the household income distribution who achieve a nutritional standard) and 
again in 1973, stating that “individuals and families are in poverty whose resources, over 
time, fall seriously short of the resources commanded by the average individual or family in 
the community in which they live” (Townsend 1954, Townsend 1973).   
This was commensurate with Booth and Rowntree, both of whom set out to review minimally 
acceptable levels of income.  Although the term ‘poverty line’ is frequently attributed to 
Booth, it was never actually present in his published works (Glennerster, Hills et al. 2004).  
The origin is unclear, and there is believed to be no exact calculation that says this is a 
threshold relevant to society (Seymour 2009)   
Townsend and Wedderburn used Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data to look at low-
income families in the 1960s and 1970s (Townsend 1979).  The FES was used to measure 
RPI, but held potential to identify what level of consumption families could achieve in 
different parts of the country with different incomes.  In 1972 the Households Below Average 
Income survey was launched, with the aim of reviewing aspects of life in the lower half of the 
income distribution, with analysis focusing on groups below 50% of the national household 
income and 60% of the national household income (Glennerster, Hills et al. 2004).  This 
approach was endorsed by the 1999 Department of Social Security when it adopted the 60% 
measure as part of a set of poverty indicators in 1990(Gordon, Townsend 2000).   
As mentioned previously, the origin of modern poverty targets seems to be the 1995 
Copenhagen Agreement.  At this meeting, countries pledged to a range of poverty alleviation 
measures, including giving “greater focus to public efforts to eradicate absolute poverty and 
reduce poverty substantially”.  (United Nations 2000, chapter 2 paragraph 25)  They 
committed to do this through several measures, including “elaborating, at the national level, 
the measurements, criteria and indicators for determining the extent and distribution of 
absolute poverty.” (ibid.) 
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Within a few years, the Blair administration in the UK had pledged to eradicate child poverty 
by 2020.  Indeed it was reduced by 25% between 1998 and 1999, and by 50% by 2010.  In 
2010 the Child Poverty Act made the 2020 target legally binding, however there is believed 
to be no chance that this target will be achieved (Belfield, Cribb et al. 2014).  What happens 
next is unknown; there is still no change in the way poverty is measured, despite the 
weakness of the fixed-percentage measure to fiscal redistribution.   
The current official measure of poverty within the OECD, the European Community and the 
UK is a household that has less than 60% of the median national equivalised disposable 
income, where equivalence scales are used to convert household income to an income 
value proportional to its needs, taking into account the household size and the age of its 
members.  This allows us to compare the incomes of, for example, a retired couple in a five-
bedroom house and a single parent in a two-bedroom house with four children.     
The Households Below Average Income survey in the UK now uses as its threshold 60% of 
the median annual household equivalised disposable income in any particular year.  This 
measure has a key advantage over absolute measures in that it makes the threshold more 
relevant to the population: setting a poverty line at a fixed percentage of the national median 
income in any given year means that all households’ incomes have already been taken into 
account when setting the line; it involves no judgement on what households should/ could 
spend money on to live an ‘acceptable’ life. However this doesn’t necessarily mean that 
households are aware of their position in the income distribution; they may see themselves 
as having adequate income for their own needs, or they may be totally unaware of what 
societal incomes are. 
One further problem with this measure is that by its mathematical nature this measure can 
show poverty falling if everyone’s incomes are also falling, so during a recession it may 
appear that there is a reduction in poverty when in fact everyone could just be poorer – the 
average income is falling.  It is also highly sensitive to fiscal redistribution, so government 
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policies on taxes and credits can affect it (meaning the impact of a policy on that measure of 
poverty may not be accurately assessed).   
Relative poverty targeting does still involve a degree of the arbitrariness that limits the 
applications of absolute poverty targets (Townsend 1979); it can be seen – as with all fixed 
measures – as an empirical tool aimed at dividing the population into two subgroups: the 
poor and the non-poor (Halleröd 2000).  Thus, it still does not tell us what it means to be 
poor. 
Although poverty avoidance remains a target of the UK government, the focus is almost 
bipartite, with policy designed to address social exclusion and also child poverty, but with 
little association between the two or dedicated whole-of-society poverty policy.  The ‘official’ 
measure remains at 60% of the median disposable equivalised household income, but 
evidence regarding the selection of the 60% measure is not forthcoming.  
This measure is a curious combination of relative (the relationship of the measure to an 
average) and the absolute (imposing that relationship as a constant 60%).  Some developed 
countries set the threshold at 50%, emphasising the arbitrariness of the measure. This 
means that even the relative income version of the poverty line may not be wholly relevant 
for individuals.     
2.3 Wellbeing and poverty 
The majority of the investigations into poverty and wellbeing are very much development 
focused.  The poverty measure tends to be abject poverty or severe deprivation, that which 
causes significant limitations to life expectancy in developing countries.  Within the 
developed world, greater focus is given to income and wellbeing, on the assumption that the 
sort of poverty prevalent in under developed countries is not present.  Because of this, there 
is little in the literature that examines current poverty thresholds and their impact on 
wellbeing or happiness.   
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The impacts of extreme poverty – that seen in less developed countries – are extensive:  
Poor individuals are likely to have significantly lower life expectancies, are malnourished, 
uneducated, suffering from avoidable diseases, live in poor conditions with no access to 
sanitation, unlikely to find employment to name just a few (Sen 1999).  All of these impacts 
may well be linked, and generational, in that poor parents are likely to have poor children.  
All of these impacts are also associated with wellbeing; individuals living in these conditions 
are likely to have very low wellbeing compared to individuals in developed countries, but 
often this low wellbeing is not that different from national averages as large proportions of 
the population suffer similar circumstances. 
The UK presents a completely different context.  The impacts of poverty are less well 
understood, particularly the impacts on wellbeing.  If, as Layard (2011) argues, happiness 
should be the focus of all policy, this lack of understanding is surely a significant omission; 
one that warrants further attention.  
2.4 Summary 
Wellbeing, happiness, quality of life and other concepts have been given an increasing 
amount of attention in economics research.  This has resulted in a greater understanding of 
the factors that affect individual wellbeing/ happiness/ quality of life.  However, there is often 
confusion regarding what wellbeing/ happiness/ quality of life is/ are, and the concepts are 
often used interchangeably.  In this paper ‘wellbeing’ is used as the subject of study, where 
wellbeing means individuals’ perception of their position related to their ideals, aspirations 
and judgements.   
The determinants of wellbeing are wide ranging, including personality factors, socio-
demographic factors, economic factors, contextual and situational factors and institutional 
factors.  The main complications with wellbeing research are that adaptation, aspirations and 
comparison add complexity to an already challenging concept, and that there are personality 
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effects between wellbeing and arguably all of its determinants.  In the methodology section 
this will be addressed further.   
As discussed income and wellbeing have a complex and often-examined relationship. It 
follows therefore that poverty and wellbeing are subject to the same issues.  Poverty has not 
received a great deal of concerted political attention in the UK since the late 1970s, and the 
attention it has been subject to has been patchy; indeed there is no evidence that the 60% 
median income threshold is anything but arbitrary.   
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the prevailing measure of poverty – relative income 
poverty, where to be poor is to have less than 60% of the median disposable equivalised 
household income – and its relationship with wellbeing, in order to assess whether it is 
relevant to individuals’ wellbeing.   
Given the evidence that income matters more to wellbeing below a poverty line, this paper 
will also examine whether there are differences in the relationship between income and 
wellbeing between poor and non-poor individuals.      
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3 Methodology 
There are two particular issues that this research aims to address:  
 Does being poor affect individual wellbeing? 
 Does being poor change the form of the wellbeing function? 
where poverty is taken to be income less than 60% of the median disposable equivalised 
income.  The answers may well be different for men and women so gender specific analysis 
will be undertaken for both questions. 
Capturing wellbeing within data is not an easy task, particularly when one cannot be sure of 
the aspect of quality of life being examined.  In Section 2 the different levels of quality of life 
were discussed and the concept of wellbeing was chosen as the subject of this analysis, 
based on the strength of argument from authors such as Kahneman et al (2003), who argue 
that wellbeing is the central concept in the quality of life spectrum.  
Wellbeing in the context of this research is defined a subjective judgement of ones overall 
wellbeing.  There are a variety of approaches one could take in capturing this concept3, and 
as Townsend (1979) notes, any study can be limited by its methodology.  This section will 
outline the techniques used in addressing the questions above.   
3.1 Unobserved heterogeneity in wellbeing investigations 
One of the main difficulties in conducting wellbeing research is the unavoidable omission of 
individual specific effects, such as personality and genetics.  Genes and psychological traits 
have been found to have a correlation of up to 80% with wellbeing reports (Lykken, Tellegen 
1996), so personality effects could arguably affect the relationship between wellbeing and 
any of the determinants discussed in Section 2. 
Self-reported wellbeing questions, first directly asked in a survey by Cantril (1965), usually 
ask individuals to rate how satisfied they are with their lives on the whole on a given scale 
                                               
3
 For examples, see Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Dolan et al. (2008) and Stutzer and Frey (2010)  
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that could be numerical (for example, zero to seven) or normative (‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very 
satisfied’).  The main problem with this approach is that the interpretation of the question and 
the response scale is down to the individual.  It is possible that there are differences in 
interpretation of wellbeing questions across countries4, and indeed personality could also 
affect interpretation; optimists may generally report higher scores than pessimists.   
Within social sciences there are different assumptions made about the response scale, 
depending on what assumptions are made about interpretation (and therefore personality 
effects).  Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) outline how important this is for making 
conclusions in any wellbeing research:  In sociology and psychology, cardinality is often 
assumed; that is, the difference between 0 and 2 on a scale is the same as the difference 
between 4 and 6.  Economists on the other hand tend to prefer the assumption of ordinal 
comparability, where the relative difference between the points on the scale is unknown but 
that all individuals share the same interpretation.  Given the strength of personality effects, 
even this is perhaps a precarious assumption, however the treatment of wellbeing as either 
cardinal or ordinal or anywhere in between does not appear to affect regression results 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Frijters 2004).   
As mentioned previously, omission of personality from any analysis will inevitably bias the 
results; slope heterogeneity – meaning that the intercept and coefficients of a regression line 
are different for different individuals – in a cross-section can yield inconsistent estimates.  As 
mentioned above the cardinality assumptions regarding wellbeing do not affect regression 
results however unobserved time-invariant effects do, and therefore should be addressed in 
any specification.   
There are other methodological approaches to personality effects in econometrics, however 
the use of fixed effects specifications appears to present greater advantages over 
techniques such as using first differences (which cannot process unobserved individual 
                                               
4
 Post-communist countries may tend to report lower wellbeing scores whereas historically Protestant, 
island and south-American nations may tend to report higher ones (MacKerron 2012) 
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heterogeneity) or ordinal fixed effects models (which involve rescaling the dependent 
variable to two categories) (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Frijters 2004). Fixed effects analysis is also 
less efficient than assuming random effects but the results are generally more robust. 
Fixed effects specifications allow us to assume the presence of individual specific effects, on 
the basis that they are fixed over time. The assumption of fixed personality and genetic 
components of wellbeing is generally accepted within economic literature (Pevalin 2000, 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Frijters 2004), even if psychological literature is more mixed in opinion 
(Boyce, Wood and Powdthavee, 2013). In any case, the impact of personality changes will 
be testing the fixed effects assumption that there is a time-invariant unobserved component 
biasing the coefficients:  where a Hausman test suggests that there is no time-invariant 
unobserved component, a random effects model will be used. 
3.2 Looking for a step-change in wellbeing 
This paper will also examine the wellbeing differences of individuals with incomes just above 
and just below poverty line.  One would think, if the poverty line is relevant (and indeed 
obvious) to individuals, it would have some sort of significance on how income and wellbeing 
are related.  If there was some kind of discontinuity, we would expect to see a step-change 
in the relationship when we look at basic plots of the data in the first instance.  Then if there 
is any evidence of a change in the position of the observations on either side of the poverty 
line, it would give us some belief in the presence of a discontinuity.   
Using a basic linear specification: 
yi = xi + Di + it 
the outcome, y, will be determined by explanatory variable x as well as D, which is a binary 
variable indicating whether or not there was ‘treatment’5.   
                                               
5
 Although there needs to be enough data within the bandwidth to actually perform the analysis, so we 
can’t always have as small a bandwidth as desired  
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Treatment in this case is whether or not the individual is ‘poor’ according to the 60% 
threshold.  The importance of  – the coefficient on the treatment variable – is determined by 
a Wald test at different bandwidths from the poverty line; using the chi-square distribution, 
this tells us whether  is statistically different from zero.   
Regression discontinuity aims to test whether assignment to the poor or non-poor group, 
when income is close to the poverty line, has an effect on wellbeing.  It compares individuals 
directly above and directly below the line (because extremes at high and low levels will bias 
the effects), within a chosen bandwidth – the distance above and below the line where we 
look for a step-change; an interval of wellbeing, designated so that no bandwidth straddles 
the poverty line.  The smaller the bandwidth, the less interference from extremes, however 
there needs to be sufficient data within the bandwidth to be able to make adequate 
conclusions:  if there are not enough observations, the size of the bandwidth will have to be 
increased.  This means there may be more interference from extremes, however using a 
large dataset such as the BHPS should mean that this issue is not problematic. Stata 
program RD is utilised to undertake the examination of discontinuity (Nichols 2007).  This 
program automatically searches for the smallest bandwidth for the available data, meaning 
that a researcher’s subjective choice of bandwidth – which could be fallible – is not 
necessary.  However, I will also set bandwidths at 100, 50 and 200 points away from the 
line, in order to ensure the Stata routine has minimised MSE 
There are two possible approaches to consider:  ‘sharp’ design or ‘fuzzy’ design, as 
discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2008).  Here a sharp design is assumed, as the 
‘treatment’ we are looking at (poverty status) is a deterministic function of income.  If we 
were to assume a fuzzy design, we would assume that poverty status is only partially 
determined by income and the predetermined cut-point, so that the probability of becoming 
poor changes by less than a value of one as the household income becomes greater than 
the threshold; in this case, as poverty status is determined wholly by the 60% threshold, we 
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use a sharp design – as soon as your income becomes lower than 60% of the median 
equivalised household income your status in the poverty dichotomy is ‘poor’.   
For this investigation therefore, the specification is:   
Wit = Xit + Pi + it 
where Wit is wellbeing for individual i at time t, X represents a range of explanatory variables 
for individual i at time t and P is the poverty ‘treatment’ – whether individual i is in poverty or 
not at time t.  is an error term.   
The alternative hypothesis of regression discontinuity (RD) analysis in this context is that 
there is a discontinuity in the (otherwise roughly linear) relationship between income and 
wellbeing at a cut-off point (the poverty line), so that there is a step-change in wellbeing at 
that point.  This allows us to focus on the line in particular, removing the effects of extreme 
wealth and extreme poverty on the analysis. 
One of the potential limitations with using this approach is that the poverty line does not 
appear to be founded on any theory or evidence in particularly, so there is no prior 
expectation of any effect.  As a potentially randomly chosen figure, we have no reason to 
think that there will indeed be a discontinuity present:  this technique should inform the 
analysis by indicating whether or not there is any change in the relationship between income 
and wellbeing at 60% of the median equivalised income.   
Furthermore RD is generally used to assess the outcome of experiments and trials, where 
treatment is administered to one group but not to another, where assignment to a group is 
random.  Assignment to income is arguably not random, as it can be determined by 
employment status, education for example, however where the poverty line is on an annual 
basis is exogenous to an individual – getting an additional qualification will not make a 
difference to where the poverty line sits.  This is similar to the local randomisation approach 
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to RD, whereby it is assumed that people who are just above and just below a treatment line 
are random, perhaps due to random error (Lee, Lemieux 2009).   
3.3 Decomposing differences between groups 
The second question this paper aims to address is whether there are differences between 
the poor and non-poor in terms of the wellbeing response to exogenous changes:  in other 
words, are there different wellbeing functions for the poor and non-poor?  This is based on 
suggestions from the literature that income matters more to wellbeing at very low levels 
(Freedman 1978, Lane 2000), indicating that by raising the income of the poor, policy can 
raise the wellbeing of that group.   
As stated previously, poverty in the UK is unlikely to be comparable to poverty in the world’s 
most under-developed countries, however it may still be the case that low income in the UK 
limits individual abilities to meet basic needs and for that reason, amongst others, increasing 
their income may bring about greater wellbeing.  This would imply that the poor and non-
poor have either different characteristics (i.e. different means and variances of independent 
variables) or different coefficients on independent variables (i.e. how wellbeing for 
individuals in their group in particular responds to exogenous factors), particularly with 
regard to income.  Decomposition analysis aims to understand these differences.     
Decomposition was first undertaken by Oaxaca (1973), who investigated gender 
discrimination in wages in the US labour market.  His investigation involve empirical analysis 
of the following form: 
Ya – Yb = (Xa – Xb)* + Xa(a – *) + Xb(*– b)   (1) 
Where: 
* = a + ( – )b       (1a) 
Here, Y is the wage rate, X represents a set of characteristics (education, work experience 
and so on) and the two groups are denoted ‘a’ and ‘b’.  In equation 1a,  is a weighting 
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matrix and  an identity matrix.  Depending on which way we believe the discrimination goes 
(e.g. are women discriminated against in workplace wages or are men receiving a bonus?  
Or is it a combination of both?)  is weighted differently and therefore will have a different 
effect on the results.   
In Section 7 the various options for  are considered, arriving at the adoption of a pooled set 
of coefficients (including the poor and non-poor in the same model) (Neumark 1988).  The 
coefficients in  therefore represent the counterfactual household where the poor and non-
poor are equal in their abilities to convert income and other factors to wellbeing; there is no 
poor discrimination with regard to wellbeing.   
To decompose the wellbeing function for the poor and non-poor the specification will 
therefore be: 
Wpoorij – Wnon-poorij = (Xpoorij – Xnon-poorij)* + Xpoorij (poorij – *) +  
Xnon-poorij (* – non-poorij)     (2) 
And: 
* = ij poorij + ( – ij)non-poorij                 (2a) 
where W is wellbeing, X is a vector of explanatory variables, i represents the individual and j 
the wave,  is a matrix of pooled-model coefficients and  is an identity matrix.  The 
interpretation of this is explained further in Section 7, with the analysis in Section 4.2. 
3.4 Data Source 
This paper uses date from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  As a multi-purpose 
study, it provides a wealth of information about a set of individuals, including several 
measures that could be used to analyse wellbeing.   
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The BHPS is a panel dataset established in 1991 to provide a nationally representative 
sample of about 5,500 households, containing a total of approximately 10,000 interviewed 
individuals.  These same individuals are re-interviewed each successive year6 and, if they 
separate from original households to form new households, they are then followed and all 
adult members of the new households can then be interviewed.  New additions to existing 
households are also included in the survey.  Including a boost in 1999 (to allow independent 
analysis of UK countries), the total sample size for the BHPS is between 10,000-14,000 
households across the UK in any given wave. 
The dataset used for this study consists of all adult (16 and above, and completed 
compulsory education) individuals interviewed and all waves available:  1991 to 2007/87, 
with around 14,000 observations per wave, however not all variables are available in every 
wave, not all individuals respond to the survey every wave (for example due to illness, 
overseas travel etc) and not all individuals will answer all the questions for the survey they 
complete.    This analysis uses an unbalanced panel, which includes all responses even if 
individuals did not complete the survey in one or more wave(s).    
The main limitation of the BHPS for this particular purpose is that it is a household survey, 
that is, only those who have a place residence are included.  Those who do not have a 
residence, for example the homeless or those in shelters or institutions, may be more likely 
to experience poverty but these individuals are not sampled.     
3.5 A wellbeing function 
The basic form of the model to be used in this paper is: 
Wit = Xit + fi + it 
                                               
6
 BHPS surveys were done in ‘waves’ that frequently crossed year boundaries.  
7
 Since then the BHPS has been subsumed into the Understanding Society survey, which includes 
the original BHPS questions plus many more.   
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Where W is wellbeing, i represents the individual and t the time, X is a vector of explanatory 
variables, f is the fixed effect associated with the individual (correlated with X) and  is the 
error term8.  W is a categorical variable, and the explanatory variables are in various forms.   
The form of this model will feed into both analyses, the effect of being poor on wellbeing and 
the differences between the poor and non-poor with respect to income and wellbeing 
(although it is not currently possible to use a widely accepted method of including fixed 
effects in a decomposition9).   
3.5.1 Dependent variable 
I have already stated that by wellbeing we mean an individual’s self-judged assessment of 
their wellbeing, as described by Kahnemann (2003).   As mentioned above, the BHPS 
contains a number of variables that could be used to represent wellbeing.  These range from 
life satisfaction questions to General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) components.   
In selecting a measure of wellbeing, one can refer to Office for National Statistics research 
examining what an appropriate measure of wellbeing is.  There it is stated that a wellbeing 
measure (for public policy) must be:  
 Theoretically rigorous;  
 Policy relevant; and  
 Empirically robust (Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe, 2011).   
In the recommendations of the report, Dolan et al (2011) suggest that an evaluative 
wellbeing measure be used. 
The BHPS provides several measures that could meet the needs of this study: 
                                               
8
 This is based on the specification used by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Frijters 
2004) 
9
 Fixed effects decomposition techniques are not yet at the stage where they are widely accepted.  
See the arguments between, for example, (Plümper, Troeger 2011, Breusch, Ward et al. 2011, 
Greene 2011).  The main problem is that the unexplained part of the decomposition may well contain 
the unobserved effects (like personalities) and there is currently no way of separating these effects.      
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 Life satisfaction question: How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall? 
 GHQ question: Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things 
considered? 
 GHQ12:  a composite measure of “lack of wellbeing”  (Gardner, Oswald 2006, p317) 
or “disutility” (Clark, Oswald 1994, p649) 
All the questions listed above are in the self-completion portion of BHPS, meaning that 
individuals may be more likely to report truthful answers (Pudney 2010).  
The life satisfaction question is answered on a verbal scale with seven options, from ‘not 
satisfied at all’ to ‘completely satisfied’ (coded 7).  There are no time qualifications to the life 
satisfaction, indicating that the question refers to the point in time when the questionnaire is 
being completed, and it may be subject to positive or negative affect at the time of 
completion (Diener 1984).  One further problem with this question is that it only has a 7 point 
semi-verbal scale as its answer, meaning that the interpretation is not ordinal. Finally, it has 
not been asked throughout the lifetime of the BHPS, only in 11 of the 18 years. 
In contrast, the GHQ question has been asked in every wave.  Regarding the temporal 
reference, this question uses the term ‘recently’; this gives the individual a time context to 
frame their answer within, however how the individual interprets ‘recently’ is not certain.  It 
also suffers the same criticism as the life satisfaction question, in that affective state may 
cause under or over reporting of how happy an individual is. Also by using the term ‘happy’ it 
may be inciting people to think about the amount of time they have spent in affective states, 
rather than the subjective quality of their wellbeing.  Finally, as with the life satisfaction 
question, this one has very limited (four) response categories: ‘more than usual’, ‘same as 
usual’, ‘less so’ and ‘much less’.   These limited categorical outcomes do not lend 
themselves particularly well to assessing the level of wellbeing econometrically.  We cannot 
assume ordinal comparability or suitability for linear methods of analysis.   
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Although not a directly asked question about wellbeing, an index created using responses to 
the full set of 12 GHQ components in BHPS may provide a better measure.  It includes the 
GHQ ‘happiness’ question above along with a range of others aimed at providing context to 
complement an individual’s answer to the overall happiness question, making it a more 
holistic wellbeing concept; but also one that can be computed into a zero to 36 Likert scale, 
much closer to the concept of a continuous variable with greater ordinal comparability.  
There are many versions of the GHQ; the original, developed by Goldberg (1978), included 
60 questions designed to screen for psychiatric illness.  The full questionnaire is 
occasionally used as an indicator of subjective wellbeing, but for cost and efficiency 
purposes, many versions are shorter than the original; BHPS has used the same format of 
GHQ12 since its inception10 and it has been used in many studies of wellbeing, including 
Gardner and Oswald (2007), who list more than a dozen other papers that use this 
dependent variable.   
The GHQ12 questionnaire asks individuals: 
“Have you recently:  
 Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing? 
 Lost much sleep over worry? 
 Felt that you are playing a useful part in things? 
 Felt capable of making decisions about things? 
 Felt constantly under strain? 
 Felt you couldn’t overcome your difficulties? 
 Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? 
                                               
10
 This is accepted as consistent in the long term (Pevalin 2000), meaning personality effects may be 
more-or-less fixed within this measure 
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 Been able to face up to your problems? 
 Been feeling unhappy and depressed? 
 Been losing confidence in yourself? 
 Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
 Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?”   
In a self-completion part of the BHPS interview, respondents select one of four options for 
each component of GHQ12 from 0 to 3, with those reporting 0 having the highest wellbeing 
and those reporting 3 the lowest.  Rather than use each question individually, we can use a 
simple summation of the responses to all 12 questions, providing a 36-point Likert scale,. 
The two additional categories within the dataset are ‘missing/ wild’ (for missing or obviously 
erroneous responses) and ‘proxy’ (where an individual’s response is completed by another).   
For reasons of analytical simplicity, this scale is inverted to be increasing in wellbeing, so 
those with values of zero had lowest wellbeing and those with scores of 36 had the highest.  
This turns a measure of mental distress, seen by Gardner and Oswald (2004, 2006, 2007) 
and Clark and Oswald (1994, 1996) to be lack of wellbeing or disutility, into a scale 
increasing in wellbeing. 
As it is a sum variable rather than categorical, one can be more comfortable with the 
assumption of ordinal comparability11, and in addition it is more normally distributed than the 
individual component responses (Banks, Clegg, Jackson, Kemp, Stafford and Wall, 1980) 
meaning we have a wider range of econometric methods available for analysis. 
                                               
11
 Where numbers are ‘natural’, meaning they can be compared (e.g. 1 is smaller than 2, 2 is half of 4 
and so on).  Much econometric analysis is based on ordinal rather than cardinal data, and 
interpretation of cardinal data is, by the nature of the data itself, more subjective. 
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3.5.2 Poverty indicator 
Creating a poverty dummy based on the relative income poverty line is accomplished by, for 
each wave of BHPS, computing the median household equivalised disposable income12.  
For each wave, a relative income poverty line is constructed by multiplying the median 
household disposable equivalised income by 60%.  Finally a dummy variable is created by, 
for each household in each year, setting a value of ‘1’ if its income is below the relative 
income poverty line.   
3.5.3 Control variables 
Using examples of wellbeing investigations within economic literature, the model in this 
study is based on the assumption that individual wellbeing depends on a range of factors, 
which have been discussed previously (Section 2, categories described below and in Table 
3.1). 
 Age (continuous and squared to account for the ‘u’ shaped relationship – this form 
was used in Blanchflower and Oswald(2008)) 
 Income (annual equivalised disposable household income; expressed in natural log 
form to account for potentially non-linear relationship, henceforth referred to as 
‘income’) 
 Gender (categorical) 
 Marital status (categorical) 
 Highest educational level attained (categorical, henceforth referred to as ‘education’) 
 Employment status (categorical) 
                                               
12
 Equivalised disposable income, where disposable is income minus direct taxes (using the 
McClements Before Housing Costs equivalence scale) is not included in the main BHPS dataset 
however is available from an add-on (Levy, Jenkins 2012).  
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 Health (binary – 0 if individual has at least one health problem, 1 if individual has no 
reported health problems) 
 Area (categorical) 
Using the categorical data listed above, a series of dummy variables were created to control 
for economic and socio-demographic effects on wellbeing; the omitted categories are first in 
the list in Table 3.1.  As mentioned above, health is a binary variable, age is included in its 
continuous form as well as squared and income is expressed as a natural log.  As separate 
regressions will be estimated for men and women there is no need for dummy variables for 
gender. The summary statistics for the dependent and control variables are shown in Table 
3.2. 
Table 3.1 – Dummy variables 
Variable Employment 
status 





No qualifications Never married Northern Ireland 
Dummies: Retired Basic qualifications Married North 
 Family care Further education Divorced/ separated South 
 Long term sick Higher education Widowed London 
 Unemployed   Wales 
 Employed   Scotland 
    Midlands 
Source: Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
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Table 3.2 – Summary statistics across all waves 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Wellbeing 193,141         24.81           5.43           0              36  
Independent variables 
Income 199,462 24,017.45 16,130.39 0 871,801.60 
Poverty  199,462 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Age 199,462 45.82 18.73 15 100 
Dummy variables 
Training/ education 195,772 .050 .219 0 1 
Retired 195,772 .205 .403 0 1 
Family care 195,772  .084 .277 0 1 
Long term sick 195,772  .043 .202 0 1 
Unemployed 195,772 .038 .191 0 1 
Employed 195,772  .576 .494 0 1 
Never married 199,370  .306 .461 0 1 
Married 199,370 .536 .499 0 1 
Divorced/ separated 199,370 .075 .263 0 1 
Widowed 199,370 .084 .277 0 1 
Northern Ireland 224,861                   .081 .273 0 1 
North 224,861  .198 .399 0 1 
South 224,861                   .174 .379 0 1 
London 224,861 .065 .246 0 1 
Wales 224,861                   .130 .336 0 1 
Scotland 224,861                   .151 .358 0 1 
Midlands 224,861 .201 .401 0 1 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data.  Means for dummy variables are proportions of sample that 
have the dummy present, this are equivalent to proportion in that category.  
3.5.4 Data adjustments 
Very few adjustments to the data were made. Responses from proxy respondents and those 
from individuals aged under 16 and still in compulsory education were dropped; these 
respondents would be less likely to have knowledge and experience of the household 
income either for assumptions of age/ life-stage (they are still ‘taken care of’ by their 
parent(s)/ guardian(s)), or – for proxy responses – because the respondent may not be fully 
aware of the individual subject’s situation and feelings.   
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For employment status, some changes were made to the coding of the answers between 
Waves 1 and 2; the model accounts for these changes and ensures that all coding is 
consistent. 
For all variables, as stated above for wellbeing, ‘wild’ responses were recoded to missing.  
3.6 A brief analysis of wellbeing, income and poverty 
To begin the analysis some cross-tabulations were created for wellbeing with income and 
wellbeing with poverty.  As is evident in Figure 3.1 below, which plots median household 
income within each wellbeing score for Wave 18 of the study.  The poverty line is also 
shown on the graph as the black line between the poor (red) and non-poor (blue) 
observations.  
Figure 3.1 – Income within each wellbeing score 
 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data.  N = 10,725 
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Looking at frequency distributions of the wellbeing of the poor and non-poor (Figure 3.2), it 
appears that the shape has some differences.  The poor distribution is slightly denser at 
levels below 20, whereas the non-poor distribution has a greater concentration of individuals 
reporting wellbeing between 20 and 30.  The poor distribution and has a lower-in-wellbeing 
second peak (29, compared with than 30 for the non-poor), however both peak at a 
wellbeing score of 23.   
Figure 3.2 – Histograms of wellbeing in non-poor and poor individuals, wave 18 
 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data.  N = 10,725 
Upon analysing the changes in these variables over time, (see Figure 3.3) it appears that 
changes in household income are not reflected in changes in wellbeing.  The same can be 
said for changes in the poverty rate (calculated as the proportion of individuals with 
household income below 60% of the median equivalised household income in any given 
wave).   
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Looking at waves nine and 10 in particular, there was approximately a 1% fall in mean 
wellbeing however income increased by 6% on the previous year, and the poverty rate had 
decreased by around 3%.  Obviously this is a very simplistic presentation, however by 
comparing waves nine and 10 with the changes between waves 17 and 18, where all 
wellbeing, income and the poverty rate decreased, would lead us to suggest that the 
changes are not closely linked. 
Figure 3.3 – Percentage changes in income, poverty and wellbeing throughout BHPS 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data.  N = 10,275 
As stated previously, the poverty measure is that of household equivalised income less than 
60% of the national median in any particular year.  
Figure 3.4 indicates that within each level of wellbeing – from 0 to 36 – there is a generally 
declining proportion of individuals living in households deemed ‘poor’.  This data suggests 
that the poor are concentrated at the lower end of the scale, reinforcing the assumption that 
poorer people are generally less happy than those who are not.  There is a curious 
observation of a larger percentage of poor households at higher wellbeing levels; this could 
be due to the small number of individuals reporting this level of wellbeing, or that some of 
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income position, for example, someone who has self-selected into a life of low-income, 
(priests and those in religious orders), whose non-monetary quality of life is high through 
excellent health, someone who has high job satisfaction despite low or unpredictable pay 
(artists and creative types -  see Bille, Fjællegaard, Frey and Steiner (2013)), a particularly 
effective social life, or just someone who has a particularly strong propensity to be happy.  
Figure 3.4 – Poverty within each wellbeing score 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data.  N = 10,725 individuals. 
Finally, in concordance with all the data so far, we can see from Table 3.3 that the median 
wellbeing of those who are not poor is one point higher than those that are poor, however 
the income of the poor is less than half of that of the non-poor.   
Table 3.3 – Poverty, income and wellbeing 
Poverty status Median income Median wellbeing 
No – non-poor  23,290.04   26  
Yes – poor   9,548.14   25  
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
3.7 Summary 
This section set out to describe the methodology and data used in the study. Drawing on 
research from Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), it was assumed that personality could 
bias any results when omitted from a regression; the solution – based on an assumption of 
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with other economic investigations into wellbeing.  Random effects will be compared to fixed 
effects using a Sargan-Hansen test.  
The data source and model were then discussed, with the intention to select a measure of 
wellbeing that is theoretically rigorous, policy relevant and empirically robust (Dolan, Layard 
et al. 2011).   
The BHPS contains several possible measures of wellbeing, including a specific question 
from GHQ12, a question on life satisfaction and a scale created from the GHQ12 itself.  All 
three possibilities could arguably represent wellbeing, however the summation of the 
GHQ12 responses to create a 36-point Likert scale is considered to be preferable to the 
other two options because it has the advantage of being asked in every wave, being a larger 
more ordinal scale and being more normally distributed.  The multitude of papers that use 
this dependent variable (see Clark and Oswald, 2007) as a measure of wellbeing (either in 
increasing or decreasing form) reassure us that it is an acceptable measure of wellbeing, 
and its mathematical properties allow a greater range of econometric applications to be 
used.  
The independent variables would include those already discussed in Section 2.  Annual 
household equivalised income will be transformed into a natural log, age will be included in 
its continuous form and as age-squared, categorical data will be included to represent 
gender, marital status, education and employment status, with a binary variable for health.  
Poverty will be indicated by a dummy variable, that takes the value 1 when, for each 
household in each year, the equivalised income is less than 60% of the national median for 
that year.   
Finally, some graphs were created to summarise the cross-tabulations of wellbeing with 
income and wellbeing with poverty, as well as plotting income and wellbeing over time.  The 
data suggested that, where income and poverty rates exhibited large fluctuations from wave-
to-wave, the changes in wellbeing were much smaller and did not seem to be related to 
Chapter 2:  The poverty line:  A step change in wellbeing? 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 44 
movements in income or poverty.  In a cross section however, higher wellbeing seemed to 
be observed where income was higher.   
Similarly, a greater proportion of those in ‘poor’ households seemed to report lower 
wellbeing; the mean wellbeing for those who were not poor was almost one point higher on 
the wellbeing scale.  
With these observations as a starting point, the next section will undertake more in depth 
analysis.   
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4 Empirical Analysis 
As with other sections, the analysis begins be restating the research questions for this study: 
 Does being poor affect individual wellbeing? 
 Does being poor change the form of the wellbeing function? 
In Section 3 the methods for addressing these questions were discussed.   
4.1 Analysis of the effect of poverty on wellbeing  
In order to assess the importance of being in poverty to individual wellbeing, a fixed effects 
panel data analysis will be undertaken.  This will allow the relationship between relative-
income-poverty and wellbeing to be investigated whilst allowing for the influence of 
personality. 
Before embarking on this analysis, would be prudent to determine whether fixed or random 
effects assumptions are more appropriate for this model.  By computing each specification, 
then running a Sargan-Hansen test13, I arrive at a statistic of 951.755 with a p-value of 
0.0000.  This test indicates that residuals are correlated with the exogenous variables, so a 
fixed effects specification is more appropriate.  Henceforth only the fixed effects model is 
interpreted but a random effects model is included here for comparison (Table 4.1). 
Taking each variable in turn, looking first at the income variable (natural log of annual 
equivalised household income) one can see that it is highly significant (at the 1% level) and 
positive in direction.  Age in its continuous form is significant at 5% but negative the squared 
form of age is not significant; these observations are not surprising given the difficulty of 
determining the effect of age on wellbeing.  
The first departure from expectation is the coefficient on the marriage dummy, which is 
significant and negative.  The literature detailed previously indicated that marriage should 
                                               
13
 An alternative to a Hausman test, that allows clustering at group level to permit the calculation of 
robust standard errors in panel data models. 
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bring about positive wellbeing effects for both genders.  Less controversial are the 
coefficients on the dummies for divorce and widowhood, which are both negative as 
expected. 
None of the dummies for education level are significant; due to the lack of clarity surrounding 
the direct effects of education on wellbeing – the literature suggests that the effects are 
indirect – this is not surprising.   
The coefficient on employment is negative and significant; this is the second departure from 
expectations.  Literature suggests that employment should bring about positive wellbeing 
effects, however this may depend on job satisfaction and hours worked.  If job satisfaction is 
low, or hours too high (thus limiting leisure time), one cannot assume that employment 
would bring about a positive effect.   
The coefficients on all the employment statuses included in the model are negative and – in 
all but one case – highly significant.  The coefficients on unemployment and long-term 
sickness are both negative and significant as expected.  I had no reason to expect either a 
positive or negative coefficient for the dummies for family care and retirement, however they 
are significant.   
Unsurprisingly, good health is associated with greater wellbeing, with a highly significant 
coefficient.   
Only three out of six regional dummies are significant, and even then those that are 
significant are only so at the 10% level.  
Finally, the coefficient on poverty is not significant. When including both income and a 
poverty indicator in the specification it is possible that there will be some overlapping effects.  
To test this, the fixed effects regression was re-estimated excluding income but retaining 
poverty; this resulted in the poverty indicator becoming significant at the 10% level, with a 
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negative coefficient, however the size of the coefficient is relatively small.  There were no 
differences in the directions or significances of the other coefficients.  
This analysis suggests that being poor by the poverty definition used here is not a significant 
contributor to wellbeing, particularly in comparison to other effects such as employment or 
marital status.    
Table 4.1 – Fixed effects and random effects models controls and poverty status 
regressed on GHQ12 wellbeing 
 Fixed effects Random effects 
 Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
Poverty 0.012 (0.045) -0.0295 (0.042) 
Income 0.160*** (0.032) 0.199*** (0.029) 
Age -0.036** (0.012) -0.039*** (0.007) 
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Married+ -0.313*** (0.074) -0.145** (0.054) 
Divorced+ -1.043*** (0.132) -1.156*** (0.099) 
Widowed+ -1.753*** (0.147) -1.379*** (0.105) 
Higher ed.+ 0.076 (0.203) 0.124 (0.085) 
Further ed.+ -0.065 (0.158) 0.167* (0.067) 
Basic quals.+ -0.170 (0.170) 0.220** (0.070) 
Employed+ -0.305*** (0.091) -0.172* (0.071) 
Unemployed+ -1.959*** (0.119) -1.904*** (0.010) 
Long-term sick+ -3.082*** (0.163) -3.679*** (0.139) 
Family care+ -0.936*** (0.115) -1.057*** (0.094) 
Retired+ -0.340** (0.114) -0.300** (0.094) 
Good health+ 0.843*** (0.035) 1.180*** (0.031) 
North + 1.655 (0.891) 0.128 (0.089) 
South + 1.709 (0.911) 0.0495 (0.092) 
London+ 1.552 (0.918) -0.0291 (0.117) 
Wales+ 1.892* (0.930) -0.127 (0.096) 
Scotland+ 2.166* (0.949) 0.253** (0.091) 
Midlands+ 1.892* (0.902) 0.240** (0.088) 
Constant 24.290*** (0.896) 24.340*** (0.238) 
N 187,945  187,945  
R2 0.021    
Note: Dependent variable: Inverted GHQ12 (wellbeing). p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  Robust 
standard errors (clustered at PID level) in parentheses.  Variables marked + are dummies. Omitted 
categories:  ‘training/ education’, ‘no qualifications’, ‘never married’ and ‘Northern Ireland’. 
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Table 4.2 – Fixed effects model removing income variable – controls and poverty 
status regressed on GHQ12 wellbeing  
 Fixed effects 
 Coefficient Standard error 
Poverty -0.083* (0.042) 
Age -0.035** (0.012) 
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 
Married+ -0.308*** (0.074) 
Divorced+ -1.053*** (0.131) 
Widowed+ -1.750*** (0.147) 
Higher ed.+ 0.107 (0.203) 
Further ed.+ -0.062 (0.158) 
Basic quals.+ -0.154 (0.170) 
Employed+ -0.257** (0.090) 
Unemployed+ -1.978*** (0.118) 
Long-term sick+ -3.088*** (0.163) 
Family care+ -0.928*** (0.115) 
Retired+ -0.343** (0.113) 
Good health+ 0.844*** (0.035) 
North + -0.778 (1.524) 
South + -0.754 (1.535) 
London+ -0.886 (1.538) 
Wales+ -0.559 (1.546) 
Scotland+ -0.281 (1.550) 
Midlands+ -0.561 (1.530) 
Constant 27.410*** (1.439) 
N 188,793  
R2 0.021  
Note: Dependent variable: Inverted GHQ12 (wellbeing). p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  Robust 
standard errors (clustered at PID level) in parentheses.  Variables marked + are dummies. Omitted 
categories:  ‘training/ education’, ‘no qualifications’, ‘never married’ and ‘Northern Ireland’. 
4.2 Analysis of the wellbeing differences between poor and non-poor 
individuals 
The fixed effects analysis above suggests that poverty does not have a very significant 
relationship with wellbeing.  That could be because there are ‘poverty status’ differences in 
the wellbeing function.  To test this, a decomposition analysis will be performed; this will 
indicate whether there are different characteristics or coefficients (or both) between the two 
groups. 
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As stated previously, the decomposition used here is based on Neumark (1988), and takes 
the form: 
Wpoorij – Wnon-poorij = (Xpoorij – Xnon-poorij)* + Xpoorij (poorij – *) + Xnon-poorij (*– non-poorij) 
and: 
* = ij poorij + ( – ij )non-poorij 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables (in this case, the categorical dummies in 
combination with age and income), i represents the individual, j represents wave,  is a 
matrix of coefficients from the pooled model of both poor and non-poor individuals and  is 
an identity matrix. 
In the table below, there are three subheadings, for =1 (the wellbeing function is that of the 
poor), =0 (the wellbeing function is that of the non-poor) and =pooled (the wellbeing 
function comes from the whole population). The subheadings each explain the right hand 
side depending on the value of . As mentioned previously, and explained fully in Section 7, 
in the absence of any justification for choosing =1 or =0, I set  equal to a matrix of 
pooled coefficients from a model containing all poor and non-poor respondents.   
In the bottom row of each table there is a raw difference; this is the left hand side of the 
equation above.  Beginning with the income distribution as a whole, in the female 
decomposition (Table 4.3) it is evident that the raw difference between the poor and non-
poor wellbeing scores is -0.9533; that is, the wellbeing of the poor is 0.9533 points lower (on 
the 0-36 scale) than the wellbeing of the non-poor.   
Within the weighted model (where the poor and non-poor wellbeing functions are identical) 
the characteristics account for a difference of -0.9165 between poor and non-poor wellbeing.  
This is in the direction to that expected and it is a significant result.  It is also explained 
predominantly by characteristics; 96% of the difference is down to the raw data rather than 
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the coefficients (the differences between which are only to be interpreted with extreme 
caution – see Section 7.2).     
This analysis suggests that the wellbeing determinants for poor individuals are not the same 
as those for non-poor individuals, however the differences mainly comprising of different 
characteristics (data) rather than different coefficients.  This in turn suggests that other than 
the effects of poverty – lower education, greater likelihood of unemployment, poorer health 
and so on – are to blame for any wellbeing differences rather than the poverty status itself.   
Of course one could argue that lower educational attainment, greater likelihood and poorer 
health could be causes of poverty, and that is indeed true, but as with all analysis we look at 
poverty status all other things being constant.  So all things being equal, if someone became 
poor, would their wellbeing decrease?  The results here suggest that it would, but only 
because poverty is associated with values of the controls that result in lower wellbeing, 
rather than, values of the controls having no effect but the simple status of being poor 
(somewhat like the simple status of being female) reduces wellbeing regardless of other 
factors.  The results suggest that there is no poor discrimination in wellbeing, nor is there a 
non-poor wellbeing bonus.   
Table 4.3 – Decomposition results of the GHQ12 wellbeing-poverty relationship 
 Coefficient Standard Error Z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
 = 1        
Characteristics -0.714 0.063 -11.350 0.000 -0.837 -0.591 
Coefficients -0.240 0.072 -3.350 0.001 -0.380 -0.099 
 = 0       
Characteristics -0.972 0.027 -35.680 0.000 -1.025 -0.918 
Coefficients 0.018 0.043 0.420 0.674 -0.067 0.103 
 = pooled (Neumark)      
Characteristics -0.917 0.024 -38.150 0.000 -0.964 -0.869 
Poor coef -0.031 0.023 -1.330 0.182 -0.076 0.014 
Non-poor coef -0.006 0.005 -1.330 0.184 -0.015 0.003 
Raw -0.953 0.040 -23.740 0.000 -1.032 -0.875 
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4.3 Regression discontinuity analysis 
Using Stata programme RD, one can examine Wald estimator to determine whether or not 
there may be a jump at the poverty line.  The rationale for using this method was discussed 
in Section 3.2, however in sum, if we assume that the poverty line designates you ‘poor’ 
therefore you receive some kind of policy ‘treatment’, we should observe a jump in wellbeing 
at the poverty line (on the basis that wellbeing is increasing in income and from our brief 
analysis in Section 3.6 appears to be roughly linear).    
Using standard bandwidths either side of the line, it is evident that I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of zero difference at the jump (Table 4.4).  The Wald test looks for differences in 
wellbeing within the bandwidths above and below the line, by testing whether the  
coefficient on the treatment indicator is significant, where the null hypothesis is that the 
difference is zero.  Table 4.4 therefore indicates that for all cases we accept the null 
hypothesis – there is no statistical difference in wellbeing immediately above and below the 
poverty line.  Treatment does not have an effect on wellbeing.  This is complementary to the 
results above, leading us to suspect that at this particular poverty line, there is no jump up or 
down in wellbeing dependent on poverty status.    
As discussed previously, there was no expectation of a positive finding with this test.  
Looking at a linear plot of the data, there seemed to be no discontinuity in the relationship 
between wellbeing and income around the poverty line.  Similarly to the decomposition 
analysis, if there was some wellbeing penalty that – ceteris paribus – resulted on falling 
below the poverty line, we would expect to see some evidence of this in the raw data.  There 
was none.   
RD analysis is looking for a treatment effect at a specified threshold.  We have not found 
one here.  There are several reasons why this could be.  The first is that – as discussed in 
Section 2 – the poverty line appears to have no theoretical foundation.  The second is that 
the line is in the wrong place; it could be 55%, or 50%.  There has been no calculation to 
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suggest what – if any – line exists (Seymour 2009).  Finally it could be that the RD test is not 
suitable for analysing the poverty line, as income is partially endogenous, even if .  On its 
own, the test would not be sufficient evidence to cast doubt on the poverty line, however 
combined I could say it has at least been supportive of the decomposition results.     
Table 4.4 – Wald test results comparing wellbeing above and below the poverty line 
 
  estimate 
Bootstrap 
standard error 
z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Bandwidth 100 1.380 2.354 0.590 0.558 -3.233 5.994 
Bandwidth 50 1.005 3.915 0.260 0.797 -6.668 8.678 
Bandwidth 200 2.563 1.545 1.660 0.097 -0.466 5.592 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this section, the theory of previous chapters was built on, putting the methodology for this 
study into action. 
The analysis began by considering fixed effects and random effects models, to determine 
which would yield the most efficient (and consistent) results.  A Sargan-Hansen statistic of 
951.755, with a p-value of 0.0000, indicated that a fixed effects specification was most 
appropriate.   
Focusing on the poverty line, the poverty dummy is not in Table 4.1 significant.  Removing 
income from the specification (Table 4.2) resulted in the poverty dummy becoming 
significant at 10% level, however the size of the coefficient was small in comparison to the 
coefficients on, for example, employment and marital status dummies.   
Decomposition analysis, to test for different wellbeing functions, indicated that there was a 
difference in the raw wellbeing between poor and non-poor individuals, of 0.9533 points on 
the scale of 0 to 36, however the majority (96%) of the difference is due to characteristics – 
data – rather than coefficients.   
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Finally, a regression discontinuity analysis (Table 4.4) aimed to determine whether there 
was a step-change in wellbeing around the poverty line.  Wald tests at three different 
bandwidths rejected this possibility, accepting the null hypothesis that there was no 
discernible difference in wellbeing on either side of the poverty line. 
In sum, this section suggests that although there may be mean differences in wellbeing 
above and below the poverty line, this is unlikely to be related to the line itself, rather to 
extremes of poverty and wealth.  The implications of this are discussed in the following 
section.     
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5 Conclusions 
Poverty is one of the most persistent economic ills blighting the whole world. Despite 
centuries of attention, it has not been banished.  When Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree and 
Charles Booth were investigating, and despairing of, poverty in the late Victorian era, 
cholera, TB, smallpox and polio were common, particularly amongst those in poverty.  We 
have now medicine to deal with all these diseases, but no remedy for poverty, which is still 
linked to ill health and increased mortality, poor education and high joblessness and general 
social exclusion even in developed countries like the UK, where there has been a generally 
upward trend in income since the industrial revolution.   
One of the greatest controversies in economics is whether more income gives people 
greater wellbeing.  Since Easterlin published his ‘paradox’ in 1973 interest in happiness 
economics has increased significantly, particularly within the last decade, yet we still don’t 
fully understand it and there are still divisions between the social sciences in how wellbeing 
should be treated.   
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, there is a school of thought calling for a 
“revolution” in social science where every academic should be attempting to understand 
what makes people happy, and furthermore happiness should be the explicit aim of 
government intervention (Layard, 2011).  Indeed there is evidence that governments are 
engaging with wellbeing research, with the UK and France setting out to specifically 
measure wellbeing.   
One of the main issues with this is that not everyone has the same concept of wellbeing in 
mind.  Definitions in the wellbeing spectrum range from quality of life, life satisfaction, 
satisfaction with components of life, evaluative judgements about wellbeing, affective states 
(happiness), biomarkers (cortisol levels or blood pressure) and so on.  A convincing case 
could be made for any of these concepts being a measure of wellbeing, and indeed they are 
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occasionally used interchangeably without much care given to relating the concept to 
varying interpretations or even to individuals.  
Different concepts of wellbeing will be suited to different analyses, and if we hope to 
understand what increases wellbeing, it is important to understand firstly, that happiness is 
individual, and secondly, that it has many levels, which apply to different spheres of an 
individual’s life at different times.  In this analysis, examining the impact of a particular form 
of poverty, a subjective wellbeing judgement was needed:  the 36-point Likert scale using 
GHQ data in the BHPS provided that measure, inverted to be increasing in well being. 
As well as discussing a concept of wellbeing, the definition of poverty was also considered.  
Like wellbeing, poverty has a number of possible meanings; most people would arguably 
assume poverty to be “a bad thing” yet there seems to be little reflection in poverty policy 
regarding what it actually means to be poor.  Most ‘official’ poverty measures used by 
governments and international organisations are either absolute or relative poverty lines.  
These lines have the benefit of being policy-accessible (i.e. they are easily measured and 
updated) however the positioning of the lines appears to be entirely arbitrary.   
One of the main criticisms of absolute poverty approaches is that they involve the setting of 
an arbitrary standard, for example a sum of money any individual should have to ensure 
their basic needs are met, but what if the preferences of the individual differ from those 
assumed in the poverty line?  The line may be totally irrelevant to those actually living in 
poverty.  Relative poverty lines – were the income distribution of a population – attempt to 
avoid this by being socially relevant, taking into account all incomes when setting the line.  
The official UK (and EU, and OECD) poverty line is set at 60% of the median household 
equivalised disposable income, but there is no justification why this particular threshold was 
chosen.  Even if this 60% threshold is socially relevant, is it individually relevant?  
Specifically, does living below the poverty line decrease ones wellbeing?  This one of the 
questions this paper set out to investigate.     
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Reviewing the literature on income and wellbeing provided a few clues to how poverty may 
relate to individual wellbeing.  Relative income has long been accepted as the more relevant 
measure of income with regard to happiness.  Studies suggest that relative settlements are 
more important than the absolute, but that there may not be a constant effect of any form of 
income across the income distribution:  income may well matter more to poor people than 
those who are wealthier.  If the poor and non-poor are two distinct groups, then very different 
policy treatment would be required, and decomposition analysis aimed to test the theory, 
providing this paper its second aim.     
Using controls for the frequently-included variables in wellbeing models – annual household 
equivalised income (in a natural logarithmic form to account for non-linearity in the income-
wellbeing relationship), age (both in continuous and squared forms, to represent a potential 
U-shaped relationship), employment status, marital status, gender and education – a panel 
dataset was constructed with BHPS data, including all members of each household that 
were over 16 and completed compulsory education, between the years of 1991 and 2008.   
Using fixed effects specifications, to account for unobserved personality effects thought to 
affect wellbeing directly and indirectly (by affecting responses to other factor), a poverty 
dummy was tested in a wellbeing function, but was only found to be significant when income 
was not included in the specification, and even then it was only significant at 10%.  The size 
of the coefficient was small – -0.083, compared with 0.844 for health or -1.978 for 
unemployment.   
With regard to the paper’s first aim therefore, to test whether the relative income poverty line 
was significant for individual wellbeing, I cannot say that this particular form of poverty 
appears to be an important determinant.   
Regarding the second aim, to test whether the poor and non poor were fundamentally 
different groups with different wellbeing functions, the decomposition analysis suggested 
that there was a difference in wellbeing between the two groups (0.9533 points on the 
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wellbeing scale of 0 to 36) however 96% of the difference is due to characteristics rather 
than coefficients.  
With regard to income the explanation is intuitive:  if an individual is poor, of course they 
have lower average income than an identical-in-every-other-way individual who is not poor, 
but they also have differences in education, health, employment status and marital status.  
That the effects of poverty are this wide ranging – yet poverty remains essentially unchecked 
in society – should be of great concern.   
In the final component of the analysis, a regression discontinuity examination aimed to 
determine whether there was a step-change in wellbeing around the poverty line.  Wald tests 
at three different bandwidths rejected this possibility, accepting the null hypothesis that there 
was no discernible difference in wellbeing on either side of the poverty line. 
Papers are always limited by their methodology, and this one is no exception.  Although I 
was able to control for fixed effects in the OLS model, one could argue that by not including 
fixed effects in the decomposition or regression discontinuity analyses, they may be exposed 
to biases.  The main issue with decomposition is that there is no widely accepted way to 
incorporate fixed effects, primarily because the fixed effects in question may well end up in 
the unexplained part of the output, with no easy way to tell them from the differences 
between the groups being tested.  That said, as I only interpreted the explained part of 
decomposition – the characteristics – omitted variables may not have biased the analysis 
enough to disregard the results.   
One of the main motivations for this paper was to examine the significance of the 60% 
median income threshold in determining wellbeing.  Although I can make only limited 
conclusions, the analysis appears to suggest that this arbitrary poverty line is not relevant for 
individuals.  This would be easy to imagine:  individuals may not care whether they are 
above or below a possibly uninformed standard that they may or may not be aware of, rather 
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they may be more affected by what their neighbours’ quality of life and income is, and their 
own historical incomes as well as expectations of future incomes.   
The relationship between poverty and ill health, mortality, low education, joblessness and so 
on may well be subject to positive feedback meaning that increasing the incomes of adults 
may not make any difference in their personal poverty cycle as the initial conditions have 
already determined the most likely path for their lives.  This is perhaps why child poverty is 
targeted specifically in the UK; investing in breaking the poverty cycle at an early stage may 
allow children to avoid the ill effects of poverty. 
The poverty line creates a dichotomy where individuals are either poor or not poor.  This is 
misrepresentative of the nature of poverty.  Poverty should be a continuous concept, from 
extreme to mild, with different analysis and treatments given to each group.  Obviously it has 
uses as a policy tool, as it focuses on the worst-off parts of the population, but, as Halleröd 
asserts, if we had a individually-meaningful measure of poverty in the first place we would 
not need a poverty line (Halleröd 2000).   
The observation that individuals adapt to their income – indeed this may be part of the 
reason why there appears to be no effect of poverty status on wellbeing in this investigation 
– means that people make do with persistent low income.  What they may not make do with 
is the effects that this low income has:  poor health and increased joblessness are both 
amongst the impacts of poverty, and are associated with lower wellbeing.   
Given the suggestion here that an arbitrary poverty line is not relevant at an individual level, 
the growing enthusiasm behind wellbeing research, policy and intervention, and the strength 
of evidence that wellbeing is about more than just income, we cannot hope to address 
poverty by focusing on solely income-based standards.  An obvious extension to this paper 
is therefore to investigate the significance of multi-dimensional poverty measures.  
Making poverty measures individually meaningful is arguably the best way to identify when 
individuals are suffering. Non-monetary and multi-dimensional measures of poverty are 
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believed by many to be the way forward as they are not believe to suffer from the adaptation 
issues that income poverty does.  Furthermore if we cannot assume that increasing income 
will improve wellbeing, we must look at aspects of life other than income to bring about 
improvements in individual happiness.  The Capabilities Approach championed by Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum, amongst others, attempts to build concepts of poverty that 
grasp its multidimensional nature, and although it is well received in development economics 
it is yet to be fully accepted for use in industrialised countries.   
Widely credited with inspiring the Human Development Index (Anand, Krishnakumar et al. 
2011), the Capabilities Approach has at its centre the individual, focusing on the ‘beings’ and 
‘doings’ that individuals value. 
These multi-dimensional approaches retain the socially relevant aspect that is important at a 
population level, but identify components of life within that population that make up ‘a good 
life’ and ensure that access to these components is not limited to those with higher wealth. 
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7 Appendix B – Decomposition Theory 
Decomposition techniques, based on the premise that there are two distinct groups in a 
population that have different characteristics, are commonly attributed to Blinder (1973) and 
Oaxaca (1973).  For example Oaxaca (1973) tested whether white and non-white individuals 
received different wages simply on the basis of their skin colour.   
Here I want to test whether the income-wellbeing relationship differs according to whether an 
individual is above or below the poverty line.  In this section the origins and basic theory of 
decomposition will be covered, along with some potential pitfalls that will be mitigated 
against in the analysis.  Finally a decomposition specification is developed for use in this 
paper. 
7.1 Basic technique 
Decomposition is used to analyse the differences between the groups in terms of their 
endowments and the coefficients on those endowments.   
For example, if we assume that Y and X are two related variables, but that the relationship 
may differ between poor and non-poor individuals: 
Y = 0 + X1 +         (1) 
Then we can say: 
Y = 0poor + Xpoor1poor + 1       (2) 
if the individual is ‘poor’ (p); and: 
Y = 0non-poor + Xnon-poor2non-poor + 2      (3) 
if the individual is ‘non-poor’ (np) , and the difference (assuming error terms are zero) is: 
Ynp – Yp = (0p – 0np) + (npXnp – pXp)     (4) 
If we have two components, for example X1 and X2, the equation becomes: 
Chapter 2:  The poverty line:  A step change in wellbeing? 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 66 
Ynp – Yp = (0np – 0p) + (1npX1np – 1pX1p)   
+ (2npX2np – 2pX2p)        (5) 
and so on.  So the overall difference is comprised of the gap between intercepts, the gap 
between x11 and the gap between X22.   
The next step is to look at the differences between the Xs (the endowments, the explained 
component) and the s (the coefficients, the unexplained component).  
It is possible to reduce equation 5 further, into two permissible formats: 
Ynp – Yp = Xp + Xnp       (6)  
or 
Ynp – Yp = Xnp + Xp      (7)  
Where: 
X = Xnp – Xp         (7a) 
and  
 = np – p.          (7b) 
Either solution provides us with a way of partitioning the gap in outcomes between the poor 
and non-poor into a part attributable to the fact that the poor have worse endowments than 
the non-poor, and a part attributable to the fact that they have (assumedly) worse 
coefficients than the non-poor. 
In the first version, equation 6, differences in the endowments (X) are weighted by the 
coefficients of the poor group (p) and the differences in the coefficients () are weighted 
by the endowments of the non-poor group (Xnp).   
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In the second version, equation 7, the opposite is true:  the differences in the endowments 
(X) are weighted by the coefficients of the non-poor (np) and the differences in the 
coefficients () are weighted by the endowments of the poor group.  
7.2 Complications 
7.2.1 Overestimation 
Jann (2008) points out that Oaxaca’s method can lead to overestimation of the importance 
of the explained component in decomposition (some group differences can spill over into the 
slope parameters in a pooled model – which has both groups together as a reference group 
with combined coefficients), and suggests using a variation which includes a group indicator 
in the model.  Jann (2008) also notes however that this issue has received little attention in 
the literature so it cannot be said to have been of paramount concern in other studies.   
7.2.2 Measurement error and the unexplained component of decomposition 
Jones suggested that researchers may wish to avoid using the unexplained component of 
decomposition, stating that it “…is in most applications arbitrary and uninterpretable…” if the 
results “…depend on arbitrary decisions about how to impose a metric on the variables…” 
(Jones 1983, p126).  In other words, any kind of measurement error can lead to the 
unexplained component being erroneously calculated.  With no mitigation currently available 
for this factor, the unexplained component of decomposition is ignored in most cases, as 
suggested by Jones and, amongst others, Cain (1986) and Fairlie (2005).   
7.2.3 Model specification 
A number of options exist that may allow the use of categorical, discrete or binary data in 
decomposition.  Fairlie developed a method that allowed the use of categorical data in the 
analysis of racial discrepancies in self-employment rates (1999).  This method, further 
developed by Fairlie (2005), allows the use of logit or probit models as the basis of the 
decomposition, rather than OLS, however he found that the non-linear decomposition 
technique he employed did not present significantly different results in all applications.  
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Sinning et al (2008) developed a method of applying a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
technique which (amongst other flexibilities) allows bootstrapping standard errors.  This 
method uses generalised linear decomposition developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) in the following form: 
Ya – Yb = (Xa – Xb)* + Xa(a – *) + Xb(*– b)   (8) 
Where: 
* = a + ( – )b       (8a) 
Here, the two groups are denoted ‘a’ and ‘b’,  is a weighting matrix and  an identity matrix.  
Different values of  will therefore change the importance placed on a and b respectively, 
thus altering the way I interpret the decomposition.  The original Blinder and Oaxaca models 
set  equal to  and a null matrix respectively.  Using Blinder’s example, the decomposition 
would be: 
Ya – Yb = (Xa – Xb)a + Xb(a – b)     (9) 
So, the difference in the endowments is weighted by the coefficient(s) of group ‘a’ and the 
difference in the coefficients is weighted by the endowment(s) of group ‘b’.   
Using Oaxaca’s specification: 
Ya – Yb = (Xa – Xb)b + Xa(a – b)     (10) 
the opposite is true; the difference in the endowments is weighted by the coefficient(s) of 
group ‘b’ and the difference in the coefficients is weighted by the endowment(s) of group ‘a’.  
Which value of  one should choose depends on which group you treat as the reference 
group, however there is no clear consensus in the literature as to how this should be done.   
Jann (2008) suggests that decomposition can be done threefold – where results are 
calculated using each of the groups and a combined model as reference groups – or as a 
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pooled model which just uses the combination of the two groups as a reference group (so 
assumes that there are no differences between the two groups) but does not fully explain in 
which context each specification would be applicable.  As each version would provide 
different estimates, Fairlie (2005) suggests that just using the pooled model may relieve the 
researcher of the need to choose between specifications, but even that has potential pitfalls 
(see Section 7.2.1).  
7.3 Direction of ‘discrimination’ 
Neumark (1988) applied Oaxaca’s method (1973) to wage differentials between men and 
women, with the following analysis:  If we use a specification where the difference in 
endowments is weighted by the coefficient(s) of group ‘a’ (in his study, this was men), we 
would assume that if there were no discrimination the male wage rate would be applied to 
both men and women (so in the data women are discriminated against).  If the coefficients of 
group ‘b’ (women) were used we would be assuming that the female wage rate would 
prevail, therefore in Oaxaca’s model men receive a wage ‘bonus’ just for being men.  
For the decomposition analysis, it could be beneficial to analyse whether poor people should 
be less happy because they are poor (they face happiness ‘discrimination’) or that non-poor 
people are happier because they are not poor (the higher income brings them ‘bonus’ 
happiness), however as discussed in the main section of this paper, wellbeing arguably has 
time-invariant components that individuals cannot consciously change, so determining 
whether there is ‘happiness discrimination’ against the poor, or ‘happiness nepotism’ for the 
non-poor or anywhere in between would be a paper unto itself.   
Neumark (1988) took the middle ground and said that for his data, employers were both 
discriminatory towards women and nepotistic towards men.  Given that Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994)  use a pooled model, and Fairlie (2005) suggests its use to avoid mis-specifying ones 
model, a pooled model is on balance the most appropriate choice.  
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7.4 Poor/ non-poor decomposition 
The decomposition method employed here will analyse whether an individual living in a 
‘poor’ household has lower subjective wellbeing than a similar individual living in a 
‘counterfactual’ household – where I assume there are no differences between the poor and 
non-poor.  A decomposition process for linear and non-linear models, developed by Sinning 
et al (Sinning, Hahn et al. 2008), will be used with an ordered logit base to make the results 
at least partially consistent with the fixed effects regression.  
The form of the model – where W is wellbeing, X is a vector of explanatory variables, i 
represents the individual and j the wave – will be: 
Wpoor,i,j – Wnon-poor,i,j = (Xpoor,i,j – Xnon-poor,i,j)* + Xpoor,i,j (poor,i,j – *) + Xnon-poor,i,j (*– non-
poor,i,j)          (11) 
* = i,j poor,i,j + ( – i,j )non-poor,i,j     (11a) 
Furthermore this analysis will follow Neumark’s (1988) example, setting  equal to the 
coefficients of the pooled model (both groups estimated together) and  an identity matrix.   
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8 Appendix C – Additional Tables 
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9 Appendix D – Notes on Happiness 
Author’s note:  This appendix is an extended version of Section 2 of this thesis.  If you have 
read Section 2, you do not need to read this section:  there is substantial repetition of 
Section 2, but this appendix contains more discussion and a wider range of evidence, 
particularly regarding correlates of wellbeing.  Much of the latter is not important for the 
progression of the paper, hence why it has been relegated here, but is included to show that 
I have done my due diligence in investigating wellbeing issues.   
9.1 Utility, Happiness, Well-being, Welfare 
The difficulty in pinpointing exactly what is meant by individual wellbeing is well known:   
“One could be well off, without being well. One could be well, without being able to 
lead the life he or she wanted. One could have got the life he or she wanted, without 
being happy. One could be happy, without having much freedom. One could have a 
good deal of freedom, without achieving much. We can go on.”  (Sen 1999, p3)   
Wellbeing (subjective and objective), happiness and welfare can often be seen as 
interchangeable.  Frey and Stutzer (2002, p408) define subjective wellbeing as “scientific 
term used in psychology for an individual’s evaluation of his or her experienced positive and 
negative affect, happiness and satisfaction with life”.  However, referring back to Sen’s quote 
above, different components should be seen as a separable construct. 
The terminology used to define the concept of wellbeing differs frustratingly from paper to 
paper.  Kahneman, Diener and Schwartz (2003) address this issue when they discuss the 
different levels of quality of life when applied to what they term hedonic psychology – the 
study of what makes experiences and life pleasant or unpleasant.   
9.1.1 Utility 
Bentham (1907) originally envisaged utility to be a balance of pleasure and pain, which 
should be the guiding influence to our actions.  However his intention was for the term to be 
used much more broadly than we would even consider pleasure and pain (experienced 
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utility) today (Stigler 1950):  he intended it to be the foundation of a rational system for civil 
and criminal law.  Rather than being a straightforward calculation, he purported that pleasure 
or pain would be measured in a context-specific manner that would take into account an 
individuals sensibility – dependent on age, gender, education, health and so on (Stigler 
1950).  So we can already see that experienced utility as we see it is less subjective, and 
Bentham’s version suffers the criticism of non-intra-comparability which drove neoclassical 
economists to depart from the subjective concept altogether14.   
The ‘Ordinalist Revolution’ as Kimball and Willis (2006) refer to it, converted the ‘positive 
feeling’ or ‘greatest good’ notion of utility to a version that only represented individuals’ 
preferences over alternatives.  Utility became computable and comparable:  individuals were 
assumed to maximise their utility, subject to constraints, and that governed their behaviour – 
they maximised their utility by exchange (Stigler 1950).  This new concept of utility became 
formalised over the recent history of economics, becoming an unavoidable (and valuable, in 
many cases) part of the discipline, however it was now a significant departure from how 
Bentham intended.  Its limitations – such as being essentially un-measurable – also began 
to appear.   
Classical economists, such as Jevons (1888), wanted to directly measure happiness, stating 
“in this work I have attempted to treat Economy as a Calculus of Pleasure and Pain.” (ibid., 
p3).  In the absence of that direct measurement, they believed that the closest alternative 
was observing economic behaviour, where choices were made on the basis of utility.  
Following that, marginal utility  (as opposed to total utility – total pleasure or pain) replaced 
total utility and happiness as the subject of economic analysis; what economists, such as 
Marshall, became interested it was the additional utility gained from market actions (Read 
2007).   
                                               
14
 Bentham, however, assumed comparability for his concept anyway on the basis that it was 
desirable (Stigler 1950) 
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Although marginal utility told us nothing about the amount of utility, it did intend to give some 
idea of the change in utility, however it became the belief of some that utility did not need 
any type of measurement to be useful.  Demand functions could be computed from 
observing consumer choices, and utility became an entity that was mathematicised (Stigler 
1950).  It bore little relation to Bentham’s pleasure-pain indicator.   
For some time, Easterlin was the only modern economist giving any attention to happiness15 
(Read 2007), but, as discussed above, it has attracted a significant increase in attention in 
recent years, with growing interest in its measurement (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Frijters 2004).  
There is a stream of economics, inspired partly by Kahneman (1999), which believes that 
there is measurable good that comes out of choices – experienced utility.  Although it 
doesn’t represent what Bentham envisaged, it does allow hedonic interpretation of utility.  
Kahneman is quite careful, however, to precisely define what it is he is referring to (Read 
2007).  Part of the difficulty in research happiness is that not everyone takes such care, and 
this leads to contradictory findings between papers.  In the section below, Kahneman’s 
continuum of wellbeing is discussed.              
9.1.2 Wellbeing and Happiness 
Life does not involve simply a balance of pleasant versus unpleasant experiences, it 
involves several aspects – including happiness and subjective well-being – as detailed in 
Figure 9.1 below, taken from Kahneman et al (2003).  Here we can see that establishing a 
concept of a good life – arguably what everyone wishes to achieve for themselves and their 
loved ones – is not straightforward.   
                                               
15
 In his 1974 paper he looked at life satisfaction on a 1-10 scale, rather than moment based 
happiness 
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Figure 9.1 – Levels in the analysis of quality of life  
 
Source:  Kahneman et al (Kahneman, Diener et al. 2003) 
At the uppermost level of the diagram above, cultural and social context come into play, 
along with exogenous characteristics such as poverty incidence, infant mortality, crime or 
pollution – how individuals view a good life.  This is followed by subjective well-being – a 
judgement of the overall quality of ones life.  
All of these aspects so far are inextricably influenced by persistent moods; this represents 
the characteristics and personalities of individuals (some people might be chronically happy, 
others generally miserable regardless of the other aspects of their quality of life) that will 
differ widely between individuals.   
At the lower levels of the diagram, real-time affective states are related to the current 
situation – pleasure or displeasure (happiness/ unhappiness).  There are multiple aspects to 
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this; the influence of both past and present situations and the transient physiological and 
chemical changes involved in the experience.   
Finally, underpinning all other components of quality of life, neural systems and the 
biochemistry together regulate the way we respond to situations; this level is arguably the 
foundation of all the others, and it will differ on an individual basis, adding complexity and 
uncertainty to any quality of life judgement. Given this multi-level and individual-specific 
description of a good life, that we hope to measure it on an individual basis is highly 
ambitious. 
9.1.3 Welfare 
Welfare is another concept altogether, and is more commonly associated with output-based 
measures of quality of life; traditionally welfare refers to utility and it is determined by 
efficiency in economic activity.  Within happiness economics, particularly the Leyden school 
of thought, welfare can be seen as utility of income (on the assumption that individuals are 
able to assess that utility) rather than the states of mind or emotion (Van Praag, Frijters 
1999) discussed above, however Kahneman and Deaton (2010) find that although income 
buys people’s life evaluations, it does not buy their daily emotional well-being, after a 
threshold, somewhat invalidating this view.   
Without making any statements or judgements regarding other definitions, this thesis 
focuses on the concept of subjective well-being (henceforth referred to as wellbeing) used 
by Kahneman et al (2003); they argue that this is the ‘centre of the story’ along with 
happiness, however happiness (as in the affective state) is not particularly suited to 
assessing the impact of poverty or capabilities as it is primarily a real-time emotion, and the 
factors I measure change over the space of a year.  What is needed here is a higher level 
(with reference to Figure 9.1) measure, as poverty is not a momentary event, it is a state.  
Various determinants for the whole spectrum of wellbeing are discussed below, with the 
issue of personality discussed later.   
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9.2 Determinants and influences 
Interest in happiness economics has increased significantly according to the number of 
journal articles published focusing on happiness, leading to a vastly increased 
understanding of the determinants and influences on individual wellbeing: personality and 
genetic factors, socio-demographic factors, economic factors, contextual and situational 
factors and institutional factors (Frey, Stutzer 2010).  
Argyle (2003) suggests that much of the information we now have about the causes and 
correlates of happiness is founded on Cantril (1965) and the myriad social surveys that 
followed.  Most of the studies Argyle cites find that demographic variables all correlate with 
subjective wellbeing, but Andrews and Withey (1976) conclude that many of the 
relationships were fairly weak, with just 10% of the variance accounted for between 
variables.  Diener (1984) did not contradict this position, but found explanatory variables 
responsible for 15% of the variance.  This is somewhat explained by Inglehart (1990) who 
suggests that aspirations and expectations may have a greater role to play than raw 
observations alone.  The effects of aspirations, achievements, adaptation and relativity are 
now well recognised as important determinants of wellbeing and determinants of the role 
other explanatory variables have to play.  I will refer to these factors as I discuss the 
determinants commonly included in wellbeing analyses.   
9.3 Economic Factors 
9.3.1 Income and Consumption 
The relationship between income and wellbeing is controversial and complex, with the 
finding of the Easterlin paradox well widely recognised and regularly discussed (Frey, 
Stutzer 2002).  One of the main reasons that income does not translate particularly easily to 
greater wellbeing, a reason that Easterlin accepts as valid (Easterlin 2001), is that 
individuals compare:  They compare their incomes, jobs, education, purchases, statuses and 
so on to, both, other people they deem ‘peers’ and to other times within their own lives.  The 
concepts of aspiration and interdependent preferences are recognised complications in the 
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happiness-income relationship and are supported by experimental studies showing the 
importance of relative judgements for happiness outcomes (Smith, Diener et al. 1989, 
Tversky, Griffin 1991). 
Following on from the concept of comparison, it is widely recognised that individuals ‘adapt’.  
As Frey and Stutzer state: 
“One of the most important processes people go through is that of adjusting to past 
experiences.  Human beings are unable and unwilling to make absolute judgements.  
Rather, they are constantly drawing comparisons from the past of from their 
expectations of the future.  Thus, we notice and react to deviations from aspiration 
levels.” (Frey, Stutzer 2002) 
Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) suggest that although adaptation is typically to 
retrospective stimuli, it can also depend on anticipation of future stimuli (aspirations).  This is 
reflected in Goedhart, Halberstadt, Kapteyn and Van Praag (1977) who find that what 
income people deem “sufficient” depends partially on their expectations for the future.  
These phenomena have, as mentioned above, been found to be important but are difficult to 
include in wellbeing models as they are inherently hard to measure and are context specific.    
In addition, people tend to make judgements about their lives based on and aspiration level 
that is formed by their hopes and expectations.  How they are progressing towards their 
aspirations determines in part how satisfied they are with their lives (Frey, Stutzer 2010).  
The problem is that because people adapt, and that they compare, inevitably leads to the 
development of new aspirations.  This ‘hedonic treadmill’, where people constantly strive to 
better their position but then adapt and raise their goals, thus gaining no additional 
satisfaction, is widely acknowledged in happiness literature.   
A further issue is that consumption may be a greater influence on wellbeing than income; 
people may be affected more by what their income allows them to purchase than the income 
itself (sitting unused in a bank account).  Weinzierl (2005) suggests that income is only a 
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“noisy proxy” for consumption however consumption is difficult to measure for several 
reasons.  
Firstly, consumption occurs not only in the direct form (purchases) but also in deferred (via 
savings) and indirect (public goods, transfers in kind) forms.  Secondly, people spend not 
only their personal income from wages/ interest/ dividends and so on, they also spend on 
credit.  It is entirely possible that someone could have a poverty-level income but a non-poor 
level of consumption.  Of course credit has to be re-paid but how these repayments are 
classified in terms of consumption is not clear.     
Thirdly, individuals are unlikely to recall how much of their income they have saved and how 
much they have spent, and that they are unlikely to be able to discern how to count 
consumption of durable goods like cars or cookers; these are purchased at time T but used 
for many periods after that – are they still being consumed as they are used or is 
consumption just the act of purchasing?  It is impossible to say how long an individual 
intends to extract utility from a durable purchase and even if asked, that individual may not 
know themselves (for example, they may not know that their tastes will change or other 
events may force the item to be replaced).   
In addition, it is widely recognised that the income-consumption relationship is not constant 
across individuals, particularly with regard to age.  In general it is assumed that younger 
people save more than older people, meaning that consumption wouldn’t have to same 
coefficient across all ages, but the switchover between saving and dis-saving is likely to be 
highly individual (Clark, Frijters et al. 2008). 
Heady and Wooden (2004) use net worth in the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia survey, as a measure of consumption and found that it matters at least as much as 
income, arguing that net worth is a better proxy than the household income measure which 
they saw as transitory.  Equivalised disposable income might also represent a more 
meaningful proxy for consumption, particularly in developed countries where basic needs 
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(food, shelter, water, heat and so on) can usually be met with minimum income, 
supplemented by social transfers.   
The effect of income on wellbeing will also vary across the income distribution.  Although 
income generally has a positive significant coefficient in wellbeing regressions, the income-
wellbeing relationship is not linear; they observe that a doubling of income within the bottom 
five deciles if income resulted in an increase of 0.05 score points of happiness, whereas a 
doubling of income in the top five deciles results in an increase of 0.03 score points; there 
appear to be diminishing marginal returns to income (Frey, Stutzer 2002).  In estimating the 
marginal utility of income, Layard et al (2008) found that elasticity with respect to income is 
smaller than negative-one.  
Measurement concerns can limit the strength of any conclusions; Frey and Stutzer (2012) 
raise the issues of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, along with limitations on the 
information available explaining variation in individual or household income.  For example, 
they differentiate between the increased earnings from working longer hours or having a 
more stressful job and increased income from a windfall; these would obviously have 
different impacts on wellbeing but income data in panel surveys does not often provide the 
information needed to make these kind of distinctions. 
Omitting personality variables may mean that income is potentially endogenous (happier 
people get better jobs); this can be mitigated somewhat by using fixed effects models for 
panel data but even then time-varying factors that lead to both greater happiness and 
greater income (for example a cure for a life-affecting illness) are difficult to control for.  
Partially exogenous income changes (through lottery participation) have been analysed by 
Gardner and Oswald and Brickman et al (Brickman, Coates et al. 1978, Gardner, Oswald 
2007); both of these studies suggest that income does bring about greater wellbeing but only 
for larger sums of money (£1,000 and upwards) and only in the short term.   
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Missing variables can lead to slope heterogeneity, in this case suggesting that individuals 
have different marginal benefit from income.  Clark et al suggest that there are more often 
than not such omitted variables but that we can’t hope to always know what they are (Clark, 
Frijters et al. 2008).  They cite Lelkes (2006) as an example; Lelkes found that those who 
were religious were less affected in wellbeing terms by income changes during economic 
transition in Hungary.  Clark et al found four different ‘classes’ (using latent class analysis) in 
terms of both intercept and the coefficient on income within the European Community 
Household Panel (Clark, Etilé et al. 2005).   
9.3.2 Employment and Leisure 
Employment is a less complex concept than income, with regard to wellbeing at least, 
however as with all data we need to be sure about what we are measuring.  Unemployment 
in particular could take one of several definitions:  simply not working (regardless of ability), 
being disengaged from the labour market (able to work but not looking), being economically 
active but unable to find a job despite looking or being in receipt of unemployment benefit.  It 
is the penultimate definition that is most commonly accepted and this is the definition used in 
this study16.  It is differentiated from other forms of not-working, specifically family care, 
retirement, training or long-term sickness.     
The benefits of employment and ills of unemployment are well recognised throughout the 
happiness literature, although it does affect people differently.  For example unemployment 
has greater negative effects on men, those who are single and those who are working-class, 
and the negative effects increase as the period of unemployment increases.   
Even when controlling for income, education and marital status, employment still has 
significant effects on wellbeing (causes and correlations).  Di Tella et al (2001) found that life 
                                               
16
 The penultimate and the final definitions are often synonymous, but the ever-changing nature of the 
benefits system means the final definition is not consistent.  The data used in this study is in panel 
format, with the employment categories closely matched between years, even if political definitions 
change.     
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satisfaction was much lower for those who were unemployed than those in employment with 
otherwise similar characteristics. 
As employment brings about significant effects on wellbeing even when other happiness 
determinants are included, individual unemployment involves psychic costs due to a loss of 
social status, self-esteem, personal relationships and the time structure involved in working 
(Frey, Stutzer 2010).  The adaptation effects individuals may have to income are not present 
in the wellbeing-employment relationship; long-term studies reveal limited adaptation to 
unemployment as well as negative effects even after re-employment indicating that 
unemployment is particularly and persistently damaging to subjective wellbeing (Clark, 
Georgellis 2012, Knabe, Rätzel 2011).   
Regarding those who are not employed due to exit from the labour market (economically 
inactive), the wellbeing effects on those who choose not to work are not well understood, for 
example, in the case of parents who stay at home, because of a limited analysis of the 
interactions between family life and work in the economics literature (Argyle 2003).   
The wellbeing effects of retirement are usually positive (Argyle 2003, Veenhoven 2004) 
however this may be due to a larger amount of leisure time being available; it is recognised 
that engaging in activities and/ or sports have a positive effect on wellbeing which persists 
even after controlling for employment, class and income (Biddle, Mutrie 2008, Thayer 1989).    
9.4 Socio-demographic Factors 
9.4.1 Education 
Education does not have a consistently strong or consistently positive effect on wellbeing.  In 
the US and Europe it has a very weak (positive) effect, but a much stronger effect in 
developing countries (Veenhoven 2004).  Education is closely linked with income and 
occupational status, and in a meta study Witter, Okun, Stock and Haring (1984) found that it 
affects subjective wellbeing primarily by influencing occupational status.  
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Clark and Oswald found that education in developed countries can have a negative effect on 
wellbeing as it creates aspirations and expectations of higher income that don’t necessarily 
materialise.  Argyle (2003) notes that the anecdotal self-esteem and optimism effects of 
education are unproven, and Clark and Oswald (1994) back this up, reporting that the highly 
educated are more distressed and adapt less than the less well educated to spells of 
unemployment.   
9.4.2 Age 
The relationship between age and wellbeing is interesting, in that there is no clear 
consensus in the literature regarding its form.  Horley and Lavery (1995) found that the old 
were less happy than the young, and in some ways they may appear to be ‘worse off’ 
(poorer health, lower income, diminishing social circle), however many studies (such as 
Argyle 2003) found that age had a positive coefficient in happiness regressions.  This 
discrepancy may be due to non-linearity; Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) identified a U-
shaped relationship between age and happiness, where the young and the old are happier 
than those who are middle aged.  There is a large caveat attached to this however; 
happiness in old age depends on health, although even controlling for health leaves older 
people generally happier than those around 40 years old.   
The aforementioned U-shape may be attributed to adaptation and changing aspirations:  
older people have more life experience, know themselves better, have more realistic 
expectations and fewer life-goals (for example ‘get a good job’, ‘get married’) to achieve, as 
well as having had time to pre-adapt to ageing and retirement – unlike redundancy, 
retirement tends to be expected.  Although their income is (most likely) lower, they will have 
more leisure time, health allowing, and their peers may be in the same position meaning that 
the psychic costs of not working can be mitigated (their reference group is retired/ older too) 
(Frey, Stutzer 2010).   
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Frey and Stutzer (2010) note the general difficulty of capturing the effect of age on 
wellbeing.  Firstly the interpretation of any wellbeing questions may change over time, even 
within the same individual.  Looking back at Figure 9.1 we can see that there are dynamic 
elements within quality of life assessments that will change over time.  The reference group 
individuals use to compare themselves with may also change.  There is also a cohort effect 
that may be interfering with the age effect; Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) found, in a study 
of young Americans and Europeans, that individuals get happier over time, implying it is time 
elapsed and not age that increases wellbeing.  Finally, we cannot assume that the causation 
is unidirectional; happy people may well live longer (Diener, Chan 2011).   
In summary age is another difficult factor to control for.  The general consensus from the 
literature on age and happiness is that different age cohorts have differently shaped 
happiness functions, and that the young and old have greater wellbeing than the middle-
aged.  
9.4.3 Gender 
In World Values Survey data, Inglehart (1990) found that women had higher levels of self-
reported happiness than men, albeit only slightly, however Kessler, McGonagal, Swartz, 
Blazer and Nelson (1993) revealed that women had a higher incidence of mood and anxiety 
disorders, and Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) found that American women exhibited a 
decline in wellbeing between the 1970s and 1990s. These observations appear 
contradictory at first glance, but it could be due to a greater propensity for women to 
experience emotion; indeed women on average experience both more extreme positive 
emotions and more extreme negative emotions so when they experience negative emotions 
they are very unhappy (as opposed to unhappy) and when the experience positive emotions 
they are very happy (as opposed to happy) meaning the distribution is more polarised than 
that for men ((Wood, Rhodes et al. 1989) cited in (Frey, Stutzer 2010)).   
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Another possible explanation for gender differences is that the reduction in discrimination 
against women in all spheres of life has raised aspirations, and created expectations that 
have overshot reality; for example wage equality has not yet been achieved on aggregate, 
and earning less than a man for the same work would make women less happy.  
9.4.4 Marriage 
Marriage is one of the most frequently observed strong correlates of wellbeing, with positive 
effects remaining after controlling for income, age, gender and so on (Argyle 2003).  Argyle 
goes on to suggest the main reasons for this relationship are that marriage provides an 
additional source of self-esteem and support, and that married people suffer less from 
loneliness; man is, according to Aristotle, a social animal(Frey, Stutzer 2010). 
A selection effect – happy people are more likely to get and stay married – is possible 
however the effect is not thought to be strong, so the positive effect of marriage on wellbeing 
is mainly assumed to be due to marriage itself (Frey, Stutzer 2010).  Married people report 
experiencing greater wellbeing than those who have never married (so are therefore single, 
or cohabiting for example), those who are divorced, separated or widowed, and the effects 
are similar for both men and women (Diener, Biswas-Diener 2002).   
9.4.5 Health 
The causal effects going from health to happiness are not clear:  one may easily assume 
that healthy people have greater wellbeing, however one could just as easily argue that 
happy people may forget about or ignore physical health problems; as mentioned previously, 
Diener and Chan (2011) suggest that happiness is beneficial for health and for increasing 
longevity.  Omitted variables – particularly personality, or genetic make-up, both of which 
can effect physical and mental health – will come into play again.    
Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) found that people can adapt (albeit only partially) to health 
conditions:  they observed that 50% of the wellbeing effect for moderate disability and 30% 
of the effect for severe disability had dissipated within three years.   
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The severity of health conditions will obviously influence the effect on wellbeing, as will 
individual tolerances.  Generally, we can assume that the less sever the health condition, the 
more likely the individual can adapt to it however in all cases it is possible that even for 
severe health conditions, individuals are not as unhappy as they expected they would be 
(Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman, 1978).  
All of these observations could be influenced by personality effects, both in terms of health 
itself and adaptation to health changes; those with a generally optimistic outlook might adapt 
to a greater extent (or tolerate more) than those who are serially pessimistic.  Using a fixed 
effects specification will in some way mitigate these effects, meaning that health should then 
be independent of personality.  Fixed effects regressions are used throughout this study, in 
places compared with random effects models to confirm the correct specification. 
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Chapter 3:  Capabilities and wellbeing:  A new 
direction for poverty policy? 
 
Abstract 
Multidimensional poverty, such as that identified within the Capabilities Approach, has a 
wider realm of impacts than a ‘traditional’ monetary poverty measure like as a poverty line, 
which only focuses on what people can buy.  The Capabilities Approach, which focuses on 
what they can be and do, may be more relevant on an individual basis, and may therefore 
affect wellbeing.  Here, capability information is extracted from the British Household Panel 
Survey, and underlying capability factors (created using principal components analysis) are 
found to be significant both in sum and individually.  Capability poverty may therefore be a 
more accurate representation of what poverty is, and thus monetary transfers – without 
access to freedoms – may have limited use in poverty mitigation.    
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10 Introduction 
Over the past few decades the concept of capabilities and the Capabilities Approach have 
become accepted as quality of life tools in developing countries, influencing the creation and 
structure of the Human Development Index (Anand, Krishnakumar et al. 2011).  Created by 
Amartya Sen (1979, 1985, 1992, 1999 amongst others) as an alternative to welfare 
economics, capabilities are beginning to enter the economics of the developed world, with 
authors such as Anand, Hunter and Smith (2005), Anand, Santos and Hunter (2007) and 
Veenhoven (2011) examining capabilities in Europe.   
Sen’s objections to the use of the principles of welfare economics in assessing quality of life 
are numerous and complex but can be summarised into a few key points.  Traditionally, 
welfare economics was based on assessment of utility, which was intended to be the aspect 
of life all consumers wished to maximise, so that overall quality of life was essentially 
measured by the contribution of each activity in which the individual was engaged to his/her 
utility. This eventually became a tautology – because individuals are engaged in an activity 
and individuals are rational utility maximisers, this activity must be a utility maximising 
activity.   However this process says nothing about individuals’ freedoms, choices, 
opportunities or abilities.  Secondly ‘welfarism’, as Sen (1979) refers to it, is based on 
models, equations and principles that – in order to formalise them – are highly abstract from 
reality.  Even if they did resemble one reality, it is unlikely that with the social differentiation 
within countries, let alone across the world, the models would be relevant in many realities.  
These assertions, along with the dissatisfaction with welfare-based development policy and 
treatment of poverty in developing countries, have led to the development of the Capabilities 
Approach and its growing operationalisation.   
The Capabilities Approach, henceforth CA, has within it two core concepts:  capabilities and 
functionings.  The approach focuses on what people are able to be and do – the beings and 
doings are functionings, and capabilities are what underlie these functionings:  they provide 
individuals with the means to achieve functionings, via the utilisation of resources such as 
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money.  Resources can only be converted to functionings if there is a capability present, and 
functionings are only valuable if the individual has had the freedom to achieve them.  This 
provides the foundation of multidimensional approach that the CA embodies:  there are 
many things that people can be and do, but to be ‘well’ and to have ‘a good life’ they need to 
be able to choose beings and doings from a bundle of possibilities.  The multitude of beings 
and doings gives rise to multidimensionality of capabilities, and highlights the weakness in 
traditional monetary assessment of poverty, which only focuses on what people can buy.   
In Chapter 2 the limitations of the standard poverty measure in the UK, and indeed many 
developed countries, were discussed, arriving at a conclusion that this standard measure 
seemed unimportant for individual wellbeing and furthermore may be an inappropriate 
measure of poverty as it focuses on only one sphere of life – financial resources.  There 
appeared to be no difference in wellbeing above and below the specified poverty line, and it 
was hypothesised that poverty meant more than having less money than others:  it was 
multidimensional, and the impact of being ‘poor’ in any one of those domains may be more 
important than money itself, particularly when benefits act as a financial safety net.   
The CA is usually applied in development economics, where very limited economic 
resources often means that individuals are not able to realise the potential functionings from 
their capabilities, however this paper is written on the basis that it also applies in developed 
countries:  a good life as arguably something that all humans strive for, and the CA, as an 
analytical tool for of quality of life, can therefore be applied anywhere where quality of life is 
important; certainly Sen gave no indication that its use was to be restricted to developing 
countries only.     
Futhermore, the capability failures in the UK may not, unless in very extreme cases, result in 
starvation, premature death from treatable illness or exposure to the elements, but they can 
affect individual lives in the developed world nonetheless (through deprivation in multiple 
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aspects, such as health – mental and physical, education or environment), and this paper 
hypothesises that capability failures can lead to lower wellbeing.     
Sen argues that the CA and what he terms the happiness approach to quality of life are 
almost rival, however this paper, along with others such as Binder (2013) believe that this 
does not have to be the case.  As I will discuss, adaptation need not be a limitation to 
happiness research; in fact it may prove useful as adaptation leads to revised aspirations, 
which could be a positive influence on wellbeing.  Another limitation with wellbeing research 
is that happiness, wellbeing - subjective and otherwise - and quality of life are so frequently 
used interchangeably without prior definition of the concept being analysed, leading to 
confusion in the understanding of its determinants (the Easterlin Paradox being perhaps the 
most famous controversy that can be challenged by using a different measure of happiness).   
On this basis, it is not contradictory to say that capabilities may influence wellbeing, where 
wellbeing is taken as a component of an individual’s life – here, the perception of her 
position related to her personal ideals, aspirations and judgements (as defined in Chapter 2).  
In the same way it is not contradictory to say that having an overall greater quality of life may 
mean that at any one time an individual is more likely to experience higher momentary 
happiness than they would have done when their overall quality of life was lower.  Of course 
we cannot assume that this is the always case, but it is not illogical to conclude that it is 
possible, and this provides the foundation for this paper:  do capabilities result in greater 
wellbeing? 
This question is addressed by Anand et al (2005), who set a precedent for extracting 
capability information from an established dataset, specifically, the British Household Panel 
Survey (henceforth BHPS).  Using a list of core capabilities (Nussbaum 2011), they find that 
capabilities are important for individual wellbeing in one particular year of the survey.   
This paper aims to investigate the importance of capabilities for individual wellbeing, 
furthering Anand et al’s work by employing principal components analysis to target the 
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capability underlying the chosen BHPS variables and by using the whole duration of the 
survey (rather than one year). 
The paper continues as follows: Section 11 discusses literature on the Capabilities Approach 
and how it relates to wellbeing.  Section 12 uses information on this latter relationship to 
feed into the development of a methodology to analyse how individual and total capabilities 
affect a given definition of life satisfaction.  This section also presents the data to be used in 
the empirical analysis, which is undertaken in Section 13.  Section 14 summarises this paper 
and discusses the potential implications.   
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11 Capabilities, Poverty and Wellbeing 
The Capabilities Approach has been seen for some decades as an important alternative to 
quality of life assessment in developing countries, avoiding the arbitrariness of threshold-
style poverty measurements and the adaptation problem associated with happiness 
measurement.  In this section, the Capabilities Approach will be described, before 
discussing the relationship between capabilities and happiness, and the difference between 
capability poverty and income poverty, providing the foundations for the subsequent 
analysis. 
11.1 The Capabilities Approach 
The Capabilities Approach (henceforth CA) focuses on what individuals are able to be and 
do in their lives (Sen 1985).  It can be seen as an approach to comparative quality of life 
assessment and to theorising about basic social justice, where each person is an ‘end'17, not 
just as part of a total or average wellbeing of a nation.  The approach is centred on choice or 
freedom, holding that the crucial good that societies should be promoting for their people is a 
set of opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or may not exercise in 
action:  the choice is theirs (Nussbaum 2011). 
The two core concepts of the CA are capabilities and functionings.  Sen (1985) sees 
capabilities as what people are able to do or able to be.  These are different from what 
individuals actually do and experience; this latter concept is termed functioning, where 
functionings can vary from the elementary, such as having sufficient nutrition, to more 
complex activities such as feeling no shame within a community.  The concept of capability 
therefore refers to the feasible alternative combinations of these functionings to bring about 
a certain outcome (Anand et al, 2005).   
The CA can be synthesised into a chain of different concepts linking goods to utility: 
                                               
17
 By ends, the CA doesn’t just mean existence, it means flourishing – so a flourishing human life 
should be the ends of social justice and therefore policy.   
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 Non market goods e.g. environment, are in the set of available goods for choice; 
 Goods are transformed into characteristics as ultimate desirable properties, so that 
the same properties can be found in different goods; 
 The functioning set is the individual’s actual achievement in enjoying the 
characteristics of the chosen goods (like the body’s functioning of absorbing nutrition 
from food); 
 The capability set is the individual’s potential achievement in enjoying the 
characteristics, e.g. fasting for health or religious reasons; 
 Evaluation is the ability to rank the capability sets.  (Sen 1985) 
The ‘core’ capabilities that should be the goal of a good society, as seen by Nussbaum 
(2011), can be either internal or combined, where internal capabilities represent a person’s 
intrinsic ability (also referred to as basic capabilities) and combined capabilities are those 
created by a combination of internal capabilities the political, social and economic 
environment an individual is part of.  Functionings in this context are the active realisations 
of capabilities, but do not alone indicate the presence of capability; in the CA, choice is an 
important component.  We can illustrate this by considering two individuals, neither of whom 
is receiving treatment for a medical condition.  Both have the same functioning – an illness – 
but they do not have the same capability if one individual chooses not to receive treatment 
but the other would prefer treatment but is denied it for whatever reason.  Only the individual 
whose choice is realised has a functioning that derives from a capability.     
Sen’s (1985) assertions that choice provides the functioning derived from a capability, are 
replicated in Sudgen’s (1998) opinion that it is the opportunity to achieve a functioning that is 
valuable, rather than the functioning itself.  He sees opportunity as valuable for three 
reasons: 
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 Individuals lead richer lives, more closely resembling their own desires, if the set of 
opportunities they can choose from is richer; 
 Having choice and making decisions is important for mental wellbeing; 
 A greater range of choices provides individuals with a greater number of possibilities 
for achieving her or his ‘ends’.  (Sudgen 1998) 
We cannot assume that functionings follow from capabilities, thus, measurement of 
capabilities will have to address the issue of whether it is a capability or a functioning being 
measured.  This is an aspect that will be taken up in Section 12. 
If we say that c is an n-dimensional vector measuring capabilities, giving rise to a value 
measured by a real scalar, then: 
 : Rn  R  
c c (Anand, Hunter et al. 2005) 
But this raises the issue of what c consists of:  Sen maintains that the CA should function as 
a comparison space, thus opposes the prior specification of any list or range of capabilities 
without reference to individual communities and without democratic discussion.  However, if 
we see the CA as a pluralistic approach with Aristotelian foundations, as Nussbaum does as 
part of a theory of basic social justice (Anand, Hunter et al. 2005), this permits the 
development of a concept of a good life along with its constituent components.   
Drawing on Aristotle, Marx and Rawls, Nussbaum (2001) bases development of a list of 
central capabilities on two tenets:  first, that certain functions are so intrinsically human that 
the absence of them would indicate a lack of human life.  Secondly, “that there is something 
that it is to do these functions in a truly human way, not merely an animal way” (Nussbaum 
2001, p72), for example a starving person will grab and eat anything potentially nourishing, 
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much like an animal, so that many of the social elements of human feeding are not present.  
This is the foundation for her concept of human dignity.   
Here the lack of any one component renders a life not worthy of human dignity, thus, 
Nussbaum’s list is irreducibly heterogeneous and the omission of one component cannot be 
compensated for by the presence of another.  Nussbaum purports that to experience human 
dignity, and individual must have:   
 life - being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.  
 bodily health - being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
 bodily integrity - being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against 
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities 
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
 senses, imagination and thought - being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, 
and reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy 
and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and 
thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s 
own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in 
ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political 
and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have 
pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain. 
 emotions - being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to 
love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to 
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grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s 
emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. 
 practical reason - being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. 
 Affiliation  
o A: being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and’ show concern 
for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be 
able to imagine the situation of another (Protecting this capability means 
protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and 
also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech);  
o B: having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to 
be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This 
entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, and national origin. 
 other species - being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature. 
 play - being able to laugh, to play, and to enjoy recreational activities. 
 control over one’s environment: 
o A: political - being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern 
one’s life; having the right of political participation, protection of free speech 
and association. 
o B: material - being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and 
having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek 
employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 
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unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human 
being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships 
of mutual recognition with other workers.  (Nussbaum 2011) 
This list is seen as a threshold – it does not seek to solve all distributional problems, rather it 
specifies a social minimum for human dignity.  The list can be specified further for each 
context, meaning that there is scope to elaborate upon it differently where tradition and 
history requires (Nussbaum 2011).  Thus it does not fully encompass life, but provides a 
starting point whereby we can assess whether an individual has access to that social 
minimum and therefore experiences human dignity.  The list is not exhaustive, but, as I show 
in Section 12.3, wellbeing increases along with the number of capabilities (as measured 
using the list above) in a near linear fashion; this indicates that it is additive and is a suitable 
measure for further analysis.   
Thus far I have accepted the assumption that, as Nussbaum (2011) intended, the list of 
central capabilities is non-compensatory, in other words, more of one cannot compensate for 
lack of another.  This is an assumption that is questioned in Anand et al (2005) who find that 
some capabilities have a greater effect on wellbeing than others (although this, they say, is 
due to the functional form of the analysis).  Indeed Veenhoven (2010) notes the possibility of 
there being different effects from general capability as well as from specific capabilities and 
Alkire, Qizilbash and Comim (2008) state that capabilities have intrinsic values, so they are 
valuable themselves rather than instrumental. 
Thus, it may be possible that, on an individual level, some capabilities do matter more for 
wellbeing; it may be considered arrogant to presume that all capabilities are equally as 
important for all people, who should have the freedom to value capabilities individuals 
alongside the freedom to convert capabilities into functionings.  This is part of Sen’s 
reluctance to specify particular capabilities:  democratic processes and social choice 
procedures – such as consensus building – within each society should be responsible for 
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developing any list of capabilities, however even then one cannot assume that all the chosen 
capabilities are equally important to every individual.     
If one assumes that Nussbaum’s list is a reasonable starting point, without assuming it is 
anything more than the humble open-ended list she intended it to be, it can serve as a set of 
basic capability indicators.  Viewing it in this way, we may be able to relax the non-
compensating aspect of the list, that is, I could allow one capability to compensate for 
another: I can include in our analysis the search for a threshold number of capabilities, akin 
to the poverty line income thresholds discussed in Chapter 2.  This will be further elaborated 
in Section 12.2.2.   
11.2 Capabilities and Wellbeing 
As mentioned above, the inherent measurability issues with the capabilities concept means 
that empirical evidence concerning its role in wellbeing is very limited.  Another issue that 
complicates the relationship is that some research has used wellbeing as a measure of 
capabilities and vice versa:  some scholars assume they come from the same concept, after 
all, if one was unhappy they must be not living ‘a good life’ and if one is happy they must 
think they are living ‘a good life’.   
Sen does not support this view of capabilities, and goes as far as to say that wellbeing is not 
as good a measure of ‘a good life’ being lived as capabilities are, mainly due to the 
propensity for humans to adapt to conditions, whether good or bad, meaning that in 
research, the happiness and capabilities approaches seem to be competitors (Comim 2008):  
happiness research appears to be more applied, exploring positive psychological features 
related to wellbeing and quantifies causes and processes underlying happiness.  The CA, by 
comparison, is more philosophically founded, and emphasises functionings and capabilities 
as ways of evaluating advantages, often criticising the reliability of happiness measures as 
being ‘informationally narrow’ (Comim 2008).   
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The informational criticism of happiness as an approach to measuring ‘a good life’ assumes 
that by measuring happiness we are measuring the ‘outcome’ of a person’s being, which 
would be an unwise act when we don’t know how that outcome arose or what is behind it.  
This – in the main – follows from an additional criticism:  the ability of individuals to adapt to 
even severe deprivation. Research has suggested that individuals can and will adapt to a 
range of conditions including disability (Oswald, Powdthavee 2008) and life events (Lucas 
2007).  This issue needs to be addressed; if individuals can adapt to negative stimuli, this 
will arguably affect the way capabilities influence wellbeing.   
Although it has been suggested in some studies that adaptation occurs, others have 
reported that adaptation is far from universal, affects different measurements of wellbeing 
differently, affects different aspects of life differently, is highly individual and is dependent on 
other factors, for example climate (Ubel, Loewenstein et al. 2005, Powdthavee 2009, Diener, 
Lucas et al. 2006).  This leads to the suggestion that adaptation is not certain.    
Furthermore the adaptation ‘problem’ may be more present in development applications 
than in Western economies: in rich countries, with higher standards of opulence and liberty, 
a significant and increasing part of the population suffers from issues such as depression or 
anxiety (Putnam 2001, Fombonne, Simmons et al. 2001). CA theory would have us suggest 
that these people must have impaired functionings or capabilities, but in developed 
economies, these impediments must be special in character as they usually imply some kind 
of constraint, such as lack of access to healthcare, that may not be the case (Pugno 2008).  
Indeed in developed economies, wellbeing is often lower than material indices (such as GDP 
growth, income or consumption measures) would have us believe, so ignoring wellbeing on 
the basis of affluence would be unwise.  
Additionally, with adaptation comes aspiration, so even if individuals do adapt to situations, 
this does not negate the ability of those same individuals to have aspirations of a better life 
and to strive to achieve those aspirations.  Indeed adaptation may be a positive as well as 
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negative phenomenon (Teschl, Comim 2005).  Although adaptation is therefore an issue 
worth considering, the evidence above suggests that it is not so significant a problem in 
many applications, including this one.   
This combined evidence allows us to assume that, in this situation, wellbeing and 
capabilities are not competitors for quality of life judgements.  Rather wellbeing – in terms of 
the definition purported above - is a justifiable thing to measure and analyse, despite its 
limitations, and Binder (2013) goes as far as to suggest a fusion between both approaches 
could overcome the weaknesses of both individual approaches, which would not be possible 
if they were fundamentally incompatible.   
Moving on to evidence examining the relationship between capabilities and wellbeing, 
Anand et al (2005) summarise some literature that touches on capabilities and their relation 
to wellbeing, citing Martinetti (2000) and Brandolini and D’Alessio (1998) who found positive 
relations between functionings and wellbeing, however note that “by concentrating on 
functionings alone, the analysis might do no more than multivariate work on poverty does 
already and it fails to exploit one of the most distinctive elements of the capabilities 
approach.” (Anand, Hunter et al. 2005, pp14-15) 
In research using the World Database of Happiness, Veenhoven (2010) suggests that 
happiness is affected by most of the capabilities in his study, based on the Nussbaum list of 
capabilities, with particularly strong effects from socially based capabilities and those 
involving aspects of health and mental health.  Only ‘intellectual’ capabilities were observed 
to have no effect.   
In Anand, Santos and Smith (2007), capabilities are targeted using a custom designed 
survey conducted within a roughly representative sample of 1,000 adults in the UK, finding 
that many of their capability dimensions were significant correlates of happiness.  A study 
with a larger sample – Anand et al (2005) - uses information in the British Household Panel 
Survey to represent individual capabilities, with reference to Nussbaum’s (2011) list.  In this 
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paper they selected questions for analysis from this survey which were related to those 
substantive values reflected in the aforementioned list, with due consideration given to the 
distinction between capabilities and functionings.   
Anand et al (2005) find that many of the capabilities do appear to affect wellbeing.  Health is 
observed to affect wellbeing negatively where it restricts activities, as does access to 
adequate nutrition and adequate shelter.  The absence of crime and freedom of movement 
have smaller – but still postive effects – whereas higher education reduces wellbeing 
(suggested by, for example, Argyle (2003) and Veenhoven (1997) to be due to raised 
expectations).  Emotions, such as fear and anxiety, have a strong relationship with 
wellbeing, as do being able to concentrate, to sleep or to be free from strain.  Being able to 
overcome difficulties, an example of practical reason, has a small positive effect along with 
being able to make decisions.   
Affiliation, which allows individuals to feel part of society, has a positive effect on wellbeing, 
as does the ability to ‘play.  The ability to vote – indication of control over individual 
environments – was not significant, however the ability to work does limit wellbeing.  As this 
analysis suggests, capabilities do appear to be important for wellbeing, although to varying 
extents and with some gender differences.   
11.3 Capability Poverty versus Income Poverty 
Income as a measure of poverty is widely used in various forms, as described in Chapter 2.  
One of the most common forms is that of a poverty line, due to its simplicity (Sen 1992):  a 
poverty line is a minimum level of income, below which an individual (or household) will be 
said to be living in poverty.  The measure often used in the UK is 60% of the median 
equivalised household income; in Chapter 2, it was suggested that this standard did not 
have any meaning to individuals in terms of their wellbeing. 
The simplicity of the poverty line, as well as being a benefit, is also its main criticism:  it 
arises from a narrow definition, limiting the interpretation of the measure to any more than a 
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head-count of those below and above a pre-defined threshold.  It tells us nothing about how 
poor individuals are and how that affects their lives, but more importantly, lacks the context 
needed to tell whether those identified as poor are actually deprived.   Sen (1992) 
differentiates between the descriptive and policy forms of poverty, where the former deals 
involves an acceptance of the existence of deprivation and an attempt to understand it within 
the relevant social context, whereas the latter is an operationalised view, with the 
assumption that something should be done about it, and thus lacks context.   
The descriptive view of poverty recognises that there are multiple hardships involved in 
deprivation that may vary between societies.  Sen (1992) suggests that this is one reason 
why poverty is better measured in terms of capabilities:  it is likely that within societies there 
may be agreement on what constitutes significant deprivation (for example acute hunger) 
rather than on monetary measures, where agreement on a threshold for deprivation may be 
difficult and perhaps unwise.   
In Sen’s approach, poverty is capability failure, where one of the failures is inadequacy of 
economic means (the means to prevent capability failure).  This associates income with the 
causal requirements of minimal capabilities, for individual groups.  To illustrate this, Sen 
uses the example of two individuals who are hungry and may end up malnourished, but one 
is hungry because she is fasting and the other because he has not the means to purchase 
food (Sen 1992).  Both have the same functioning (being hungry) but only one (the faster) 
has a capability, and income poverty is the cause of the capability failure.  Here one can see 
that income is only part of the poverty ‘story’. 
Empirical evidence comparing income and capability poverty is limited, not least because of 
the openness of the concept of capabilities and the inherent measurability issues that brings.  
Evidence that compares the effect of these concepts on happiness is even more limited.  In 
a paper comparing capability poverty, wellbeing poverty and income poverty, Kingdon and 
Knight (2006) find that income poverty in their South African data is not a good 
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representation of capability poverty, as the capability measures appear to matter to 
happiness even after controlling for income and assets.   
11.4 Summary 
The Capabilities Approach (CA) is a framework for analysing quality of life, looking at what 
individuals are able to be and do in their lives.  The two core concepts – capability and 
functioning – are linked by a critical component:  choice.  One may appear to exhibit a 
functioning, but if an individual has not chosen it, it does not result from a capability, 
therefore that individual has a capability failure.   
The CA originated from Sen’s dissatisfaction with poverty and quality of life assessment in 
developing countries, but one can apply this pluralistic approach to developed countries 
using a list of central capabilities developed by Nussbaum (2011) and adapted in papers 
such as Anand et al (2005) and Veenhoven (2010), which suggest that capabilities do affect 
wellbeing and that there are different impacts from different capabilities.  This, along with 
research by Alkire et al (2008), allows us to relax the irreducible heterogeneity assumption 
that Nussbaum suggests for her list.   
This paper is based on Anand et al’s (2005) work, with several key differences.  Firstly, they 
use a different dependent variable – that asking individuals to rate their life satisfaction on a 
one to seven scale, whereas here the 36-point likert scale is used.  The reasons for 
choosing this latter variable are discussed in depth in Chapter 2 of this thesis, arriving at the 
conclusion that the information gain from the larger and more ordinally comparable scale 
provides more flexibility for statistical investigations, along with the observations being more 
normally distributed than the individual component responses (Banks, Clegg et al. 1980). 
The second key difference is that Anand et al (2005) do not use panel data, on the basis that 
they cannot accept the assumption of fixed personality effects.  However, Pevalin (2000) 
finds that within the GHQ12 measure of wellbeing, personality effects are more-or-less 
constant over time.  The growing use of this wellbeing variable in panel data investigations 
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(for example, Gardner and Oswald (2007), who list more than a dozen other papers that use 
this same variable) supports this observation, and on this basis, this paper assumes 
constant personality effects and uses panel data methods (described in Section 12).   
Finally, although many of the variables are the same, there are some differences in the 
variables chosen to represent the capabilities used in the analysis.  For each capability, the 
variables used are described in Appendix B.  Anand et al (2005) find statistically significant 
effects on wellbeing from at least one of the variables from each capability ‘category’, 
although in varying magnitudes and with gender differences.  Following on from Anand et al 
(2005), this paper aims to investigate the importance of capabilities for individual wellbeing, 
using a list of core capabilities (Nussbaum 2011).    
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12 Methodology 
So far this paper has discussed the differences between income poverty and capability 
poverty, and considered the nature and specification of a capabilities list and the justification 
of using it to assess whether an individual has a good life – ultimately leading to greater 
wellbeing.  Central capabilities are paramount to human dignity, assuring individuals a 
minimum social standard of life.  Yet there is little research focusing on capabilities and their 
impact on individuals. 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on capabilities, by investigating the importance 
of central capabilities for individual wellbeing through econometric analysis: Using a list of 
core capabilities (Nussbaum 2011) and the precedent set by Anand et al (2005), I extract 
capability information from questions within the BHPS and use it to create a range of 
capability indicators to be used in analysis, which are then subject to principal components 
analysis to target the factors underlying the BHPS measures.  These factors are then used 
in an assessment of the impact of capabilities on wellbeing, with the ultimate aim of 
suggesting further investigations into capabilities for policy purposes. 
12.1 Dataset 
This study, like Chapter 2, uses BHPS data to provide its variables.  As a multi-purpose 
study, established in 1991, the BHPS provides a wealth of information about a set of 
individuals, belonging to a nationally representative sample of about 5,500 households, 
containing a total of approximately 10,000 interviewed individuals.  These same individuals 
are re-interviewed each successive year and, if they separate from original households to 
form new households, they are then followed and all adult members of the new households 
can then be interviewed.  New additions to existing households are also included in the 
survey.  Including a boost in 1999 (to allow independent analysis of UK countries), the total 
sample size for the BHPS is between 10,000-14,000 households across the UK in any given 
wave. 
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The dataset used for this study consists of all adult (16 and above, and completed 
compulsory education) individuals interviewed and all waves available:  1991 to 2007/8, with 
around 14,000 observations per wave, however not all variables are available in every wave, 
not all individuals respond to the survey every wave (for example due to illness, overseas 
travel etc) and not all individuals will answer all the questions for the survey they complete.     
This analysis uses an unbalanced panel, which includes all responses even if individuals did 
not complete the survey in one or more wave. 
12.1.1 Wellbeing measurement 
The basic form of the model to be used in this paper is: 
Wit = Xit + fi + it 
Where W is wellbeing, i represents the individual and t the time, X is a vector of explanatory 
variables, f is the fixed effect associated with the individual (correlated with X) and  is the 
error term18.  W is a categorical variable, and the explanatory variables are in various forms.   
In Chapter 2 the potential wellbeing measurements contained within the BHPS are 
discussed, arriving at the conclusion that the GHQ12 measure, which we will retain in this 
analysis.   
There are many versions of the GHQ; the original, developed by Goldberg (1978), included 
60 questions designed to screen for psychiatric illness.  The full questionnaire is 
occasionally used as an indicator of subjective wellbeing, but for cost and efficiency 
purposes, many versions are shorter than the original; BHPS has used the same format of 
GHQ12 since its inception and it has been used in many studies of wellbeing, including 
Gardner and Oswald (2007), who list more than a dozen other papers that use this 
dependent variable.   
The GHQ12 questionnaire asks individuals: 
                                               
18
 This is based on the specification used by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) 
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“Have you recently:  
 Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing? 
 Lost much sleep over worry? 
 Felt that you are playing a useful part in things? 
 Felt capable of making decisions about things? 
 Felt constantly under strain? 
 Felt you couldn’t overcome your difficulties? 
 Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? 
 Been able to face up to your problems? 
 Been feeling unhappy and depressed? 
 Been losing confidence in yourself? 
 Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
 Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?”   
In a self-completion part of the BHPS interview, respondents select one of four options for 
each component of GHQ12 from 0 to 3, with those reporting 0 having the highest wellbeing 
and those reporting 3 the lowest.  Rather than use each question individually, we can use a 
simple summation of the responses to all 12 questions, providing a 36-point Likert scale. 
The two additional categories within the dataset are ‘missing/ wild’ (for missing or obviously 
erroneous responses) and ‘proxy’ (where an individual’s response is completed by another).   
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For reasons of analytical simplicity, this scale is inverted to be increasing in wellbeing, so 
those with values of zero had lowest wellbeing and those with scores of 36 had the highest.  
This approach was used by Clark and Oswald (1994) and Gardner and Oswald (2006).   
12.1.2 Measuring Capabilities 
As mentioned previously, there is a risk in measuring capabilities that we may be measuring 
functionings instead, and the risk of measuring functionings is that you see a functioning and 
assume capability where there may be none: Fleurbaey (2002) highlights the difficulty of 
determining the notion of access, and supposing that we can tell whether someone 
genuinely has access to a bundle of functionings.   
The key to focusing on capabilities is to focus on choice, and through examining the 
questions behind each variable used in detail, we can gauge how much choice we can 
assume.  
If we are going to target ‘a good life’ we need to undertake an evaluative exercise to 
distinguish between two different questions (Nussbaum, Sen 1993):  what are objects of 
value? And, how valuable are they?  Sen (1992) states that the assessment of capability 
sets is negatively related to their number of elements: the value of a set can be reduced 
when the number of elements is reduced, but it could not be enhanced by an increase in 
trivial choices.  Evaluation of possible capability sets can be undertaken by a variety of 
means, including the assessment of/ by: 
 the value of highest-value (weighted) element; 
 the number of elements; 
 a combination of a maximal element x with the number of members of the set (x, n); 
 the option ultimately chosen; and/ or 
 an a priori definition of a set of basic capabilities. 
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According to Sen (1992), neither option 1 nor option 2 could provide straightforward 
empirical counterparts for measuring capabilities.  Option 3 and Option 4, the latter of which 
is based on Samuelson’s revealed preference, are limited by data (specifically, the lack of 
counterfactual information).  Finally, he believes option 5 should generally be avoided if the 
set is not context specific, however it can be justified in, for example, poverty assessment, 
thus giving ‘permission’ for a list of central capabilities to be used in this situation.  
Nussbaum’s (2011) list therefore forms the foundation of the analysis here, as it does for 
Anand et al (2005) and Veenhoven (2010). 
The list of central capabilities mentioned above is matched to indicators in Error! Reference 
ource not found., where a range of BHPS variables are linked to core capabilities (further 
details of coding are supplied in Appendix B).  This short list of capability indicators was 
refined from a longer list on criteria such as availability in multiple waves, number of 
respondents to the question, whether it focuses on a capability or a functioning and how well 
it could fit within the description of Nussbaum’s capabilities.  The long list was created from a 
trawl of the BHPS documentation, comparing the wording of questions to the descriptions of 
Nussbaum’s capabilities.  
In order to create capability indicators, each variable is converted to a binary scale if not 
already binary, for reasons of analytical simplicity:  in this study I aim to look at the wellbeing 
differences between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of capabilities, so rather than suggest that 
individuals have a partial capability achievement, I assume that capability achievement is 
binary.   
One complication with this assumption is that individuals may have different capability 
thresholds, whereby some have perceive they ‘have’ a capability at a different level to 
others, however Nussbaum (2011) implies that capability achievement is indeed 
dichotomous, as a partially achieved capability is still not totally achieved.  Using some 
judgement and also the method used in Anand et al. (2005), the variables chosen for 
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analysis are converted to a binary scale.  This way I can say a capability is either present or 
not present, drawing thresholds for variables as described in Appendix B.  Using Anand et 
al. (2005) as a starting point, care has been taken to – as much as possible with secondary 
data – ensure that the variables are measuring capabilities rather than functionings.  Full 
details of which codes are included in each variable are provided in Appendix B.     
One of the key benefits of the BHPS is that it returns to the same respondents in each wave 
of the survey, allowing us to control for personality effects in question responses.  Anand et 
al (2005) find that personality does influence wellbeing, and may influence the impact of 
capabilities, but that controlling for personality did not change the results in their one-wave 
cross-section.  Nonetheless the longitudinal nature of the data means that I can be more 
confident that personality effects on any relationship between capabilities and wellbeing are 
accounted for.   
One of the critical points that must be made here is that I have not selected exactly the same 
variables as previous authors adopting this method have.  The refining criteria are partly to 
blame for this (in choosing a panel dataset, I limit myself to variables that are available in 
more than one year; and in choosing one form of a dependent variable I cannot use closely 
related components as regressors) but it important to note that by and large, the selection of 
variables from the BHPS – or indeed any dataset – will be down to the researchers.  My 
interpretation of, for example, the emotions capability might be different to someone else’s.   
This is an unavoidable complication of extracting capability information from an existing 
dataset not designed to measure capabilities, however, as discussed above, great care has 
been taken to ensure that – as much as possible – the variables selected do represent the 
core capabilities.   
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Table 12.1 – Capability Indicators Selected from BHPS 
Capability Variables (including BHPS title*) 
Life No data available 
Bodily health 1 wHLLT – Health limits daily activities 
Bodily health 2 wHLLTW – health limits type or amount of work 
Bodily health 3 wLFSAT1 – satisfaction with health 
Bodily integrity 1 wCARUSE – have access to car 
Bodily integrity 2 wCRDARK – feel safe walking alone at night 
Bodily integrity 3 
wHSPRBQ – accommodation has vandalism/ 
crime in the area 
Bodily integrity 4 wCRMUGG – extent of people being attacked 
Bodily integrity 5 
wCRWORA – worry about being a victim of 
crime 
Senses, imagination and thought wQFEDHI – highest qualification held 
Emotions 1 
 
wSSUPA – is there someone who will listen to 
you? 
Emotions 2 




wSSUPC – is there someone you can relax 
with? 
Emotions 4 
wSSUPD – is there someone who really 
appreciates you? 
Emotions 5 
wSSUPE – is there someone you can count on 
to offer support? 
Practical reason wLFSATO – satisfied with life overall 
Affiliation 1 wORGA – active in organisations 
Affiliation 2 wFRNA – frequency of talking to neighbours 
Affiliation 3 wFRNB – frequency of meeting people 
Affiliation 4 
wHSCNTF – would like to socialise but must do 
without because I cannot afford it 
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Other species No data available 
Play 1 wLFSAT6 – satisfied with social life 
Play 2 wLFSAT7 – satisfied with amount of leisure time 
Play 3 wLFSAT8 – satisfied with use of leisure time 
Play 4 wJBHRLK – preference over hours worked 
Control (over one’s environment) 1 
wVOTE7 – voted in May 2005 (or previous) 
general election 
Control 2 wLFSAT2 – satisfaction with income 
Control 3 wLFSAT3 – satisfaction with house 
Control 4 wLFSAT4 – satisfaction with spouse/ partner 
Control 5 wLFSAT5 – satisfaction with job. 
* The ‘w’ prefix at the beginning of each variable title indicates the ‘wave’ of the survey the variable is 
from.   
12.1.3 Control variables 
In addition to capabilities, there is a range of variables that are recognised in the economic 
literature (Clark, Frijters et al. 2008, Argyle 2003) as affecting wellbeing (Table 12.2).  Using 
this literature, the model in this study is therefore based on the assumption that individual 
wellbeing depends on factors which include: 
 Age (continuous and squared to account for the ‘u’ shaped relationship – this form 
was used in Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) amongst others) 
 Income (annual equivalised disposable household income; expressed in natural log 
form to account for potentially non-linear relationship, henceforth referred to as 
‘income’) 
 Gender (categorical) 
 Marital status (categorical) 
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 Highest educational level attained (categorical, henceforth referred to as ‘education’) 
 Employment status (categorical) 
 Health (binary – 0 if individual has at least one health problem, 1 if individual has no 
reported health problems) 
 Area (categorical) 
Using the categorical data listed above, a series of dummy variables were created to control 
for economic and socio-demographic effects on wellbeing; the omitted categories are first in 
the list in Table 12.3.  As mentioned above, health is a binary variable, age is included in its 
continuous form as well as squared and income is expressed as a natural log.  
Although seen as a potential determinant of wellbeing, education will not be included in the 
analysis in Chapter 4.  This is because educational status is used to determine the senses, 
imagination and thought capability indicator, so this indicator would be highly correlated with 
any education dummies. 
The summary statistics for the dependent and control variables, including dummy variables, 
are shown in Table 12.3. 
Table 12.2 – Dummy variables 
Variable Employment status Marital status Area 
Reference category: Training/ education Never married Northern Ireland 
Dummies: Retired Married North 
 Family care Divorced/ separated South 
 Long term sick Widowed London 
 Unemployed  Wales 
 Employed  Scotland 
   Midlands 
Source: Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
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Table 12.3 – Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Wellbeing 193,051 24.805 5.430 0 36 
Independent variables 
Equivalised income 226,040 23,350.93 15,791.65 0 871,802 
Age 199,395 45.840 18.721 16 100 
Dummy variables 
Training/ education 195,772 .050 .219 0 1 
Retired 195,772 .205 .403 0 1 
Family care 195,772  .084 .277 0 1 
Long term sick 195,772  .043 .202 0 1 
Unemployed 195,772 .038 .191 0 1 
Employed 195,772  .576 .494 0 1 
Never married 199,370  .306 .461 0 1 
Married 199,370 .536 .499 0 1 
Divorced/ separated 199,370 .075 .263 0 1 
Widowed 199,370 .084 .277 0 1 
Northern Ireland 224,861                   .081 .273 0 1 
North 224,861  .198 .399 0 1 
South 224,861                   .174 .379 0 1 
London 224,861 .065 .246 0 1 
Wales 224,861                   .130 .336 0 1 
Scotland 224,861                   .151 .358 0 1 
Midlands 224,861 .201 .401 0 1 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data.  Means for dummy variables are proportions of sample that 
have the dummy present, this are equivalent to proportion in that category.   
12.1.4 Data adjustments 
Very few adjustments to the data were made. Responses from proxy respondents and those 
from individuals aged under 16 and still in compulsory education were dropped; these 
respondents would be less likely to have knowledge and experience of the household 
income either for assumptions of age/ life-stage (they are still ‘taken care of’ by their 
parent(s)/ guardian(s)), or – for proxy responses – because the respondent may not be fully 
aware of the individual subject’s situation and feelings.   
Chapter 3:  Capabilities and wellbeing:  A new direction for poverty policy 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 115 
For employment status, some changes were made to the coding of the answers between 
Waves 1 and 2; the model accounts for these changes and ensures that all coding is 
consistent. 
For all variables ‘wild’ responses were recoded to missing.  
12.2 Methods of analysis 
12.2.1 Principal Components Analysis 
Principal components analysis (henceforth PCA) is one of the core methods of factor 
analysis, where we endeavour to uncover underlying relationships between observed and 
unobserved latent variables (see for example Morciano, Hancock and Pudney (2012)).  If we 
have an unobserved variable that we want to analyse (Y), but only have two related 
variables (f1 and f2), we can analyse the relationship: 
Y = b1f1 + b2f2 +  
where f1 and f2 are unobserved factors that are correlated with Y, b1 and b2 are correlation 
coefficients and  is a unique component of variation not covered by either factor.  
This technique is appropriate and useful in this investigation, as there is a large number of 
capability indicators that have not been specifically designed to extract information about the 
capability; rather, most capabilities have a number of indicators to cover all potential aspects 
of that capability.  As such, there are more indicators than capabilities, and the indicators are 
imprecise.  Using PCA allows variable reduction as well as the ability to focus on the nature 
of the individual capability more closely.   
Focusing on one capability in particular, for example health, there are three capability 
indicators within the BHPS that I believe are correlated with the actual, but unobserved, 
capability.  So one can say the health capability is: 
Health = 1I1 + 2I2 + 3I3 +  
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where  represents the ‘weight’ for each indicator (I) and  is a random component.  The key 
therefore is to identify the weights, which is the goal of factor analysis techniques.  Here, the 
three indicators are correlated with the underlying factor, which helps determine the amount 
of variation.  The correlation will determine how much the indicators change as the factor 
changes:  if health is correlated with I1, I2 and I3, even if there is no intrinsic connection 
between I1, I2 and I3 they will still be correlated because of their common relationship to 
health.   
In using factor analysis techniques, we can reduce a range of capability data into one factor/ 
a number of factors that cover the majority of the variation.  The number of factors estimated 
is usually equal to the number of variables used to measure the underlying concept, but not 
all factors will be equal in importance.  The Kaiser Test is one way of determining which 
factors to take forward.  This test is based on inspection of the eigenvalues (where 
eigenvalues represent the amount of variance accounted for by each factor, where the sum 
of the eigenvalues is equal to the number of indicators):  the recommendation is to retain 
only those components that have an eigenvalue above one, where one is the average size 
of the eigenvalues (Kaiser 1960).  Parallel analysis (Horn 1965) is undertaken to confirm that 
the eigenvalue rule holds, or if it doesn’t, to determine what the threshold for inclusion is 
(Dinno 2009).  After using PCA on the long list of capability indicators, for each capability 
individually, the factors to be used in analysis are selected using this test.  All the capability 
indicators are transformed to the same scale using z-scores prior to undertaking PCA.   
The retained factors are then used in the analysis stage to represent individual capabilities, 
however they first must be rotated to find the simple structure for the factor loadings (i.e. 
creating a solution that allows factors to load close to 1 if important or close to 0 in 
unimportant).  This is required because some factors can be affected to a greater (or lesser) 
extent by particular variables, which can make it difficult to interpret factors in some 
situations.  By rotating the factors, we find a solution whereby each variable affects only a 
small number of factors – those retained after the Kaiser and Scree tests.  Varimax rotation 
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is the standard procedure for rotation, as it keeps the ‘axes’ orthogonal and maximises the 
variance retained (rotation unavoidably loses some variance as the rotations are within the 
‘factor’ space rather than the ‘data’ space (Lewis-Beck, Bryman et al. 2004).  Once rotated, 
the factors can then be used in further analysis. 
12.2.2 Applying a capability ‘poverty line’ 
Assuming, as previously discussed, that capabilities are not irreducibly heterogeneous, we 
can examine the relationship between the number of capabilities present, the sum of the 
capability indicators belonging to an individual, and her or his wellbeing.  The simplest way 
of looking for a threshold is to plot the dependent variable against the independent variable, 
in this case, I plot wellbeing against a sum variable that indicates the number of capabilities 
an individual has.  This will give an idea of any relationship that might exist, and if it is linear, 
whether there are any obvious ‘jumps’, which might indicate thresholds.  Further analysis 
could then include regression discontinuity analysis, around the hypothesised threshold 
should one appear obvious.        
12.2.3 Fixed effects analysis 
Wellbeing research has the unavoidable complication of the existence of individual 
unobserved heterogeneity in reporting, in other words, personality is known to affect 
wellbeing responses: indeed, genes and psychological traits have been found to have a 
correlation of up to 80% with wellbeing reports (Lykken, Tellegen 1996).  To counteract this, 
the use of panel data has the advantage of being able to control for time-invariant 
determinants of wellbeing, such as personality, allowing us to focus on how changes in 
capability possession can affect wellbeing.  As with previous chapters, I use a fixed effects 
model in testing the effects of capabilities on wellbeing.  Two versions of analysis will be 
conducted:  one with all capability indicators and one with the capability factors calculated 
through PCA.  A random effects model will also be estimated and compared to the fixed 
effects model with a Sargan-Hansen test.     
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12.3 A brief analysis of wellbeing and capabilities 
From Figure 12.1 we can see that the mean wellbeing is higher when an individual possess 
a larger number of capabilities.  This provides some vindication of the hypothesis of this 
paper:  having more capabilities does seem to result in greater wellbeing.   
The scatter plot indicates that there is a near-linear relation between the number of 
capabilities and median wellbeing, with some disturbance below 4 capabilities and above 24 
capabilities; indeed above 24 capabilities, the slope of the fitted line is shallower, indicating 
that the marginal increase in wellbeing due to increasing capabilities is lower after this point.   
Similarly in Figure 12.2, it is evident that within increasing wellbeing scores the median 
number of capabilities rises, however there appears to be some fluctuations, with the 
increase in median capabilities smaller between wellbeing scores below 14, and scores 
above 24, with the largest increases observed between scores for the middle range of 
wellbeing.   
In Section 12.2.2 it was suggested that any significant discontinuity in the relationship 
between capabilities and wellbeing could be observed by looking at scatter diagrams of the 
two variables.  From Figure 12.1 and Figure 12.2 it is not evident that there is any significant 
jump that would indicate a threshold, and there is no current evidence for there being any 
threshold in the number of capabilities an individual should have to be poor or not poor.   
Nussbaum (2011) suggests that all capabilities are equally important, so that if even one is 
missing for an individual, that person may have a lower quality of life thus lower wellbeing, 
however looking at Figure 12.1 it would appear that the mean wellbeing score rises along 
with the number of capabilities achieved.  Furthermore, the incremental rise in wellbeing is 
lower above capabilities of 24 than below it, indicating that the assertion above may not be 
reflected in data and that at some point (here, 24 capabilities) the marginal increase in 
wellbeing is lower.  In addition, we reasoned in Section 11.1 that some capabilities may 
matter more to wellbeing than others, so where capabilities are diverse, this method of 
Chapter 3:  Capabilities and wellbeing:  A new direction for poverty policy 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 119 
investigation may not highlight any thresholds as they may be in different places for different 
capabilities.   
These observations suggest that there is not a single threshold in the n umber of capabilities 
that dichotomises wellbeing into high and low categories:  Nussbaum’s assertion that the 
loss of one capability is enough to render a life not worthy of human dignity appears to be 
contrary to the almost-linear relationship.  As a result, there is no clear capability poverty 
line, so the analysis in Section 13 will focus on individual capabilities rather than a sum.   
Figure 12.1 – Mean wellbeing by number of capabilities 
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Figure 12.2 – Median number of capabilities by wellbeing score 
 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data. N = 10,725 individuals 
12.4 Summary 
In this section I set out the methodology for undertaking the analysis in this paper.  I 
discussed the dataset to be used – the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) – and the 
variables to be included.  The dependent variable – wellbeing – was described, following on 
from discussion in Chapter 2 that concluded it was theoretically rigorous, policy relevant and 
empirically robust.  The measurement of capabilities was then covered, basing the selection 
on research done by Anand et al (2005) keeping as close as possible to the concept of 
capabilities rather than functionings.  Summary statistics for a range of control variables 
were then presented, including age, income, employment, education, marital status, region 
and gender. 
Moving on to the techniques to be used for analysis, beginning with principal components 
analysis (PCA).  PCA allows us to uncover underlying relationships between observed and 
unobserved factors.  As I am using existing data and ‘matching’ questions from BHPS it is 
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measuring specific aspects of health, so by using more than one variable for each concept, 
and then using PCA to measure the underlying factor, I can reduce the number of variables 
to a number of factors that measure the majority of the variation.  The factors are then used 
as independent variables. 
I also discussed the possibility of doing regression discontinuity analysis on any threshold 
that appeared in the data that indicated a ‘break’ in the relationship between capabilities and 
wellbeing, however none was obvious. There is no evidence that any threshold exists in this 
data or in any data used in other investigations.  On this basis the investigation here focuses 
on the impact of the individual capabilities and the sum of all capabilities. 
One of the major benefits of the BHPS is that it returns to the same individuals year-on-year, 
allowing us to observe the same person’s responses in each wave in which they participate.  
This means that unobserved heterogeneity – for example from personality effects – can be 
controlled for, as this paper can assume that personality is more-or-less constant over time.  
For this paper, the effects of capabilities on wellbeing will be investigated using fixed effects 
regression (although random effects will be estimated and compared before selecting fixed 
effects for final analysis).   
Looking briefly at the distribution of wellbeing and capabilities, it appears that higher levels of 
wellbeing are associated with a higher number of capabilities, and vice versa.  This 
seemingly positive association of more capabilities with greater wellbeing provides a useful 
basis for the investigations in the following section.   
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13 Empirical Analysis 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on capabilities, by investigating the importance 
of a list of central capabilities – both as a whole and individually – for individual wellbeing.  
The outcome of Chapter 2 has suggested monetary poverty in the form of an arbitrary 
dichotomy may not be a significant determinant of wellbeing; if this is true, we can 
hypothesise that multidimensional poverty – capability deprivation – may be a more 
individually relevant determinant. 
Building on work by Anand et al (2005), a range of BHPS variables have been selected to 
represent – some individually, others collaboratively – capabilities drawn from a list 
developed by Nussbaum (2011).  In Section 12, this paper noted that higher wellbeing is 
associated with larger numbers of capabilities held by an individual, and vice versa providing 
a foundation for the analysis undertaken here.  In this section, the collection of capability 
indicators is reduced to a smaller number of factors to represent capabilities.  These factors 
are then used as independent variables in fixed effects regression to appraise the impact of 
the capabilities on wellbeing.   
13.1 Principal Components Analysis 
As discussed in Section 12.2.1, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) allow us to reduce a 
long list of capability indicators (shown in Error! Reference source not found.) to a smaller 
umber, focusing on the common factor underlying the data (the capability itself).  The factors 
for inclusion are selected based on their eigenvalues – that is, the amount of variance 
accounted for by each factor – with confirmation by parallel analysis. 
Three variables were used for the bodily health capability, and from these, one underlying 
factor was retained with an eigenvalue of 1.933, accounting for 65% of all variation.  Parallel 
analysis confirms – by reporting adjusted eigenvalues – that only one component should be 
retained, as only component 1 has an eigenvalue that is greater than the corresponding 
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adjusted eigenvalue.  There is a roughly equal factor loading for each variable on 
component 1.   
Table 13.1 – Principal Components Analysis of Bodily Health Capabilities 
Factor loadings Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
Bodily health 1 0.576 -0.605 0.549 
Bodily health 2 0.589 -0.159 -0.792 
Bodily health 3 0.567 0.780 0.264 
 Eigenvalue Adj. eigenvalue Proportion 
Component 1 1.933 1.010 0.645 
Component 2 0.564 0.999 0.118 
Component 3 0.502 0.995 0.127 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
For bodily integrity, five variables were input.  Of these, two were retained with eigenvalues 
above one, confirmed by adjusted eigenvalues also above one.  Together these two 
components account for 50% of the variation.  There is a relatively small loading of the first 
bodily integrity variable on component 1, but a relatively high loading on component 2; the 
same applies for the fifth bodily integrity variable (although to a lesser extent).  The other 
variables load relatively higher on component 1, and lower on component 2.   
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Table 13.2 – Principal Components of Bodily Integrity Capabilities 
Factor 
loadings 
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 
Body integrity 
1 
 0.268   0.818   0.277   0.403   0.144  
Bodily 
integrity 2 
 0.510  -0.094  -0.480   0.391  -0.589  
Bodily 
integrity 3 
 0.503   0.070   0.438  -0.647  -0.362  
Bodily 
integrity 4 
 0.517   0.020  -0.481  -0.284   0.648  
Bodily 
integrity 5 
 0.384  -0.564   0.519   0.430   0.285  
 Eigenvalue Adj. eigenvalue Proportion 
Component 1  1.543   1.016  0.309 
Component 2  1.011   1.007  0.202 
Component 3  0.910   1.000  0.182 
Component 4  0.793   0.993  0.159 
Component 5  0.743   0.984  0.149 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
For emotion again five variables were analysed.  Component 1 alone accounted for over 
50% of the variation, and was retained with an eigenvalue of 2.5; the other components had 
adjusted eigenvalues below the unadjusted ones thus were rejected.  The retained 
component has roughly equal loadings from each emotion variable.   
Table 13.3 – Principal Components of Emotion Capabilities 
Factor 
loadings 
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 
Emotion 1  0.460  -0.434   0.084  -0.550   0.539  
Emotion 2  0.441  -0.531  -0.246   0.676  -0.075  
Emotion 3  0.431   0.298   0.814   0.249  -0.001  
Emotion 4  0.417   0.661  -0.495   0.107   0.364  
Emotion 5  0.484   0.061  -0.155  -0.408  -0.756  
 Eigenvalue Adj. eigenvalue Proportion 
Component 1  2.526       1.007       0.505  
Component 2  0.747       1.003       0.149  
Component 3  0.647       1.000       0.130  
Component 4  0.559       0.997       0.112  
Component 5  0.521       0.993       0.104  
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
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Affiliation had four variables to be analysed.  Of these, there were two that were retained, 
accounting for 75% of the variation.  The first affiliation variable only loads slightly onto these 
two components, meaning the latter three variables make up the majority of the retained 
factors.   
Table 13.4 – Principal Components of Affiliation Capabilities 
Factor loadings Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
Affiliation 1 -0.0302 0.0876 0.9943 0.0476 
Affiliation 2 0.5101 0.2733 -0.0491 0.6049 
Affiliation 3 0.5413 0.2225 0.0061 0.1595 
Affiliation 4 0.5106 0.2522 0.025 -0.7787 
 Eigenvalue Adj. eigenvalue Proportion 
Component 1 2.378 1.079 0.418 
Component 2 1.928 1.037 0.339 
Component 3 0.993 1.013 0.175 
Component 4 0.388 0.990 0.068 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
As with affiliation, there were four variables subject to PCA for play.  One component – with 
an eigenvalue of 2.1 – was retained, accounting for 52% of the variation.  The first three 
variables load more on this component – with loadings over 0.5 – compared to the fourth 
play variable with a loading of only 0.1.   
Table 13.5 – Principal Components of Play Capabilities 
Factor loadings Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
Play 1      0.556  -    0.133       0.762  -    0.305  
Play 2      0.572       0.013  -    0.627  -    0.529  
Play 3      0.589  -    0.107  -    0.132       0.790  
Play 4      0.131       0.985       0.097       0.051  
 Eigenvalue Adj. eigenvalue Proportion 
Component 1      2.092       1.008       0.523  
Component 2      0.987       1.002       0.247  
Component 3      0.514       0.998       0.129  
Component 4      0.407       0.993       0.102  
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
For control, five variables were analysed.  Two components – with a combined variation of 
56% - were retained.  The first control variable loads relatively lightly on component 1, but 
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more heavily on component two.  There are no variables that are particularly under-
represented in the two retained components.   
 Table 13.6 – Principal Components of Control Capabilities 
Factor 
loadings 
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 
Control 1      0.121       0.739       0.568       0.329       0.095  
Control 2      0.536  -    0.336       0.155       0.463  -    0.601  
Control 3      0.450  -    0.361       0.556  -    0.434       0.413  
Control 4      0.525       0.078  -    0.517       0.359       0.568  
Control 5      0.469       0.453  -    0.280  -    0.600  -    0.370  
 Eigenvalue Adj. eigenvalue Proportion 
Component 1      1.682       1.006  0.3365 
Component 2      1.102       1.003  0.2204 
Component 3      0.911       1.000  0.1821 
Component 4      0.692       0.997  0.1384 
Component 5      0.613       0.994  0.1227 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
For the senses and the practical reason capabilities, I had only one representative variable, 
so there was no need to undertake PCA.   
After PCA has been conducted and the retained factors identified, all the factors extracted 
are rotated.  As discussed above, this is to remove any undue influence that come 
components may have.   In the tables below, basic information on all the capability indicators 
that will be used in the panel data analysis are provided.   
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Table 13.7 – Summary statistics for retained factors 
Variable N Mean (e-09) Std.Dev Min Max 
Bodily health 113,064  -    0.006        1.396  -   4.247        0.727  
Bodily integrity 
1 
32,580  -    0.694          2.776  -   0.502          0.267  
Bodily integrity 
2 
32,580          0.106          1.102  -   3.064          2.714  
Emotion 111,555          0.003          1.585  - 10.430 0.479 
Practical reason  268,380   0.950   0.219  0.000     1.000  
Affiliation 1 19,713  -    0.049          1.438  -   2.646          0.889  
Affiliation 2 19,713  -    0.191          1.317  -   2.068          1.227  
Play 103,824  -    0.237        1.666  -   5.360        0.642  
Control 1 163,737  -    0.400          1.516 -   5.776         0.807  
Control 2 163,737  -    0.110          1.185  -   3.564          3.656  
Senses 226,165 0.316 0.465 0.000 1.000 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
13.2 Analysing the effect of capabilities on wellbeing 
Three different model specifications using wellbeing as dependent variable are analysed in 
this section: 
Model 1:  Wellbeing and capability factors -  Wit = Cfit1 + fi + it 
Model 2:  Wellbeing and capability factors with controls - Wit = Cfit1 + Xitxit + fi + it 
Model 3:  Wellbeing and a sum of total capabilities (original capability variables in 
Table 12.1, not the capability factors developed above) with controls - Wit = Csumit1 
+ Xitxit + fi + it 
Where W is wellbeing for individual i in time t, Cf is a vector of capability factors relating to 
that individual in time t, Csum is a sum of capabilities held by individual I at time t, X is a 
vector of control variables, f is a time-invariant component and  is an error term. 
Before embarking on this analysis, it is prudent to determine whether fixed or random effects 
assumptions are more appropriate for this model.  By computing each model specification in 
both fixed and random effects, then running a Hausman test, this paper can conclude that in 
model 2 and model 3, residuals are correlated with the exogenous variables (see Table 
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13.8), so fixed effects specifications are more appropriate for these models.  However, for 
model 1, there is no evidence that the error term is correlated with the explanatory variables.   
The intuition behind this could be that time invariant bias – from personality effects for 
example – only affects the control variables rather than the capability indicators, which may 
largely be exogenous, rather than marital status which personality may interact with (Lucas 
2007).  For model 1 therefore, we will use a random effects specification, and for models 2 
and 3, a fixed effects specification.   
Table 13.8 – Hausman test results for fixed vs random effects models 
Specification Chi-square Prob>chi2 
Model 1 0.291 13.040 
Model 2 0.001 42.440 
Model 3 0.000 2,504.660 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data  
In the following table, the output from fixed effects analysis of the three models is presented.  
One obvious difference between models 1 and 2 and model 3 is the number of observations:  
model 3, which doesn’t include the capability factors, and instead includes the number of 
capabilities achieved, has over 185,000 observations, compared to just 1,700 and 1,500 
respectively for models 1 and 2.  This is due to the limited number of instances where all the 
original capability variables are available at the same time.  This makes models 1 and 2 
relatively less robust than model 3.  All three models have 0.000 p-values for the F (models 
2 and 3) and chi-square (model 1) joint-significance tests.   
Looking first at model 1, which regresses capability indicators on wellbeing, it is evident that, 
as in Anand et al (2005), not all capabilities have the same effect on wellbeing, as the 
significant coefficients on the capability factors have different magnitudes.  Health, with a 
coefficient of 2.010, senses (4.301), affiliation (0.970) and the two control factors (2.250 and 
1.211) all have significant effects on wellbeing; none of the other capability factors do. 
Health is a widely accepted determinant of wellbeing, as discussed in Section 2 of this 
thesis.  Senses – the ability to think freely – allows us to imagine, be creative and explore 
Chapter 3:  Capabilities and wellbeing:  A new direction for poverty policy 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 129 
learning; measured here as educational attainment, it is often known in the literature to have 
a positive effect on wellbeing, even if not consistent.  Affiliation allows people to feel self-
esteem amongst their peers, and control allows individuals power over their lives and the 
environments in which they live.    
In Model 2, where control variables are included, more capabilities become significant.  
Bodily integrity now has a significant positive coefficient on wellbeing (0.281); senses (9.847) 
and practical reason (39.67) both become highly significant.  Affiliation becomes highly 
significant (1.13), as does the second affiliation measure, but the coefficient becomes 
negative (-4.77).  This factor has the same factor loadings as factor 1, but with lower 
correlations to the original variables.  The factors themselves are uncorrelated, so it could be 
that in an expanded model there is some interaction with the control variables.  An iteration 
of the model was run testing for interactions, however none were significant.  It could be that 
only one affiliation factor is needed, even though parallel analysis suggested two were 
appropriate.  Retaining just one affiliation factor and rerunning the model does not 
significantly change any output other than the coefficient on affiliation, which becomes 
slightly larger in model 1 and slightly smaller in model 2, without any changes in 
significances.  The first play factor also has a negative coefficient (11.46) but is only 
significant at the 5% level.  Play – made up of variables looking at amount and satisfaction 
with leisure time – may be inversely related to employment status and age.  As one gets 
older, it may become harder to enjoy leisure time.  Similarly if one must work more hours 
and desired, and attending social events/ taking part in leisure activities becomes stressful 
rather than enjoyable, there may be a more complicated effect on wellbeing.   
Finally, health remains significant but the coefficient reverses in direction.  This is 
unexpected, as literature suggests (as discussed in Chapter 2) health should have an effect 
on wellbeing.  The variables used to represent the capabilities – health that limits activities or 
work, and satisfaction with health – should be focusing on the capability aspect of health, 
whereby it prevents a functioning from occurring, however it may be that simpler variable (for 
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example, “are you in good health?”) may be more appropriate.  It could also be that some of 
the information regarding health was lost in the PCA.  To test the former theory, a different 
health dummy was included instead of the health capability factor, however it was 
insignificant.  Testing the latter theory, by replacing the health capability factor with the 
original health capability variables, also produced insignificant results.   
One possible explanation is that where health limits work, there may be compensation in the 
form of social transfers, which could mean that at least the financial effects of work-limiting 
health may be mitigated, with other effects mitigated indirectly as the financial assistance 
may help individuals achieve functionings that otherwise they would not have access to.  
Another explanation is that the impact of the health capability is being picked up by other 
capabilities, or simply that the original variables used do not focus accurately enough on the 
health capability.  This is perhaps not unexpected given that we are using imprecise 
secondary measures of capabilities which, by their nature, should be context specific.  
With fixed effects regression, the changes in the dependent variable and the changes in the 
explanatory variables are examined.  It might be that the changes in ones life that result in 
gaining the play capability, or the second affiliation capability, or health capability, once 
controls are included, may not have an immediate positive impact on wellbeing:  if we think 
about leisure time, if one retires, one might be more satisfied with the amount of leisure time 
available, but still suffer the ill effects (peer group isolation, change in pace of life, feeling of 
redundancy and so on) of leaving the workforce.  So in this instance, we might not see a 
positive change in wellbeing straight away.  Similarly with health, if one becomes healthy 
after a period of illness, one might not instantly recover a previous level of wellbeing; illness 
may have persistent effects.  A limited number of waves in the dataset means this cannot be 
tested within this model.  
In terms of the control variables, income was highly significant, as expected, with a 
coefficient of 9.131.  Age was also highly significant both in its log and normal forms, 
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indicating the u-shaped functional form may be present in this model, whereby the younger 
and older sample participants are happier than those in the middle; this is consistent with the 
literature  (Blanchflower, Oswald 2008).  Interpreting the effects of the control dummies is 
difficult as the limited sample size results in many variables dropped out due to there being 
no change within the sample time frame.  The marriage dummy is significant and positive, 
indicating that those who are married have higher wellbeing than those who have never 
been married.  The London dummy is highly significant and negative, meaning that those 
living in London are have significantly lower wellbeing than those living in Northern Ireland.  
The only employment status dummy that remained – that for being employed – was not 
significant.       
In Model 3, the total number of capabilities an individual possesses is included as a 
regressor along with the control variables, but individual capability indicators are excluded.  
The number of capabilities is highly significant, with a coefficient of 0.153.   
In this model several of the marital status and employment status controls were significant, 
although none of the regional controls were.  Age becomes more significant than in model 2.  
All the marital status dummies have significant negative coefficients; for divorce or 
widowhood this is perhaps understandable, but one might have expected a positive 
coefficient on marriage.  The reason behind this could be that because these are dummies – 
thus only have an effect on wellbeing when they are changed – they do not represent the 
state of being divorced or being married, only becoming divorced or becoming married, the 
effects of which may not be in line with the longer term effects. 
This analysis applies to all dummy variables used in this paper including those for 
employment status where becoming employed has a slightly negative coefficient when one 
would assume that employment would bring about positive wellbeing effects.   
The capability measure here – the sum of all the capability indicators a person has in each 
wave – is highly significant, with a positive coefficient of 0.153, indicating that an individual 
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who gains one more capability indicator could stand to experience greater wellbeing, by an 
increase of 0.153 on the scale of 0 to 36.   
The limited number of observations for models 1 and 2 means that one cannot read much 
into these results, but the significance of at least some capability factors could be taken as 
an indication that there might be some underlying relationship worth looking at in future 
research. 
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Table 13.9 – Panel data models of capabilities and wellbeing (GHQ12) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Health factor 1 2.010* -11.10*  
 (1.059) (4.931)  
Bodily integrity factor 1 -0.255 7.281**  
 (0.489) (2.725)  
Bodily integrity factor 2 -2.190 -0.00456  
 (1.186) (0.797)  
Senses indicator 4.301** 9.847***  
 (1.643) (1.794)  
Practical reason indicator -4.325 39.67***  
 (4.712) (9.994)  
Emotions factor 1 0.112 -0.339  
 (0.781) (0.672)  
Affiliation factor 1 0.970* 1.133***  
 (0.433) (0.334)  
Affiliation factor 2 0.260 -4.777***  
 (0.479) (1.344)  
Play factor 1 -0.131 -11.46***  
 (0.861) (2.806)  
Control factor 1 2.250** 1.266  
 (0.850) (0.825)  
Control factor 2 1.211* -1.442  
 (0.571) (1.696)  
Total capabilities   0.153*** 
   (0.003) 
Log equivalised income  9.131*** 0.045 
  (2.684) (0.028) 
Age  -2.502*** -0.072*** 
  (0.619) (0.011) 
Age squared  0.0185*** 0.000 
  (0.00506) (0.000) 
Married+  5.831** -0.289*** 
  (2.104) (0.072) 
Divorced+  0 -0.916*** 
  (.) (0.128) 
Widowed+  0 -1.647*** 
  (.) (0.148) 
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Employed+  13.88 -0.074 
  (11.89) (0.080) 
Unemployed+  0 -1.354*** 
  (.) (0.110) 
Long-term sick/ disabled+  0 -2.289*** 
  (.) (0.149) 
Family care+  0 -0.379*** 
  (.) (0.098) 
Retired+  0 0.0416 
  (.) (0.101) 
North+  0 0.004 
  (.) (1.780) 
South+  0 0.019 
  (.) (1.787) 
London+  -38.07*** -0.116 
  (7.086) (1.790) 
Wales+  -19.18 0.160 
  (11.89) (1.798) 
Scotland+  0 0.498 
  (.) (1.800) 
Midlands+  0 0.205 
  (.) (1.784) 
Constant 19.400*** -54.21 25.160*** 
 (0.584) (29.00) (1.685) 
N 1,857 1,523 188,114 
adj. R2  0.880 0.546 
P value (chi square/ wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable: inverted GHQ12. Significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Variables marked with + are dummies.  Omitted categories:  
‘training/ education’, ‘no qualifications’, ‘never married’ and ‘Northern Ireland’.  $ Omitted due to 
collinearity – not enough observations in the panel; symptom of small sample size. 
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13.3 Summary 
In this section I undertook two analyses:  one extracting underlying capability variables 
drawn from the BHPS and one using those factors in fixed effects regression.  The aim of 
the investigation was to assess whether capability deprivation was a significant determinant 
of wellbeing, both for capabilities as a whole and for individual capabilities.  The analysis 
suggests that capabilities are indeed determinants of wellbeing.  
The principal components analysis, PCA, found that for most of the capability variables there 
was at least one underlying factor.  The retained factors – those that exceeded the Kaiser 
test eigenvalue threshold of 1 with confirmation through parallel analysis - accounted for 
between 50% and 75% of the variance in the original variables.  
The panel data analysis focused on three model specifications:  one testing just the 
capability factors, one adding controls and one that was a sum of an individual’s capabilities 
with controls (the controls being for education, age, marital status, employment and so on).   
Model 1 looked at the effect of capability factors on wellbeing on wellbeing, and found that 
some were significant and positive, including health, senses, affiliation and the two control 
factors, with coefficients of 2.010, 4.301, 0.970, 2.250 and 1.211 respectively.  This is in line 
with the hypothesis of this paper, where the presence of a capability should increase a 
person’s quality of life, thus improving their wellbeing.  
In Model 2, a number of control variables were added to account for the effects of income, 
employment, age, marital status, age and region.  The majority of these were dropped from 
model 2 due to collinearity, itself due to a limited number of observations for this model.  In 
this model, senses became highly significant, as did practical reason and affiliation, however 
the second affiliation factor was highly significant and negative; play also had a negative 
coefficient.  Health remained significant but its coefficient became negative; no explanation 
for these negative coefficients can be arrived at, other than speculation about potential 
interactions between capabilities and control variables, or this model having a relatively 
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small number of observations; furthermore despite testing potential alternative variables, the 
results remained confusing.  This is a possibly inevitable consequence of using secondary 
data to measure what is in essence a context specific concept.  Bodily integrity became 
significant in this model (7.281), however the control factors became insignificant.     
In model 3, rather than have a range of capability factors, a sum variable that adds up the 
number of capabilities an individual possesses is included.  This sum variable is highly 
significant, with a coefficient of 0.153.  Controls are included in this model, with marital 
status and employment status dummy categories all being significant, along with age.  
Income however, was not significant.   
There are several limitations to this analysis.  Firstly the limited number of variables means 
that models 1 and 2 are not as robust as model 3.  Also, as much as I have attempted to 
ensure that the capability indicators focus on capabilities rather than functionings, it is 
possible that I have not been entirely successful; this is a criticism of any work (including 
Anand et al (2005) and Veenhoven (2010) that extracts capability information from a dataset 
which did not intend to measure capabilities.  In addition it is possible that some of the 
control variables – income, employment status, marital status for example – could be 
functionings too, so by including them as controls we are measuring both a capability and a 
functioning at the same time.  This may account for the differences between models 1 and 2.   
The analysis undertaken in this section has allowed us to do two things:  firstly, using a 
range of capability variables from the BHPS, I have reduced these to capability factors, in 
measurement of an underlying concept(s) common to each set of capability indicators.  
Secondly, using these factors in fixed effects regression has allowed us to analyse the effect 
of capabilities on wellbeing, which seems to be – with the caveats above – positive and 
somewhat significant.   
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14 Conclusions 
Inspired by the potential for the operationalisation of the Capabilities Approach in developed 
countries, this paper set out to examine whether capabilities, in sum and individually, 
affected our adopted definition of wellbeing.  The results suggest some positive association 
between measures of capabilities and wellbeing.   
Although further research is needed – particularly in measuring capabilities and working with 
thresholds and degrees of capability achievement – it suggests that a good life in terms of 
capability achievement can result in greater wellbeing.  Where the Capabilities Approach 
and happiness approach had been seen by some (including Sen 1999) to be competing 
measures of quality of life, this paper views them as focusing on different aspects of life, 
where one’s wellbeing (in terms of satisfaction with life as a whole) can depend on the 
capabilities one has achieved.   
The appeal of the CA in poverty measurement is centred on its multidimensionality.  
Monetary measures of poverty focus on only one aspect, which in the capabilities framework 
is a resource to be utilised to achieve functionings.  But without capabilities, and the freedom 
to choose a functioning, money may lose one of its core benefits – the ability to exchange it 
to achieve ends.  When one views ‘a good life’ as ends most people arguably have, 
capability failures seem intrinsically important.   
This paper began by considering what the CA is and how it came to being, observing that 
the CA is a framework for analysing quality of life, looking at what individuals are able to be 
and do in their lives.  The two core concepts – capability and functioning – are linked by a 
critical component:  choice.  One may appear to exhibit a functioning, but if an individual has 
not chosen it, it does not result from a capability, therefore that individual has a capability 
failure.   
The CA originated from Sen’s dissatisfaction with poverty and quality of life assessment in 
developing countries, but as a pluralistic approach one can use reasoning to apply it to 
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poverty in the UK with a few caveats. Sen views the CA as a quality of life tool, and that 
measuring wellbeing as a representation of quality of life is unwise due to the effects of 
adaptation, whereby individuals ‘learn’ to tolerate substandard lives.   
In this paper I can mitigate Sen’s concerns with two particular actions:  firstly, defining a 
concept of wellbeing which is not attempting to represent overall quality of life (rather it 
inverts the disutility presented by the GHQ12, so it focuses particularly on mental wellbeing 
without making judgements on other aspects of the wellbeing spectrum – momentary 
happiness for example, life satisfaction, or more material wellbeing) and secondly, by 
arguing that adaptation is not universal, may be more of a concern in development 
applications, and that with adaptation come aspirations: even if individuals do get used to a 
particular level of deprivation, it does not limit the ability of individuals to aspire to greater or 
better things.   
Armed with a measure of wellbeing used in Chapter 2, this paper investigates how 
capabilities affect it.  Although Sen has not specified what capabilities are needed for a good 
life, on the basis that any list should be arrived at democratically by individual communities, 
Nussbaum believes that there is a role for a list of basic capabilities that should be present 
to achieve a core ‘good life’, with others added when society requires.  Along with Anand et 
al (2005) and Veenhoven (2010), this paper uses Nussbaum’s list as the basis of analysis. 
The methodology for this study involved several stages.  After the concept of wellbeing 
being analysed was discussed in Chapter 2, heavily in its Appendix D, I limited the 
discussion here, retaining the same concept.  The capabilities however warranted 
specification.  Using Anand et al (2005) as an example, I searched the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) database for questions that could pertain to capabilities, being careful 
to – as much as possible – ensure that the element of choice was present in the question, to 
avoid the possibility that the variable is measuring a functioning rather than a capability.  The 
BHPS also provided variables that control for age, income, employment, marital status, 
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region and gender – factors recognised in the economic literature as affecting wellbeing.  
Being a longitudinal survey, I can use panel data techniques to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity – i.e. personality effects – in wellbeing.   
Moving on to the techniques to be used for analysis, I began with principal components 
analysis (PCA), which allows us to uncover underlying relationships between observed and 
unobserved factors.  The retained factors from PCA were then used in further analysis.  The 
panel data analysis focused on three model specifications:  one testing just the capability 
factors, one adding controls and one that was a sum of an individual’s capabilities with 
controls.  Each model was estimated using fixed effects and random effects, and for all 
models a fixed effects specification was found to be more appropriate.   
Model 1 regressed the capability factors on wellbeing, finding that some capabilities were 
indeed significant - including health, senses, affiliation and the two control factors, with 
coefficients of 2.010, 4.301, 0.970, 2.250 and 1.211 respectively. In Model 2, a number of 
control variables were added to account for the effects of education, employment, age, 
marital status, age and region, however the majority dropped out due to collinearity from the 
limited number of observations.  Bodily integrity became significant in this model, and 
practical reason and senses both became highly significant.  The first affiliation factor 
became highly significant along with the second, but the second acquired a negative 
coefficient, along with health and play.  There is no forthcoming explanation for these 
unexpected results.   
The ultimate conclusion from the analysis here is that the capability factors drawn from 
principal components analysis of BHPS data do appear to have some effect on wellbeing, 
which seems to be – with caveats and exceptions – positive and significant.  Combining this 
with our conclusion from Chapter 2, that the standard poverty measurement used in policy 
does not appear to affect wellbeing, it leads to the possibility that multidimensional poverty 
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may be what matters more to individual wellbeing in the UK:  specifically, capabilities could 
matter.   
This presents important policy considerations, particularly where interventions tend to be in 
the form of monetary transfers.  In model 3, it was indicated that when capabilities in sum 
are included in a wellbeing specification, income is not significant.  So at a holistic level, 
policymakers may find an eventual limit to the effect of social transfers on wellbeing.  
Returning to the concept of income as being a means to achieve ends, if there are barriers 
blocking the achievement of ends, income arguably loses one of its main functions.  
Similarly, if there is a lack of choice regarding capabilities and functionings, income again 
loses one of its main functions:  the element of choice is paramount to capability 
achievement, as forcing a capability on someone who did not choose (or want) it should be 
seen to be as negative as a capability failure in the first place.     
Freedom to choose the ends that are important to an individual is arguably subjective.  
Different capabilities may have greater importance to one person than to another.  Although 
Nussbaum’s (2011) list is a starting point, she argues that the list is a minimum, open to 
interpretation and further specification.  This gives us the possibility to consider further 
development of lists at community level, where capability failures are seen to be significant 
and detrimental to wellbeing. 
Ultimately, without capabilities being present, monetary transfers will arguably result in no 
increase in quality of life, therefore what policy should be focusing on is providing, and 
insuring against the barriers to, capabilities.  This is therefore an area where intervention has 
the potential to make a difference: it would require a further understanding of why 
capabilities fail at the level of communities and individuals, and would represent a departure 
from the traditional form of policy intervention in the UK (Townsend 1979), but might be an 
area where interventions could bring about much more tangible results for individuals.  
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16 Appendix B – Capability Variables in BHPS 
This short list of capability indicators was refined from a longer list on criteria such as 
availability in multiple waves, number of respondents to the question, whether it focuses on 
a capability or a functioning and how well it could fit within the description of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities.  The long list was created from a trawl of the BHPS documentation, comparing 
the wording of questions to the descriptions of Nussbaum’s capabilities.  
In order to create capability indicators, each variable is converted to a binary scale if not 
already binary, for reasons of analytical simplicity:  in this study I aim to look at the wellbeing 
differences between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of capabilities, so rather than suggest that 
individuals have a partial capability achievement, I assume that capability achievement is 
binary.   
Using judgement, the descriptions of Nussbaum’s capabilities and the method used in 
Anand et al (2005), I draw thresholds for variables where it seems most appropriate. 
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Table 16.1 – Capability indicators and source variables 
Capability Variables (including BHPS title*) 
Life No data available 
Bodily health 1 
wHLLT – Health limits daily activities 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Bodily health 2 
wHLLTW – health limits type or amount of work 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Bodily health 3 
wLFSAT1 – satisfaction with health 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Bodily integrity 1 
wCARUSE – have access to car 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; no (2) coded to 0 
Bodily integrity 2 
wCRDARK – feel safe walking alone at night 
- Very safe (1) and fairly safe (2) coded to 1; a bit unsafe (3), very unsafe (4) and 
never go out after dark (5) coded to 0 
Bodily integrity 3 
wHSPRBQ – accommodation has vandalism/ crime in the area 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Bodily integrity 4 
wCRMUGG – extent of people being attacked 
- Very common (1) and fairly common (2) coded to 0; not very common (3) and not 
at all common (4) coded to 1 
Bodily integrity 5 
wCRWORA – worry about being a victim of crime 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Senses, imagination 
and thought 
wQFEDHI – highest qualification held 




wSSUPA – is there someone who will listen to you? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 2 
wSSUPB – is there someone who will help in a crisis? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 3 
 
wSSUPC – is there someone you can relax with? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 4 
wSSUPD – is there someone who really appreciates you? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 5 
wSSUPE – is there someone you can count on to offer support? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Practical reason 
wLFSATO – satisfied with life overall 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Affiliation 1 
wORGA – active in organisations 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; no (2) coded to 0 
Affiliation 2 
wFRNA – frequency of talking to neighbours 
- Most days (1) remained as 1; once or twice a week (2) coded to 1; once or twice a 
month (3) coded as 0; less than once a month (4) coded as 0; never (5) coded as 
zero 
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Affiliation 3 
wFRNB – frequency of meeting people 
- Most days (1) remained as 1; once or twice a week (2) coded to 1; once or twice a 
month (3) coded as 0; less than once a month (4) coded as 0; never (5) coded as 
zero 
Affiliation 4 
wHSCNTF – would like to socialise but must do without because I cannot afford it 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Other species No data available 
Play 1 
wLFSAT6 – satisfied with social life 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Play 2 
wLFSAT7 – satisfied with amount of leisure time 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Play 3 
wLFSAT8 – satisfied with use of leisure time 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Play 4 
wJBHRLK – preference over hours worked 
- Work more hours (1) and work fewer hours (2) coded to 0; keep the same hours 
(3) coded to 1 
Control (over one’s 
environment) 1 
wVOTE7 – voted in May 2005 (or previous) general election 
- 1 (voted) remained as 1; 2 (didn’t vote but could have) was coded to 0 
Control 2 
wLFSAT2 – satisfaction with income 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Control 3 
wLFSAT3 – satisfaction with house 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Control 4 
wLFSAT4 – satisfaction with spouse/ partner 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Control 5 
wLFSAT5 – satisfaction with job. 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
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Chapter 4: Knowing what you’ve got:  Capability 
loss aversion and wellbeing 
 
Abstract 
Loss aversion with regard to income is a well-established phenomenon, however as the 
wellbeing responses to income have been called into question in recent decades, it follows 
that one should consider whether loss aversion is present for capabilities, which this thesis 
has argued so far may be more important to wellbeing compared to income.  Capabilities are 
‘ends’ and income is only a means to achieve those ends, so if loss aversion is often found 
in studies investigating utility responses to income changes, it must also be present in the 
relationship between capabilities and wellbeing.  This study finds, through using fixed-effects 
regression analysis of BHPS data, that loss aversion to capabilities is indeed present. 
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17 Introduction 
In previous chapters of this thesis, income deprivation (poverty) has not been found to be 
significant for individual wellbeing; instead, capabilities appear to have greater importance.  
Potential reasons for this could include poverty standards being irrelevant to individuals 
(particularly the poverty line, which is an arbitrary and national measure, unlikely to be 
conceivable to the individual), the welfare system compensating for very low income through 
social transfers and benefits in kind, or that income only matters when it is a means to an 
ends:  if the ends are not achievable (capability failure), income may not be so important.   
If income poverty is seen as ‘a bad thing’ in any setting, capability failure should therefore be 
seen in the same negative light, as the analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that greater wellbeing 
is associated with the achievement of more capabilities, with regression results placing 
significance on both some individual capabilities and on the total number of capabilities 
achieved, even when income is accounted for.   
So far however the analysis has been static, so I have not specifically addressed what 
happens when the capabilities one possesses changes:  if capabilities are as important to 
wellbeing as previous chapter have suggested, understanding what happens when we gain 
or lose them will be essential for policy applications that affect them. 
In policy evaluation, costs and benefits are generally considered in monetary terms and the 
welfare analysis in terms of decision utility; Kahneman and Sugden (2005) suggest that 
experienced utility would be better used as it is immune to some of the problems human 
psychology causes in stated preference analysis – such as forecasting errors or framing 
effects.  Furthermore, analysis is often undertaken on a ‘willingness to pay’ to either gain or 
avoid losing something:  it is generally accepted (Vendrik, Woltjer 2007) that utility 
responses to losses and gains are asymmetric – as prospect theory purports – but also that 
people may make errors in forecasting their utility (Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson and Gilbert, 
2006). 
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This loss aversion with regard to income is widely recognised in the choice theory literature 
(Kahneman, Tversky 2000) but focuses on decision utility.  As a psychological phenomenon 
(Köbberling, Wakker 2005) it should follow that loss aversion can affect experienced utility – 
and specifically, the concept that I have been analysing thus far: wellbeing.  Similarly, given 
the responsiveness of wellbeing to capabilities it should also follow that there may be loss 
aversion in individual wellbeing responses to changes in capabilities.  
In Section 18, I present loss aversion theory and discuss the literature focusing on wellbeing 
responses to income changes and the potential for loss aversion to capabilities.  In Section 
19 the study methodology is then introduced, discussing the dataset – the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), – variables and methods of analysis.  A brief summary of the 
relationship between capability gains and losses and wellbeing is also presented, after 
which, in Section 20, more detailed analysis of the relationship is undertaken using fixed 
effects regressions.  Finally, in Section 21, some concluding remarks are made.   
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18 Loss aversion, wellbeing and capabilities 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I considered the role of the poverty line in determining wellbeing, 
then contrasted this with the effects of capability achievement in Chapter 3.  The research so 
far suggests that an arbitrarily set poverty line is not important for individual wellbeing, but 
some individual capabilities and the total number of individual capabilities possessed by an 
individual do matter for wellbeing.  In this paper, I look at whether capability loss has an 
effect on wellbeing, greater than the effect of an equivalent capability gain. 
In this section, I will review the loss aversion literature, before considering it with respect to 
wellbeing and capabilities, and finally developing a theory of capability loss aversion and 
why it might matter for wellbeing.   
18.1 Loss aversion 
Traditionally in economics, expected utility theory assumed the role of a model of rational 
choice:  individuals make choices based on the expectation of the benefits they will extract 
from a range of options available to them, itself based on the probability of each option’s 
potential benefits.  Risk aversion is one of the central tenets of this theory, whereby 
individuals who prefer more certain prospects are risk averse (equivalent to the concavity of 
a utility function), however it, along with the tenets of asset integration and expectation were 
found to fail in certain situations (the best known, perhaps, being Allais’ paradox).  Prospect 
theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in response to these failures, maintains 
that the foundation of choice is not so much the final outcome of a decision but the change it 
creates from some reference point, for example a status quo, an individual ideal or a social 
standard.     
In prospect theory, decisions are made based on differences (gains or losses) from a 
reference point, and the value function represents these gains (where it is concave) and 
losses (convex).  A steeper slope for losses than for gains in the value function represents 
loss aversion, and a diminishing marginal sensitivity to increasing gains and increasing 
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losses is represented by the convexity and concavity.  Kahneman and Tversky hypothesised 
that the value function would be as convex in losses as it is concave in gains, due to the 
reflection effect – the reflection of different prospects around zero reverses the preference 
order.   
Although prospect theory has been tested frequently (see Köbberling and Wakker (2005) for 
an overview), Kahneman himself admits “the extent to which loss aversion is also found in 
experience is not yet known” (Kahneman 1999, p.19).  Experienced utility, often suggested 
to be a representation of happiness (see Appendix D of Chapter 2 of this thesis for a 
discussion), is generally assumed to be increasing in income and in particular in the level of 
income relative to others(see Easterlin 1974, Clark, Frijters et al. 2008 for example).  
However research has found that expected and decision utility (wanting or desiring 
something (Carter, McBride 2013)) often depart from experienced utility – actually enjoying it 
(ibid.): as loss aversion theory originally focused on decision utility and peoples’ preferences 
over expected outcomes, it does not follow that experienced utility will be subject to the 
same phenomenon.  Indeed one of the criticisms of prospect theory is it cannot prove that 
the asymmetric effects of losses and gains are not affective forecasting errors (Kermer, 
Driver-Linn et al. 2006). A number of papers have attempted therefore to examine whether 
loss aversion is prevalent in experienced utility as well as decision utility, although the 
evidence is still limited in volume (ibid.). 
Before the availability of wellbeing data in large datasets, much of the evidence for loss 
aversion was gathered from experimental studies.  I believe that experimental studies 
cannot replicate reality; this is linked to the criticism of loss aversion that it is an affective 
forecasting error when looking at expected utility.  On this basis I think making 
generalisations from experimental data is unwise.  In addition much experimental evidence 
involves participants making choices, and in reality we are unlikely to choose to be made 
redundant or choose to have a capability – such as our health – taken away from us.  Again, 
this limits the generalisations of experimental evidence.  However the literature involving this 
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methodology generally supports the presence of loss aversion:  Schmidt and Traub  (2002) 
find evidence of loss aversion in an experiment using preferences and choices regarding 
lotteries.  Novemsky and Kahneman  (2005)seek boundaries for loss aversion, in an 
experiment designed to look at loss aversion in risky and risk-less situations, and find that 
there is not loss aversion to something an individual ‘planned’ to lose, for example 
exchanging money (a loss) for a good or service.   
Finally in Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv  (2007)a range of studies into loss aversion 
are examined, and the authors cite a number of papers positively finding loss aversion in 
experimental data, with ratios (of the impact of losses to the impact of gains) ranging from 
1.8  (Booij, Van de Kuilen 2009, cited in, Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt et al. 2007) to 4.8  (Fishburn, 
Kochenberger 1979, cited in, Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt et al. 2007).  They also undertake their 
own experiment that also suggested that utility is convex for losses and concave for gains.  
As will be discussed, research into loss aversion in experienced utility is less prevalent than 
that focusing on decision utility (which is all one really can assess in experimental settings, 
as the situations are not ‘live’ for the individuals taking part), and research into loss aversion 
in capabilities seems – at least in the published literature – sparse.  This study aims to 
contribute towards that gap.   
18.2 Wellbeing and loss aversion 
The subject of analysis in prospect theory, as mentioned above, is decision utility – 
decisions are made on the basis not of the number value of an outcome but on the basis of 
the deviation from a point of reference, be it the status quo or a source of comparison.  In 
Chapter 2, Appendix D I discussed the concept of happiness in relation to utility; as others 
(Boyce, Wood et al. 2013, Di Tella, Haisken-De New et al. 2010, Vendrik, Woltjer 2007) 
have purported, experienced utility and decision utility are different types of utility.  They are 
however aspects of happiness, so it follows that I can legitimately use experienced utility in 
place of decision utility in investigations. 
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Senik (2009) tests loss aversion effects on experienced utility indirectly, through examining 
the effects of internal (e.g. ones own past) and external (e.g. reference group) comparisons 
– she finds that internal (and dynamic rather than static) comparisons are more important to 
individual wellbeing; the effects are believed to be due to lost opportunities, so although the 
paper is not a specific test for loss aversion, it does indicated that losses are felt 
disproportionately. 
Di Tella, Haisken-De New and MacCulloch (2010) examine the effect of anticipated changes 
in income, and find evidence, albeit weak, in favour of loss aversion affecting decision utility.  
Deaton (2012) investigates the effects of the financial crisis on wellbeing, using the self 
reported wellbeing of Americans as a dependent variable and assessing the effects of the 
stock market, GDP and unemployment.  As expected, when these variables perform poorly, 
or suffer declines, wellbeing is negatively affected, but the paper does not explicitly test for 
asymmetric effects of negative and positive changes in economic conditions.   
Two papers do investigate asymmetric effects.  Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) use fixed effects 
least squares estimations to test a number of assumptions regarding loss aversion, with a 
focus on whether (decision) utility is concave or convex in relative income.  They note, as 
others have done, that there is little empirical evidence of loss aversion concerning 
experienced utility as opposed to decision utility.  
Using the hypothesis that wellbeing (decision utility) is as concave in gains as it is convex in 
losses, they test the effects of departures of income from an average of a reference group, 
using a panel of German data.  Specifically, Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) test whether the 
characteristics of the value function (what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) refer to instead of 
a utility function) hold for the dependence of life satisfaction on relative income. 
They find, contrary to expectations, that life satisfaction is concave in losses as well as 
gains, meaning that there is an increasing marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to losses, 
where losses are negative departures of one’s own income from an average.  Prospect 
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theory would have it that sensitivity decreases as losses increase, however Vendrik and 
Woltjer (2007) suggest that this increasing sensitivity may be due to losses not only in 
income but in social participation – the further ones income falls compared to the reference 
group, the more difficult it will be to maintain ones level of social activities.  They equate this 
to Sen’s (1985) concept of objective functioning, providing a convenient lead for this study. 
Moving on from Vendrik and Woltjer, Boyce et al (2013) used German and British datasets 
to test for the presence of loss aversion.  Using multi-level modelling (with lagged wellbeing 
to address personality factors) they include a dummy that focuses on the effect of negative 
changes in income between the current year and the previous year. 
Boyce et al (2013) estimate two forms of a model for each dataset (British and German), one 
with control variables and one without, and find that a one unit decrease in log-transformed 
income resulted in a 0.11 standard deviation (SD) reduction in wellbeing (0.13 without 
controls) in the German data, compared to a 0.05 SD increase (both with and without 
controls) in wellbeing for an equivalent rise in log-transformed income.  For the British data, 
taken from the BHPS, income gains were not significantly associated with wellbeing, but a 
one unit reduction in log transformed income results in a 0.03 SD rise in psychological 
disorder (which we can view as the inverse of mental wellbeing).   
The results from Boyce et al (2013) suggest the presence of loss aversion in wellbeing with 
regard to income in two large social surveys, however no existing studies investigate loss 
aversion in capabilities.  This paper will draw on the literature examining the effects of loss 
aversion on wellbeing and apply it to measures of both income and capabilities.   
18.3 Capabilities and loss aversion 
Implicit in prospect theory is that less income (therefore poverty) is bad, and more income is 
good.  It therefore allows us to purport that becoming poor from a non-poor starting point 
would be a negative experience, more so than becoming poorer once one is already below 
the poverty line.  However analysis in Chapter 2 demonstrated that the arbitrarily set poverty 
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line used in policy applications was not relevant for individual wellbeing.  This was furthered 
in Chapter 3, which found that capabilities – both individually and in sum – could be 
significant determinants of wellbeing despite the inclusion of income in a wellbeing 
specification.  This leads us to consider whether loss aversion would apply to capabilities in 
the same way that it applies to income: income (albeit with the complications discussed in 
Chapter 2) is positively related to wellbeing, as are capabilities.  Futhermore, income is a 
resource (or can be, where available) that allows individuals to convert their capabilities into 
functionings.  So capabilities alone are not the whole picture of quality of life – individuals 
need resources:  physical, mental, societal and financial.  If there is loss aversion in income, 
could there also be loss aversion in capabilities?   
As literature on loss aversion with regard to capabilities is scant, this paper will consider the 
assumptions of loss aversion with regard to income and assess whether they can be applied 
to capabilities.  Chapter 2 showed us that wellbeing was roughly linear and increasing in 
income; Chapter 3 showed us a similar picture for wellbeing and capabilities; see the figures 
below to illustrate.  So the first assumption of loss aversion – that more income is generally 
good – is met.  However whilst there is evidence – as discussed in the previous section – 
that income losses have a greater negative impact on wellbeing than the equivalent for 
gains, there is no such evidence for capabilities.  Filling that gap with some information – 
whether confirmatory or not – will be the main aim of this paper.   
Specifically, I want to examine whether losses in capabilities have larger impacts than 
equivalent gains.  The rationale for this being possible is similar to that for income.  
Individuals are believed to favour the things they currently have (rather than things they 
could exchange for):  In Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler  (1991), an experiment (conducted 
by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)) is described whereby participants are offered a 
lottery ticket or $2, and later asked if they would like to change their choice.  The majority do 
not change.  As stated previously, much of the evidence for loss aversion is experimental 
rather than in ‘live’ markets where individuals learn, and this latter study, like others, is 
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based on choices.  The issue with capabilities is that they are not things individuals can 
easily manipulate; if you live in an area where you feel unsafe being out at night, your 
choices are to stay indoors or move.  Moving isn’t always an option, particularly if you are in 
social housing or where you cannot access the financial capital needed for house 
purchases, and staying indoors may violate another capability if – for example – you need to 
visit the shops to buy food, or buy token for the electricity meter.  So by losing a capability – 
which may not be a choice like choosing a lottery ticket over $2 – do we expect someone’s 
wellbeing to be negatively affected?  From the outcome of Chapter 3, where it was indicated 
that the number of capabilities and individual possessed was positively related to wellbeing, 
we can purport that yes, by losing a capability and individual may experience lower 
wellbeing, and vice versa for gaining a capability (to refer to the example just given, you may 
apply to the housing association to move to a safer area and a property becomes available, 
thus you can move and gain the ability to walk freely in your neighbourhood at night).  The 
next logical question is how the negative effect on wellbeing compares to the positive effect.  
How I will undertake this investigation is discussed in Section 19.   
18.4 Summary     
Loss aversion arose as a response to the failures of expected utility theory to fully account 
for individuals decisions:  it states that individuals make decisions based on the expected 
departure from some reference point – such as the status quo or a reference point – rather 
than on the value of the final outcome.  Kahneman and Tversky state that “losses loom 
larger than gains” (1979, p. 279) with respect to decision utility, but although there is 
evidence supporting loss aversion in decision utility, the research focusing on experienced 
utility, which we can take as a representation of happiness, is limited. 
A few studies do test income loss aversion effects on experienced utility, with positive results 
(Di Tella, Haisken-De New et al. 2010, Senik 2009, Vendrik, Woltjer 2007, Boyce, Wood et 
al. 2013).  Boyce et al (2013) specifically examine the existence of loss aversion in the 
BHPS, using log transformed income and dummy variables to represent losses, and find that 
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indeed losses are felt more greatly than equivalent gains.  Boyce et al however use 
multilevel modelling – to account for the hierarchical structure of social survey data – rather 
than fixed effects.  Although they include a lagged version of the dependent variable, fixed 
effects is believed to be a more robust method for addressing time-invariant effects, given 
that we don’t need to examine the levels of the hierarchies (neighbourhood and so on) 
(Allison 2009).  This will feed into the methodology for the study in hand, discussed below.   
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19 Methodology 
In this paper I attempt to use methodology applied in literature discussed above to 
capabilities.  Firstly I regress income losses and income gains on wellbeing to test for 
asymmetric effects, both with and without controls, then I perform the same regressions with 
capability losses and capability gains.  I expect to find that there are asymmetric effects 
indicating the presence of loss aversion, particularly for capabilities, which, previous papers 
have suggested, may be more important determinants of wellbeing than income.   
19.1 Dataset 
This study, like the others in this thesis, uses BHPS data to provide its variables.  As a multi-
purpose study, established in 1991, the BHPS provides a wealth of information about a set 
of individuals, belonging to a nationally representative sample of about 5,500 households, 
containing a total of approximately 10,000 interviewed individuals.  These same individuals 
are re-interviewed each successive year19 and, if they separate from original households to 
form new households, they are then followed and all adult members of the new households 
can then be interviewed.  New additions to existing households are also included in the 
survey.  Including a boost in 1999 (to allow independent analysis of UK countries), the total 
sample size for the BHPS is between 10,000-14,000 households across the UK in any given 
wave. 
The dataset used for this study consists of all adult (16 and above, and completed 
compulsory education) individuals interviewed and all waves available:  1991 to 2007/820, 
with around 14,000 observations per wave, however not all variables are available in every 
wave, not all individuals respond to the survey every wave (for example due to illness, 
overseas travel etc) and not all individuals will answer all the questions for the survey they 
complete.     
                                               
19
 BHPS surveys were done in ‘waves’ that frequently crossed year boundaries.  
20
 Since then the BHPS has been subsumed into the Understanding Society survey, which includes 
the original BHPS questions plus many more.   
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This analysis uses an unbalanced panel, which includes all responses even if individuals did 
not complete the survey in one or more wave(s); because the sample is nationally 
representative and chosen at random, it is unlikely that any systematic factors will cause 
individuals to drop out, so the risk of selection bias is low and is more than compensated by 
having a more representative sample (Taylor, Brice et al. 2010). 
The main limitation of BHPS for this particular purpose is that it is a household survey, that 
is, only those who have a place of residence are included.  Those who do not have a 
residence, for example the homeless or those in shelters or institutions, may be more likely 
to experience capability failure but these individuals are not sampled.     
19.1.1 Wellbeing measurement 
As with other papers, the basic form of the model to be used here is: 
Wit = Xit + fi + it 
Where W is wellbeing, i represents the individual and t the time, X is a vector of explanatory 
variables, f is the fixed effect associated with the individual (correlated with X) and  is the 
error term21.  W is a semi-categorical variable on an increasing scale from 0 to 36. The 
explanatory variables are in various forms, as depicted in Table 19.2.   
In Chapter 2 the potential wellbeing measurements contained within the BHPS are 
discussed, arriving at the conclusion that the GHQ12 measure, which has been used as a 
dependent variable in Chapters 2 and 3, as well as this one.  
There are many versions of the GHQ; the original, developed by Goldberg (1978), included 
60 questions designed to screen for psychiatric illness.  The full questionnaire is 
occasionally used as an indicator of subjective wellbeing, but for cost and efficiency 
purposes, many versions are shorter than the original; BHPS has used the same format of 
                                               
21
 This is based on the specification used by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004). 
Chapter 4:  Knowing what you’ve got:  Capability loss aversion and wellbeing 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 160 
GHQ12 since its inception22 and it has been used in many studies of wellbeing, including 
Gardner and Oswald (2007), who list more than a dozen other papers that use this 
dependent variable.  Gardner and Oswald  (2006) and Clark and Oswald  (1994)invert this 
scale as I have done, to create an increasing measure of wellbeing.   
One of the key benefits of the BHPS is that it returns to the same respondents in each wave 
of the survey, allowing us to control for any personality effects in question responses in the 
GHQ12, as well as in other questions.  Anand et al (2005) find that personality does 
influence wellbeing, and may influence the impact of capabilities, but that controlling for 
personality did not change the results.  Nonetheless the longitudinal nature of the data 
means that we can be more confident that personality effects on any relationship between 
capabilities and wellbeing are controlled for.   
19.1.2 Capability measurement 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the key to focusing on capabilities is to focus on choice, and 
through examining the questions behind each variable used in detail, we can gauge how 
much choice we can assume23.  In Appendix B a list of BHPS variables is mapped against 
the central capabilities developed by Nussbaum (2011) using the precedent set by Anand, 
Hunter and Smith (2005) and Veenhoven (2010). 
In order to create capability indicators for Chapter 3, each variable was then converted to a 
binary scale if not already binary, for reasons of analytical simplicity:  in this study I focus on 
the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of capabilities rather than suggest that individuals have a partial 
capability achievement, I assume that capability achievement is binary.  As such, when an 
individual ‘has’ a capability the binary variable is 1 or 0 otherwise. These binary variables are 
then summed for each individual within each time period to create a variable that indicates 
                                               
22
 This is accepted as consistent in the long term (Pevalin 2000), meaning personality effects may be 
more-or-less fixed within this measure 
23
 One of the risks of this study is that, like the previous paper, we cannot be entirely sure that we are 
looking at capabilities rather than functionings; with functionings, there is no assumption of choice, 
and imposing a functioning that has not been chosen may be as bad as restricting access to a 
functioning that has been chosen.   
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how many capabilities an individual benefits from during each time period.  The coding 
details are presented in Appendix B, with greater discussion in Chapter 3.   
19.1.3 Control variables 
The happiness literature discussed in Chapter 2 (see, for example, Clark, Frijters et al. 2008, 
Argyle 2003) details a wide range of factors that are suggested to influence wellbeing.  
These include employment status, marital status, the region in which one lives, age and 
gender.  The volume of research that has found these factors to be significant in wellbeing 
determination leads us to include them in the wellbeing regressions, so I create a range of 
dummy variables for the categories within each factor (Table 19.1).  Education would 
normally be included, however the education data in the BHPS is used to create the senses, 
imagination and thought capability variable, so it is not used as a control here.  Summary 
statistics for all the variables included in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 19.2. 
Table 19.1 – Dummy variables 
Variable Employment status Marital status Area 
Reference category: Training/ education Never married Northern Ireland 
Dummies: Retired Married North 
 Family care Divorced/ separated South 
 Long term sick Widowed London 
 Unemployed  Wales 
 Employed  Scotland 
   Midlands 
Source: Author’s analysis of BHPS data 
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Table 19.2 – Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Dependent variable 




226,165 20.685 5.962 1 31 
Equivalised 
income 
226,040 23,350.93 15,791.65 0 871,802 




195,772 .050 .219 0 1 
Retired 195,772 .205 .403 0 1 
Family care 195,772  .084 .277 0 1 
Long term 
sick 
195,772  .043 .202 0 1 
Unemployed 195,772 .038 .191 0 1 
Employed 195,772  .576 .494 0 1 
Never married 199,370  .306 .461 0 1 
Married 199,370 .536 .499 0 1 
Divorced/ 
separated 
199,370 .075 .263 0 1 
Widowed 199,370 .084 .277 0 1 
Northern 
Ireland 
224,861                   .081 .273 0 1 
North 224,861  .198 .399 0 1 
South 224,861                   .174 .379 0 1 
London 224,861 .065 .246 0 1 
Wales 224,861                   .130 .336 0 1 
Scotland 224,861                   .151 .358 0 1 
Midlands 224,861 .201 .401 0 1 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data.  Means for dummy variables are proportions of sample that 
have the dummy present, this are equivalent to proportion in that category.   
19.1.4 Data adjustments 
Similar to other chapters of this thesis, very few adjustments were made to the data. 
Responses from proxy respondents and those from individuals aged under 16 and still in 
compulsory education were dropped, and for employment status, some changes were made 
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to the coding of the answers between Waves 1 and 2; the model accounts for these changes 
and ensures that all coding is consistent. 
For all variables, ‘wild’ responses were recoded to missing.  
19.2 Looking for loss aversion 
Loss aversion implies that the effect of increases in income will not be the same as the effect 
of decreases by the same amount; indeed it is purported that losses have a greater negative 
effect on wellbeing than a gain of the same amount has positive.   
Two particular methods to focus on loss aversion were adopted by authors such as Vendrik 
and Woltjer (2007) and Boyce et al (2013).  The former use social reference income as the 
reference point; they calculate a moving age bracket reference group combined with 
education, region and gender categories.  They use fixed effects regression that accounts 
for time invariant personality factors, and although their results were positive (coefficients 
indicating loss aversion were significant), it does not represent actual changes in ones own 
income thus is vulnerable to the ‘affective forecasting error’ criticism.  In the latter study, 
Boyce et al use log-transformed income and its deviation from that in a previous year, 
representing individual losses and gains from the previous year.  As discussed previously, 
they use multilevel modelling rather than fixed effects, but their choice of variable allows us 
to focus more specifically on changes compared to the status quo.  Their analysis also 
strongly indicated loss aversion, with coefficients on a ‘losses’ dummy and an interaction 
term both being significant.  For this study, I will combine the fixed effects method adopted 
by Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) with the variable type – an internal reference point - used by 
Boyce et al (2013). 
The model specification I will use is: 
Wit = C-it1 + C+it2 + Xit3 + fi + it 
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Where Wit is the change in wellbeing for individual i at time period t (compared to t-1) fi is 
the time-invariant (personality) effect belonging to individual i, Xit is a range of control 
variables for individual i and time t, it is an error term and CY+ and C- take the value of 
capability losses and capability gains from the previous year.  I will estimate several forms of 
the model – both with and without controls – and a version that just includes the change in 
capabilities from the previous year (so which takes both positive and negative values).  To 
test consistency of this method with other studies, I will also look for the presence of loss 
aversion to income.   
19.3 Losses versus gains 
Undertaking a brief analysis of capability losses and gains, we can see that – as expected – 
capability losses are associated with lower mean wellbeing and capability gains are 
associated with higher mean wellbeing. 
In Figure 19.1 we can see that below a capability change of zero, i.e. a capability loss, mean 
wellbeing is generally lower, with the slope being slightly steeper (albeit with a disturbance 
between -7 and 0) than that above zero.     
Figure 19.1 – Mean wellbeing change by capability change t – t-1 
Source:  Author’s analysis of BHPS data. N = 10,725 indiviuals. 
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19.4 Summary 
In this section I present the methodology for approaching this investigation.  Wellbeing 
measurement is briefly discussed (as it has been discussed extensively in previous 
chapters) and I present its definition as individuals’ perception of their position related to 
their ideals, aspirations and judgements.  The basic form of the models used in this analysis 
is: 
Wit = Xit + fi + it 
where W is wellbeing, i represents the individual and t the time, X is a vector of explanatory 
variables, f is the fixed effect associated with the individual (correlated with X) and  is the 
error term 24 .  I present the control variables that populate X and note some data 
adjustments.   
The dataset used here will be an unbalanced panel from the British Household Panel 
Survey, using observations between the years of 1991 and 2008.  The variables chosen are 
consistent with other papers in this thesis to maintain comparability: wellbeing is measured 
using an inverted version of the GHQ12 Likert scale.    
As discussed above and in Section 18, there is no current research investigating loss 
aversion for capabilities and its impact on wellbeing, but there are some that address income 
loss aversion, and I borrow from their examples by setting out to undertake fixed effects 
least-squares analysis of models, using departures from an internal reference point (the 
previous periods’ values) to represent losses and gains. 
Finally I looked at some rough correlations between capability change and wellbeing, where 
Figure 19.1 suggests that capabilities exhibit similar characteristics to income with respect to 
loss aversion:  losses appear to be felt more keenly than gains – as shown by the steeper 
slope for decreases in capabilities than for increases.   
                                               
24
 The specific model structure will be presented in the following section. 
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20 Empirical Analysis 
As mentioned previously, this paper aims to discover whether loss aversion applies to 
capabilities as well as income.  Loss aversion to income is well tested in experimental 
studies as well as those using survey data, and it is mainly found to be prevalent and 
significant, however there is no evidence to suggest that loss aversion could also be found in 
capabilities.  I look for loss aversion both in income and in capabilities to compare the 
impacts on wellbeing, partially to test the validity of the method with other studies and 
partially to see if there are similarities in the relationships.   
In Section 19.3 we saw that gains in income are associated with higher wellbeing, but that 
losses are associated with lower wellbeing.  The same applies for capabilities, to a 
seemingly greater extent.  Here I use fixed effects regression to examine these initial 
observations further.    
20.1 Capability loss aversion 
As discussed in Section 18, there is no current literature that looks for the presence of 
capability loss aversion and examine its effects on wellbeing.  There are some however that 
investigate the effects of income loss aversion on wellbeing, and, using the examples set by 
these studies (see Section 19.2) I develop a range of model specifications:  
Model 1: Wit = Cit1 + fi + it 
Model 2: Wit = Cit1 + Xit2 + fi + it 
Model 3: Wit = C-it1 + C+it2 + fi + it 
Model 4: Wit = C-it1 + C+it2 + Xit3 + fi + it 
Where: 
W = Wit – Wit-1 
C = Cit – Cit-1 
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C+ = Cit – Cit-1 if C>0 
and: 
C- = Cit – Cit-1 if C<0 
In the above equations, Wit is wellbeing for individual i at time period t, fi is the time-invariant 
(personality) effect belonging to individual i, Xit is a range of control variables for individual i 
and time t and it is an error term.     
Estimating the equations above we can see that in models 1 and 2, change in capabilities is 
highly significant both with and without controls (Table 20.1) - 1 is 0.045 in model 1 and 
0.043 in model 2.  So change in capabilities overall has a positive effect, but in models 3 and 
4 (also Table 20.1) we can see that capability losses have a significantly greater negative 
effect than capability gains have positive: 1 is -0.107 in model 3 and -0.086 in model 4 and 
are highly significant, compared to values for 2 of 0.007 in model 3 (not significant) and 
0.009 (significant at 10% level) in model 4.  Although small therefore, it does appear that 
capability changes are significant. 
Taking the ratio of these two coefficients, in model 3 we see that the negative effect from 
losses is 15 times greater than the positive effect of gains.  The addition of controls in model 
4 does diminish this slightly, as the negative effect is only 9 times greater, but this still 
indicates strongly that there is loss aversion for capabilities, even if the effect is small.    
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Table 20.1 – Capability change variables regressed on wellbeing (GHQ12) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




0.045*** (0.002) 0.043*** (0.002)     
Capability 
losses 
    -0.107*** (0.005) -0.086*** (0.005) 
Capability 
gains 
    -0.007 (0.004) 0.009* (0.004) 
Ln equivalised 
income 
  0.041 (0.031)   0.049 (0.029) 
Age   -0.030* (0.013)   -0.035** (0.012) 
Age squared   -0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
Married+   -0.312*** (0.081)   -0.250*** (0.073) 
Divorced+   -1.012*** (0.141)   -0.991*** (0.131) 
Widowed+   -1.725*** (0.163)   -1.715*** (0.150) 
Employed+   -0.101 (0.088)   0.089 (0.080) 
Unemployed+   -1.459*** (0.123)   -1.337*** (0.112) 
Long-term 
sick/ disabled+ 
  -2.622*** (0.168)   -2.420*** (0.152) 
Family care+   -0.510*** (0.112)   -0.342*** (0.099) 
Retired+   -0.126 (0.113)   0.092 (0.102) 
North+   -0.906 (1.440)   -0.383 (1.635) 
South+   -0.842 (1.448)   -0.334 (1.644) 
London+   -1.061 (1.452)   -0.498 (1.647) 
Wales+   -0.643 (1.466)   -0.157 (1.656) 
Scotland+   -0.284 (1.455)   0.122 (1.655) 
Midlands+   -0.650 (1.443)   -0.153 (1.640) 
_cons 24.790*** (0.000) 27.090*** (1.400) 25.070*** (0.019) 26.570*** (1.555) 
N 168,997  164,684  193,051  188,114  
adj. R2 0.005  0.016  0.006  0.018  
P-value (F) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note: Dependent variable: Inverted GHQ12 (wellbeing). p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  Robust 
standard errors (clustered at PID level) in parentheses.  Variables marked + are dummies. Omitted 
categories:  ‘training/ education’, ‘no qualifications’, ‘never married’ and ‘Northern Ireland’.  
20.2 Income loss aversion 
To test the consistency of this study to those looking for income loss aversion, I repeat the 
above analysis with income rather than capabilities.  Doing this will also allow us to compare 
the outcome with papers, such as Boyce et al  (2013) who do find the presence of income 
loss aversion in BHPS data.  Given that there is no methodology for looking for the effects of 
Chapter 4:  Knowing what you’ve got:  Capability loss aversion and wellbeing 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 169 
loss aversion in capabilities, it is important to do this to test the method here against that in 
other studies.  If the results are wildly different it may be due to the method therefore, rather 
than data (as I also use the BHPS) and therefore one may have to question the method for 
measuring capabilities; as discussed in Section 18, preferences for the status quo and the 
relationship between income and capabilities (where the latter is one of many resources that 
individuals can use to convert capabilities into functionings) lead us to assume that there 
could possibly be loss aversion to capabilities as well as income.  Furthermore the roughly 
linear relationship highlighted in Section 12, as well as the outcome of total capabilities as a 
significant determinant of wellbeing in a regression, confirms this possibility.   
A second reason for undertaking analysis of income is to compare the effects.  Although a 
well-established phenomenon in experimental studies, with ratios of the effects of losses to 
those of gains ranging from 1.8 to 4.8, I cannot say that there is a clear consensus of how 
much loss aversion can be expected to either income or capabilities.  Comparing any ratios 
that come out of each analysis will therefore add context.   
Using equivalised household income in natural log form, I create three variables:  one 
variable that represents the change in income from one year to the next, one that takes all 
the negative changes in income and one all the positive, where: 
Y = Yit – Yit-1 
Y+ = Yit – Yit-1 if Y>0 
and: 
Y- = Yit – Yit-1 if Y<0 
So the models to be estimated become: 
Model 1: Wit = Yit1 + fi + it 
Model 2: Wit = Yit1 + Xit2 + fi + it 
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Model 3: Wit = Y-it1 + Y+it2 + fi + it 
Model 4: Wit = Y-it1 + Y+it2 + Xit3 + fi + it 
Where Wit is wellbeing for individual i at time period t, fi is the time-invariant (personality) 
effect belonging to individual i, Xit is a range of control variables for individual i and time t, it 
is an error term and Y, Y+ and Y- are as described above. 
In Table 20.2 the results of the regressions are displayed.  In model 1 it is evident that 
change in income is a significant determinant of wellbeing, with the coefficient on income 
change highly significant, exhibiting a value of 0.106.  Adding controls to the regression 
(model 2) does not reduce the high significance of the variable but does reduce the size of 
the coefficient slightly to 0.101, however this tells us nothing about loss aversion – for that I 
need to test for differential effects on losses and gains. 
Models 3 and 4 attempt to capture these effects by including different measures for income 
losses and income gains.  Interestingly, where income losses are negative and significant 
(1 = -0.239 in model 3 and 1 = -0.182 in model 4), income gains are not significant in either 
model.  This is consistent with Boyce et al (2013).  This result could be due to the source of 
the income gains, perhaps through working longer hours.  It could also be that, as discussed 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis, that if there are capability failures, additional income will not bring 
about improvements in quality of life.   
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Table 20.2 – Income change variables regressed on wellbeing (GHQ12) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Change in 
income (ln) 
0.106*** (0.023) 0.101*** (0.030)     
Income loss (ln)     -0.239*** (0.044) -0.182*** (0.051) 
Income gain (ln)     -0.012 (0.038) 0.029 (0.040) 
Ln. Equivalised 
income 
  -0.035 (0.043)   -0.031 (0.036) 
Age   -0.042** (0.014)   -0.051*** (0.012) 
Age squared   0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
Married   -0.274** (0.085)   -0.258*** (0.074) 
Divorced   -0.976*** (0.146)   -1.008*** (0.132) 
Widowed   -1.583*** (0.167)   -1.719*** (0.151) 
Higher 
education 
  0.155 (0.232)   -0.089 (0.206) 
Further 
education 
  -0.044 (0.181)   -0.095 (0.160) 
Basic 
qualifications 
  -0.170 (0.197)   -0.178 (0.172) 
Employed   -0.122 (0.100)   0.076 (0.086) 
Unemployed   -1.569*** (0.137)   -1.398*** (0.116) 
Long term sick   -2.644*** (0.180)   -2.476*** (0.155) 
Family care   -0.554*** (0.123)   -0.379*** (0.103) 
Retired   -0.134 (0.123)   0.063 (0.106) 
North   -2.305 (1.590)   -0.287 (1.607) 
South   -2.210 (1.588)   -0.219 (1.616) 
London   -2.429 (1.593)   -0.397 (1.620) 
Wales   -1.787 (1.611)   -0.067 (1.628) 
Scotland   -1.697 (1.562)   0.245 (1.628) 
Midlands   -2.025 (1.584)   -0.055 (1.612) 
Constant 24.800*** (0.000) 29.500*** (1.566) 24.830*** (0.001) 27.730*** (1.546) 
N 160,440  154,757  193,051  185,798  
R2 0.000  0.011  0.000  0.013  
Note: Dependent variable: Inverted GHQ12 (wellbeing). p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  Robust 
standard errors (clustered at PID level) in parentheses.  Variables marked + are dummies. Omitted 
categories:  ‘training/ education’, ‘no qualifications’, ‘never married’ and ‘Northern Ireland’ 
20.3 Analysis  
In this section I use fixed effects least-squares regression to look for evidence of loss 
aversion to capabilities; that is, I aim to examine whether there are asymmetric effects for 
losses and gains in capabilities.  I find that indeed there are asymmetric effects in the 
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wellbeing response to capability changes:  both with and without controls, losses have an 
effect around 15 times greater than gains.   
Testing these results by applying the same method to income, I found that although income 
losses were significant, gains were not; this outcome is supported somewhat by the findings 
of Boyce et al (2013) who found that income gains only had a marginally significant 
relationship with wellbeing without controls; gains became insignificant when controls were 
added.  However the analysis suggests that there is loss aversion to both factors.   
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21 Conclusions 
In this paper I set out to test whether loss aversion – one of the central tenets of prospect 
theory – was present in the relationship between capabilities and wellbeing.  Beginning with 
a presentation of loss aversion theory, discussing how “losses loom larger than gains”  
(Kahneman, Tversky 1979, p279) – decision utility is affected to a greater extent by losses 
(departures from a reference point) than by gains of the same amount.  Reference points 
can be internal – from one’s own past – or external, such as the average income of peers, 
and some studies (see Luttmer 2005, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Di Tella, Haisken-De New et 
al. 2010) suggest that income comparisons of both types do affect wellbeing.  Examining 
wellbeing effects based on decision utility is vulnerable to the criticism of affective 
forecasting error, in other words, the expectation of losses might be greater than that of 
equivalent gains, but the reality may not be the case.  The use of experienced utility – 
wellbeing – rather than decision utility avoids this criticism, and this is the dependent 
variable I use in this study. 
The dataset used in this study is the BHPS – the British Household Panel Survey – and the 
variables chosen are consistent with other papers in this thesis to maintain comparability: 
wellbeing is measured using an inverted version of the GHQ12 Likert scale.  The capabilities 
used in this study are based on Martha Nussbaum’s (2011) list of central capabilities, and 
the capability indicators are those developed for the previous paper in this thesis:  Using 
Anand, Hunter and Smith (2005) and Veenhoven (2010) as a precedent, I chose a range of 
BHPS responses to represent capabilities, then used principal components analysis to 
select the core factors for each capability, which were then used as capability dummies, and 
summed to create a ‘total capabilities’ variable for each individual in each year.    
I use a basic wellbeing specification that uses fixed effects least squares to look for 
asymmetric effects in wellbeing responses to changes in capabilities:  there is already some 
initial evidence (from Figure 19.1) that negative changes in capabilities are associated with 
disproportionately lower wellbeing when compared with positive changes.   
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The empirical analysis gives further evidence to support the presence of loss aversion to 
capabilities; without controls, losses have an effect at least 15 times greater than for gains, 
and even the addition of control variables only reduces this to 9.  However the coefficients 
are small, with a reduction of one capability resulting in a 0.1 reduction in wellbeing. 
Repeating this analysis for income, gains were not significant although losses were, with a 
coefficient of -0.2. 
The caveats for this study are similar to those for Chapter 3 – the extraction of the capability 
variables from the BHPS is, despite endeavours to closely compare the description of each 
capability with the text surrounding the BHPS question, subjective.  So I have not used the 
same variables as Anand et al (2005) and another researcher may not use the same 
variables as me.  This is unavoidable when extracting information from a set of questions 
that were not designed to measure capabilities, and researchers must assure themselves 
that the data they are using represented the capabilities (and only the capabilities, rather 
than functionings) as much as possible.  
Having used wellbeing as the dependent variable – something that is actually experienced 
rather than anticipated (as with decision utility) – the results don’t suffer the criticism of 
affective forecasting error; indeed it does appear that for capabilities losses loom larger than 
gains and are felt more keenly than gains. 
In Section 18 I presented the rationale for testing for loss aversion in capabilities. Implicit in 
prospect theory is that less of a good thing is bad, and more of a good thing is good. In 
Chapter 3, I found that capabilities – both individually and in sum – could be significant 
determinants of wellbeing despite the inclusion of income in a wellbeing specification.  So, 
as ‘good’ things, do we lose wellbeing by losing capabilities?  Prospect theory holds that 
losses loom larger than gains for income and decision utility:  the wellbeing penalty from 
losing £10 is larger than the wellbeing gain from winning £10.  Although prospect theory has 
not often been tested in experienced utility, those studies that do test it find a similar 
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outcome:  losses have larger wellbeing reductions than respective gains would create.  Put 
simply, we are averse to losses in expectation (decision utility) and reality (experienced 
utility).   
Given the relationship between income and capabilities – income is a resource, that 
individuals can use to achieve ends (functionings) – we might expect a similar relation, but a 
lack of prior literature means there was no proven foundation for this expectation.  This study 
was therefore exploratory.  The positive outcome – that there was a greater wellbeing loss 
from capability reduction than wellbeing gain for capability addition – supports the existence 
of loss aversion in something other than income or assets.   
The implications of these results also support those of other papers in this thesis, 
specifically, that capabilities do appear to matter to wellbeing, even if the loss aversion 
affects appear to be smaller than those for income:  if there are capability failures, 
individuals may be prevented from using their income to achieve ends that they need or 
desire to bring them closer to their own view of ‘a good life’.  Thus, even though there was 
no prior expectation of a significant result, it is perhaps unsurprising that we find loss 
aversion in capabilities, particularly when income is controlled for. 
 
Chapter 4:  Knowing what you’ve got:  Capability loss aversion and wellbeing 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 176 
22 Appendix A – References 
 ABDELLAOUI, M., BLEICHRODT, H. and PARASCHIV, C., 2007. Loss Aversion Under Prospect 
Theory: A Parameter-Free Measurement. Management Science, 53(10), pp. 1659-1674. 
ALLISON, P.D., 2009. Fixed Effects Regression Models. (Quantitative Applications in the Social 
Sciences, 160)  SAGE Publications. 
ANAND, P., HUNTER, G. and SMITH, R., 2005. Capabilities and well-being: evidence based on the 
Sen–Nussbaum approach to welfare. Social Indicators Research, 74(1), pp. 9-55. 
ARGYLE, M., 2003. Causes and Correlates of Happiness. In: D. KAHNEMAN, E. DIENER and  N. 
SCHWARZ, eds, Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 
344-378. 
BOOIJ, A.S. and VAN DE KUILEN, G., 2009. A parameter-free analysis of the utility of money for the 
general population under prospect theory. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(4), pp. 651-666. 
BOYCE, C.J., WOOD, A.M., BANKS, J., CLARK, A.E. and BROWN, G.D.A., 2013. Money, Well-
Being, and Loss Aversion: Does an Income Loss Have a Greater Effect on Well-Being Than an 
Equivalent Income Gain? Psychological Science, 24(12), pp. 2557-2562. 
CARTER, S. and MCBRIDE, M., 2013. Experienced utility versus decision utility: Putting the ‘S’ in 
satisfaction. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 42, pp. 13-23. 
CLARK, A.E., FRIJTERS, P. and A. SHIELDS, M.A., 2008. Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: 
An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(1), 
pp. 95-144. 
CLARK, A.E. and OSWALD, A.J., 1994. Unhappiness and unemployment. The Economic Journal, 
104(424), pp. 648-659. 
DEATON, A., 2012. The financial crisis and the well-being of Americans. Oxford Economic Papers, 
64(1), pp. 1-26. 
DI TELLA, R., HAISKEN-DE NEW, J. and MACCULLOCH, R., 2010. Happiness adaptation to income 
and to status in an individual panel. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76(3), pp. 834-
852. 
EASTERLIN, R.A., 1974. Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence. 
In:  DAVID, P.A., REDER, M.W., eds., Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in 
Honour of Moses Abramovitz, New York: Academic Press, Inc., pp. 89-125. 
FERRER-I-CARBONELL, A., 2005. Income and well-being: an empirical analysis of the comparison 
income effect. Journal of Public Economics, 89(5), pp. 997-1019. 
FISHBURN, P.C. and KOCHENBERGER, G.A., 1979. Two-piece Von Neumann Morgenstern utility 
functions. Decision Sciences, 10(4), pp. 503-518. 
GARDNER, J. and OSWALD, A.J., 2007. Money and mental wellbeing: A longitudinal study of 
medium-sized lottery wins. Journal of Health Economics, 26(1), pp. 49-60. 
GARDNER, J. and OSWALD, A.J., 2006. Do Divorcing Couples Become Happier By Breaking Up?. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, (Statistics in Society), 169(2), pp. 319-336. 
GOLDBERG, D., 1978. Manual of the General Health Questionnaire. Windsor. UK: NFER-Nelson, . 
KAHNEMAN, D., 1999. Objective Happiness. In: D. KAHNEMAN, E. DIENER and  N. SCHWARZ, 
eds, Well-Being:  the Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 3-25. 
KAHNEMAN, D., KNETSCH, J.L. and THALER, R.H., 1991. Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss 
aversion, and status quo bias. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), pp. 193-206. 
Chapter 4:  Knowing what you’ve got:  Capability loss aversion and wellbeing 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 177 
KAHNEMAN, D. and SUGDEN, R., 2005. Experienced utility as a standard of policy evaluation. 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 32(1), pp. 161-181. 
KAHNEMAN, D. and TVERSKY, A., eds,  2000. Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge University 
Press. 
KAHNEMAN, D. and TVERSKY, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(2), pp. 263-291. 
KERMER, D.A., DRIVER-LINN, E., WILSON, T.D. and GILBERT, D.T., 2006. Loss aversion is an 
affective forecasting error. Psychological Science, 17(8), pp. 649-653. 
KÖBBERLING, V. and WAKKER, P.P., 2005. An index of loss aversion. Journal of Economic Theory, 
122(1), pp. 119-131. 
LUTTMER, E.F.P., 2005. Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 120(3), pp. 963-1002. 
NOVEMSKY, N. and KAHNEMAN, D., 2005. The Boundaries of Loss Aversion. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 42(2), pp. 119-128. 
NUSSBAUM, M.C., 2011. Creating capabilities. Harvard University Press. 
SAMUELSON, W. and ZECKHAUSER, R., 1988. Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty, 1(1), pp. 7-59. 
SCHMIDT, U. and TRAUB, S., 2002. An experimental test of loss aversion. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 25(3), pp. 233-249. 
SEN, A., 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University Press. 
SENIK, C., 2009. Direct evidence on income comparisons and their welfare effects. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(1), pp. 408-424. 
TAYLOR, M.F.(., BRICE, J., BUCK, N. and  PRENTICE-LANE, E., 2010. British Household Panel 
Survey User Manual Volume A: Introduction, Technical Report and Appendices. Colchester: 
University of Essex. 
VEENHOVEN, R., 2010. Capability and happiness: Conceptual difference and reality links. Journal of 
Socio-economics, 39(3), pp. 344-350. 
VENDRIK, M. and WOLTJER, G.B., 2007. Happiness and loss aversion: Is utility concave or convex 
in relative income? Journal of Public Economics, 91(7), pp. 1423-1448. 
 
Chapter 4:  Knowing what you’ve got:  Capability loss aversion and wellbeing 
 
Not for citation without the author’s permission 178 
23 Appendix B – Capability Variables in BHPS 
This short list of capability indicators was refined from a longer list on criteria such as 
availability in multiple waves, number of respondents to the question, whether it focuses on 
a capability or a functioning and how well it could fit within the description of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities.  The long list was created from a trawl of the BHPS documentation, comparing 
the wording of questions to the descriptions of Nussbaum’s capabilities.  
In order to create capability indicators, each variable is converted to a binary scale if not 
already binary, for reasons of analytical simplicity:  in this study I aim to look at the wellbeing 
differences between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of capabilities, so rather than suggest that 
individuals have a partial capability achievement, I assume that capability achievement is 
binary.   
Using judgement, the descriptions of Nussbaum’s capabilities and the method used in 
Anand et al (2005), I draw thresholds for variables where it seems most appropriate. 
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Table 23.1 – Capability indicators and source variables 
Capability Variables (including BHPS title*) 
Life No data available 
Bodily health 1 
wHLLT – Health limits daily activities 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Bodily health 2 
wHLLTW – health limits type or amount of work 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Bodily health 3 
wLFSAT1 – satisfaction with health 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Bodily integrity 1 
wCARUSE – have access to car 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; no (2) coded to 0 
Bodily integrity 2 
wCRDARK – feel safe walking alone at night 
- Very safe (1) and fairly safe (2) coded to 1; a bit unsafe (3), very unsafe (4) and 
never go out after dark (5) coded to 0 
Bodily integrity 3 
wHSPRBQ – accommodation has vandalism/ crime in the area 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Bodily integrity 4 
wCRMUGG – extent of people being attacked 
- Very common (1) and fairly common (2) coded to 0; not very common (3) and not 
at all common (4) coded to 1 
Bodily integrity 5 
wCRWORA – worry about being a victim of crime 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Senses, imagination 
and thought 
wQFEDHI – highest qualification held 




wSSUPA – is there someone who will listen to you? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 2 
wSSUPB – is there someone who will help in a crisis? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 3 
 
wSSUPC – is there someone you can relax with? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 4 
wSSUPD – is there someone who really appreciates you? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Emotions 5 
wSSUPE – is there someone you can count on to offer support? 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; yes, more than one (2) coded as 1; no-one (3) coded as 0 
Practical reason 
wLFSATO – satisfied with life overall 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Affiliation 1 
wORGA – active in organisations 
- Yes (1) remained as 1; no (2) coded to 0 
Affiliation 2 
wFRNA – frequency of talking to neighbours 
- Most days (1) remained as 1; once or twice a week (2) coded to 1; once or twice a 
month (3) coded as 0; less than once a month (4) coded as 0; never (5) coded as 
zero 
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Affiliation 3 
wFRNB – frequency of meeting people 
- Most days (1) remained as 1; once or twice a week (2) coded to 1; once or twice a 
month (3) coded as 0; less than once a month (4) coded as 0; never (5) coded as 
zero 
Affiliation 4 
wHSCNTF – would like to socialise but must do without because I cannot afford it 
- Yes (1) coded to 0; no (2) coded to 1 
Other species No data available 
Play 1 
wLFSAT6 – satisfied with social life 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Play 2 
wLFSAT7 – satisfied with amount of leisure time 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Play 3 
wLFSAT8 – satisfied with use of leisure time 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Play 4 
wJBHRLK – preference over hours worked 
- Work more hours (1) and work fewer hours (2) coded to 0; keep the same hours 
(3) coded to 1 
Control (over one’s 
environment) 1 
wVOTE7 – voted in May 2005 (or previous) general election 
- 1 (voted) remained as 1; 2 (didn’t vote but could have) was coded to 0 
Control 2 
wLFSAT2 – satisfaction with income 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Control 3 
wLFSAT3 – satisfaction with house 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Control 4 
wLFSAT4 – satisfaction with spouse/ partner 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
Control 5 
wLFSAT5 – satisfaction with job. 
- 7 (completely satisfied) to 4 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) were coded to 1; 3 
(slightly dissatisfied) to 1 (not satisfied at all) were coded to 0 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I set out to make the case that monetary poverty – at an arbitrary level – is not 
relevant to individual wellbeing, that capabilities are important determinants of wellbeing, 
and finally that dynamic effects of capabilities influence wellbeing.  In these aims, this 
research has had some success.  In this section I summarise the results of each paper, 
discuss them in the context of the literature and suggest policy implications and further 
research.     
Summary of results 
The first investigation – into the significance of the poverty line for wellbeing, Chapter 2 – 
found that being ‘poor’ by an arbitrary standard did not affect ones wellbeing.  The poverty 
line used here is 60% of the median household equivalised disposable income; although 
often referred to (as discussed in Chapter 2), there is no obvious reason why this particular 
threshold was chosen.  This calls into questions not only its relevance to the concept at 
hand, but also its relevance to individuals living above or below the threshold.  This doubt 
was vindicated by the results of fixed effects regression that indicated that poverty - 
arbitrarily defined - was not amongst the significant determinants of wellbeing. 
The second part of Chapter 2’s poverty line investigation further tested the threshold, by 
examining whether the poor and non-poor were distinct populations, and decomposition 
analysis suggested that there was a difference in wellbeing between the two groups (0.9533 
points on the wellbeing scale of 0 to 36).  However 96% of the difference is due to 
characteristics rather than coefficients – this means that the differences were accounted for 
by factors such as education, health, employment status and marital status, rather than any 
fundamental difference in the slope or intercept of a wellbeing function.  I cannot conclude 
therefore that there are any fundamental differences in wellbeing determination for those 
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living above or below a poverty line.  This was supported by RDD analysis that found no 
evidence of a discontinuity in wellbeing either side of the poverty line.   
Chapter 3 introduced the concept of capabilities – widely assumed to represent 
multidimensional poverty – as an alternative to the 60% threshold.  Monetary poverty only 
focuses on the financial aspects of deprivation, whereas there is much evidence that it is 
multifaceted. Building on the outcome of Chapter 2 – that the 60% median income poverty 
line may not be important for wellbeing determination, Chapter 3 conducted principal 
components analysis to reduce a list of capability indicators extracted from the BHPS into 
principal factors that represented each capability on Nussbaum’s list.  Some of the capability 
factors included in a fixed effects regression model were significant – both with and without 
controls – where the coefficients range from 0.970 (affiliation) to 4.301 (senses, imagination 
and thought), as was a count variable of the total number of capabilities an individual 
possessed.  This research therefore suggested that capabilities could be important 
determinants of wellbeing, both individually in some cases and on the whole.   
Chapter 4 extended this analysis by focusing on asymmetries in the relationship between 
capabilities and income, and looked at how wellbeing would change when the number of 
capabilities was increased or reduced:  would losses ‘loom’ larger than gains as they are 
often found to for income?  Reference points for income can be internal – ones own past – 
or external (a peer group) and no studies appear to have been undertaken that examine 
whether this phenomenon would also apply to capabilities so I set out with no expectations 
as to the likelihood that the hypothesis of symmetric responses to positive and negative 
changes in capabilities would be accepted.   
Using fixed effects regression to control for unobservable heterogeneity, this latter 
investigation included two capability change variables; one that contained only negative 
changes and one that contained only positive changes. Although the effects were small, it 
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was found that losses have a negative effect significantly larger than the positive effect of 
gains, strongly indicating the presence of loss aversion to capabilities.  
Caveats 
As mentioned previously, any study is limited by its methodology, and these essays are no 
exception, so the following issues should be taken into account when considering the 
conclusions.  An issue prevalent throughout all three papers is unobserved time-invariant 
bias, from sources such as personality, which – in economics – is assumed to be roughly 
stable; or at least, the part of personality that would bias wellbeing responses to income, 
education and other controls is assumed to be roughly stable  (Oswald, Powdthavee 2008) .  
However in the psychological literature, personality is viewed as changing over the lifetime, 
meaning that – in the case here – there would be no time-invariant factors; personality 
effects that constantly change would end up in the error term of a regression.  Throughout 
this study I have tested each regression model to see if the assumption of time-invariant 
omission holds, and in all but one case, Hausman tests – that look for the presence of 
unobserved time-invariant factors in a panel data regression – suggest that the appropriate 
model specification is a fixed effects one.  That isn’t to say that personality is fixed; it simply 
means that there is an unobserved component that doesn’t change over time.  This could be 
personality, or it could be part of personality.  Regardless, where appropriate I used a 
random effects panel specification, which simply means there was no bias from omitted 
time-invariant factors that needed to be controlled for.  In doing this I make no conclusion 
about whether personality is stable or not; simply, I sought to ensure my models were robust 
in the face of potential bias.   
A second limitation, which affects Chapters 3 and 4, is the extraction of BHPS data to 
measure capabilities.  Although this has been undertaken by Anand et al (2005) and 
Veenhoven (2011), the approach is not wholly vindicated by repetition:  each researcher will 
read Nussbaum’s list of core capabilities and interpret them with as objectively as possible, 
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but there is an unavoidable subjective component whereby our interpretations are enriched 
with our own experiences and beliefs.  This means that not all researchers can be expected 
to arrive at the same range of variables to represent the central capabilities.  This is the 
nature of extracting information from a dataset that was not designed to measure that 
information.  I have mitigated this somewhat by undertaking principal components analysis:  
from a number of variables that widely represent the capability, I extract components that 
measure the majority of the underlying concept that is not measured.   
Linked to this is the possibility that in some cases we are measuring functionings (what 
people do) rather than capabilities (their abilities to ‘do’ if they choose to).  A functioning that 
arises without a capability being present is not believed to be valid:  central to the CA is 
choice, so that external choices are not imposed on us against our will.  We must be able to 
choose the functionings that we want to achieve given our set of capabilities.  If there is a 
capability failure, we cannot achieve associated functionings, but it is only when those 
functionings are desired but cannot be chosen that the failure arises.  If a functioning is not 
desired and would not be chosen, imposing it on someone is just as much a capability failure 
as denying if to them in the first place.  As much as possible, care has been taken to ensure 
that the variables selected represent capabilities rather than functionings, however as I use 
variables not designed to measure capabilities, it is possible that there is some aspect of 
functioning unknowingly included.   
A further limitation is that even within the CA proponents there is division as to whether a 
central list is permissible; Nussbaum believes it is, but Sen disagrees.  His disagreement 
however, can be lifted in the place of poverty asessment  (Sen 1992) , which is the 
overarching theme of this thesis.  In this latter case, Sen (1992) states that a specified list is 
tolerated within his framework.  Although not ideal in Sen’s view taking a pluralistic, 
practicable approach, as I do, does allow us to look at capabilities in the absence of any 
current capabilities measurements, or facility to develop a democratic consensus on what 
capabilities are important to our population.     
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The data itself presented some limitations, as BHPS variables are not present in every wave 
of the survey.  This was particularly problematic in Chapter 3, measuring the individual 
capabilities.  For two models, the sample size was well than 2,000 individuals over two 
waves.  Compared to 188,000 over 18 waves for model 3 of that paper, these samples are 
particularly small and may be the reason why some results were unexpected.  The only 
solution would be to abandon some capabilities altogether; there were some variables (for 
example the ones representing emotion) that were only available for nine waves, and of 
those nine waves, only six had observations for affiliation variables and so on.  I could have 
omitted the variables present in the least number of waves, but even in this limited form, I 
believe the sacrifice of power for completeness is worthwhile, particularly as I then looked at 
capabilities as a sum.   
Finally, the BHPS presents a limitation in being a household survey.  Only residential 
addresses listed in a national postcode database are included.  Traveller sites, institutions, 
refuges are all excluded.  Individuals whose main place of residence is at one of these sites 
may be poor and may be capability deprived – perhaps moreso than individuals in 
residential addresses – however we have no way of including them in the study.  The same 
applies for homeless individuals, who may be homeless due to poverty or capability failure 
(being homeless is a severe violation of the bodily integrity capability to name but one).  This 
means that those who may be more severely affected by poverty and/ or capability failure 
are not included in the survey.  There is unfortunately no mitigation for this.   
Implications 
There are two concluding statements one can make from these essays.  Firstly, that the 
poverty line – in its arbitrary form used in this thesis, specified by government policy – has 
no discernible effect on individual wellbeing, other than the effects that result through 
associated changes like employment status or educational attainment.  Secondly, 
capabilities – some individually and in sum – can have an effect on wellbeing in static and 
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dynamic aspects; in the static sense, people with more capabilities generally experience 
higher wellbeing and the presence of particular capabilities – senses, imagination and 
though, affiliation, practical reason for example – indicates higher wellbeing.  In the dynamic 
sense, the addition and removal of capabilities also affects wellbeing, in an asymmetric 
pattern:  losing a capability results in a greater wellbeing loss than the increase in wellbeing 
resulting from gaining a capability.   
As mentioned above, there is no evidence that the 60% poverty line has any theoretical 
founding (Seymour 2009).  This is perhaps why there was no evidence for different 
wellbeing functions for the poor and non-poor – any wellbeing differences were accounted 
for by factors other than being under or over the poverty line itself.  Although subject to some 
controversy (Blanchflower, Oswald 2004), there is frequent observation that greater income 
is associated with greater wellbeing, and when I plotted observed income against observed 
wellbeing there was an upward and roughly linear relationship between the two variables; 
there did not appear to be any threshold where the relationship changed to be steeper or 
flatter or where a discontinuity was suggested. This is perhaps intuitive:  income is – to an 
extent, because few of us will become part of the 1%  (Stiglitz 2011) – continuous, so what 
you can afford to buy/ do is also continuous (assuming constant preferences, rather than a 
switch to luxury goods).  A fall of £1 in annual income could move someone below the 
poverty line, but this is unlikely to have any significant effect on her or his household 
consumption; similarly for a £1 increase that raises a household above the poverty line.  The 
research here therefore affirms the literature suggesting the poverty line is theoretically 
unfounded and socially irrelevant (Belfield, Cribb et al. 2014, Seymour 2009, Townsend 
1979). 
The current UK poverty target, to eradicate child poverty by 2020, will not be met.  However 
the interpretation of this is complex:  the 60% median income threshold is unavoidably 
affected by fiscal policy (Brewer, Browne et al. 2011).  In addition the general income level 
and income inequality both can affect how many people fall below the line.  So although the 
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eradication of child poverty target will not be met, it does not necessarily mean that the 
quality of life of less well-off individuals has fallen.  The nature of this poverty measurement 
limits what we can say about the experiences people have (heightening the importance of a 
relevant measurement).  The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Parekh, MacInnes et al. 2010) 
suggests that the numbers of people in poverty will rise, but again, we cannot be sure 
whether this is due to genuine falls in quality of life or whether it is due to the nature of the 
fixed poverty line.  This alone should be enough to lead policymakers to consider alternative 
measures, and indeed material deprivation is now being included in the Households Below 
Average Income series, but this is inextricably linked to income as it focuses on what people 
can afford to buy, rather than what they are able to be using – for example – social capital or 
entrepreneurship (part of their personal resources). 
As Halleröd asserts, if we had a individually-meaningful measure of poverty in the first place 
we would not need a poverty line (Halleröd 2000):  what this means is that if we knew what it 
really was to be poor, and could identify the suffering and intervene at individual and societal 
levels, there would be no need for an unfounded dichotomy that divided a society into 
treatment groups, where the poor were worthy of intervention.  Within that poor category, 
there would be such a large variety of experiences that blanket treatment would be only 
sufficient for some, and might be unnecessary for those in – for example – the 59th centile of 
median household income. 
So, what is an individually meaningful indication of poverty?  The capabilities approach (CA) 
aims to provide it, and Chapters 3 and 4 examined whether it could have an impact on 
wellbeing. The appeal of the CA in poverty measurement is centred on its 
multidimensionality. Monetary measures of poverty focus on only one aspect, which in the 
capabilities framework is a resource to be utilised to achieve functionings. But without 
capabilities, and the freedom to choose a functioning, money may lose one of its core 
benefits – the ability to exchange it to achieve ends. When one views ‘a good life’ as ends 
most people arguably have, capability failures seem intrinsically important. 
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In the CA, income is seen as a resource (along with other physical, societal and emotional 
resources) that individuals use to achieve ends (Kingdon, Knight 2006, Sen 1992) .  In 
Chapters 3 and 4, regression models included capabilities and an income measurement as 
regressors on wellbeing.  Income was not significant when accompanied by the sum-of-
capabilities variables, however was significant on its own (as seen in the income loss 
aversion models in Chapter 4).  This supports the literature view that income alone is not 
enough to ensure a good life; it instead acts as a conduit for capabilities to be converted into 
functionings – a means to achieve ends.     
One of the complications of the CA was its limited applicability – Sen (1979)  has asserted 
that capabilities should be context specific and relevant to communities.  One of the 
criticisms Sen makes of wellbeing research is that individuals are believed to adapt to 
deprivation:  after a certain amount of time living in extreme poverty, individuals ‘get used to 
it’ and still experience positive and negative emotions as they would if they were not in 
extreme poverty.  
Adaptation however, is not universal  (Pugno 2008).  Particularly in the developed world, 
deprivation, that Sen is concerned individuals will adapt to, is not the same deprivation of 
poor individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Furthermore in developed countries, despite 
economic growth and rising average income, the incidence of anxiety is rising, even for 
those who are relatively well off  (Fombonne, Simmons et al. 2001)  so it is not necessarily 
true that adaptation is occurring in all societies.  And finally, adaptation need not be 
negative, as with it comes further aspirations  (Teschl, Comim 2005).  Chapter 4 of this 
thesis suggests that dynamic changes in capabilities do affect individuals, at least in the 
short term; an interesting extension – not possible within these models due to limited waves 
of data – would be the persistence of these effects; this would allow us to make greater 
assertions about adaptation to capability deprivation.   
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Binder  (2013)  believes that with careful consideration there is the potential for synthesis 
between the CA and happiness research.  The two need not be opponents.  Wellbeing 
research can overcome the impracticality of the CA – how do you measure a good life if it is 
wholly individual and context specific? – and CA can overcome the adaptation criticism of 
wellbeing research.  A synthesis may be possible with due care and attention to each 
approach.  In this thesis I have aimed to provide that due care and attention, with the 
limitations mentioned above, but looking at whether the presence of capabilities is significant 
to wellbeing and how changes in those capabilities affects wellbeing over time; recognising 
that in some spheres capabilities and wellbeing are measuring the same thing – here I have 
tried to focus on a particular aspect of wellbeing – and inverted GHQ12 variable used by 
Gardner and Oswald  (2004, 2006) amongst others – and separated it from the whole-of-life 
quality assessment contained within the CA.     
In these papers I have discussed the limitations of the fixed and arbitrary poverty line 
(Chapter 2), and extolled the merits of a multidimensional approach like the CA (Chapters 3 
and 4).  The research summarised above suggests that capabilities do matter to wellbeing – 
an individual’s wellbeing does appear to be affected by the presence of certain capabilities 
(play, practical reason for example) and also be the total number of capabilities she has 
available to her.  Moreso, the loss of a capability is felt more keenly than a gain so the 
‘capabilities matter’ observation holds in both static and dynamic contexts.  This effect 
remains even when income is included in the wellbeing specification.  The loss aversion 
outcome was not expected – there is no literature to suggests loss aversion in capabilities 
and – but adds weight to the arguments in Chapter 3 that the more aspects of an individual’s 
life we are able to consider when assessing poverty, the more relevant and important that 
assessment will be.  This supports the nature and intent of the CA, in providing an 
individually relevant measure of what it is to be poor (Nussbaum 2011, Alkire 2010) .     
The simple point that arises is that ultimately, without capabilities being present, monetary 
transfers will arguably result in no increase in quality of life, therefore what policy should be 
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focusing on is providing, and insuring against the barriers to, capabilities. This is therefore 
an area where intervention has the potential to make a difference: it would require a further 
understanding of why capabilities fail at the level of communities and individuals, and would 
represent a departure from the traditional form of policy intervention in the UK  (Parekh, 
MacInnes et al. 2010), but might be an area where interventions could bring about much 
more tangible results for individuals.  Enabling someone to choose how to live her or his life 
is better than providing monetary social transfers when that choice is not present. 
Policy relevance and extensions 
The most obvious policy implication of the researched contained here is that – on the basis 
that policy aims to improve lives – the poverty line may not be the best treatment indicator 
for very low income without an idea of what the effects it has on individuals are.  Individuals 
do not know whether they are above or below this arbitrary standard, therefore don’t know 
they are ‘poor’; simply put, it is not meaningful to them.   Non-monetary and multi-
dimensional measures of poverty may be more relevant individually, as Sen (1985) argues 
that people experience poverty as limitations on what they can be and do.  Where there are 
barriers to beings and doings, money isn’t always going to be the answer.   
Capabilities have not been given a great deal of attention in the developed world, however 
the implications of the research here are that this should change.  What people are able to 
be and do is not something limited to less developed countries, and limiting human potential 
is arguably a failure of any state.  The Households Below Average Income data collected by 
the DWP does include the collection of some material deprivation data, but this focuses 
more on what people have rather than what they can do. 
Other than Anand et al (2007) there has not been any attempt to measure capabilities, 
leaving researchers to extract capability information from datasets that are not designed with 
that purpose in mind. Nonetheless, some of the capabilities within Nussbaum’s list are 
individually significant determinants of wellbeing; the majority of the capabilities measured 
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here were significant as was a count variable of the total capabilities; losing capabilities 
significantly affects individual wellbeing too, asymmetrically, and more so than losing 
income.  Governments should not therefore ignore the potential of capabilities in improving 
individual lives and improving society as a whole.   
Sen refrained from developing a list of capabilities on the basis that what is important should 
be debated and refined democratically through consensus building. Furthermore, although 
Nussbaum’s (2011) list is a starting point, she argues that the list is a minimum, open to 
interpretation and further specification. This provides the possibility to consider further 
development of lists at community level, where capability failures are seen to be significant 
and detrimental to wellbeing.  Repeating this exercise over time would allow researchers to 
investigate persistence of, and adaptation to the effects of capability failures.  Individuals 
therefore should have a role to specify what is important to them in their quest to live a good 
live.  Although expensive on a national scale, it is not impossible for this to happen in the UK 
or in any developed country:  in a society where we can ask one population whether it wants 
to be independent from another, we can ask it what a good life is.  This would be 
groundbreaking:  a country that didn’t just throw money at those with low income but instead 
asked people what they wanted to be and do and removed the barriers to those individuals 
achieving a good life regardless of their income. 
Developing a set of beings and doings that would give people the opportunity to lead a good 
life is therefore the most important extension to this research.  We could begin with 
Nussbaum’s list, or develop our own list, and use that on a representative scale to see 
where society was failing.  Only then would we be able to remove the barriers to human 
flourishing and enable society to be truly ‘good’.   
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